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INTRODUCTION 
Congress is more ideologically polarized now than at any time in the 
modern regulatory era,1 which makes legislation ever harder to pass.2 One of 
the consequences of this congressional dysfunction is a reduced probability 
that Congress will update regulatory legislation in response to significant 
new economic, scientific, or technological developments. This predicament, 
we argue here, has important implications for the federal agencies charged 
 
1 By “the modern regulatory era,” we mean the period from the 1960s to the present; the data 
on polarization, however, show that Congress is more polarized now than at any time since well 
before World War II. For evidentiary support for this claim, see infra Part II.  
2 See Chris Cillizza, The Least Productive Congress Ever, WASH. POST ( July 17, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/17/the-least-productive-congress-ever/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J2XV-EJRH (noting that the 112th Congress passed fewer bills than 
any Congress “since they began keeping these stats way back in 1947” and ascribing the problem in 
part to “factionalism”). 
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with implementing statutes over time and for courts adjudicating challenges 
to agency statutory implementation.3  
We explain how federal agencies coping with new regulatory challenges 
often encounter problems of “fit” with older statutes, which require them to 
make delicate legal and political judgments in the face of congressional 
silence. And we show how, following the Goldilocks principle, agencies seek 
to get this process just right by balancing the perceived need for regulatory 
innovation with a concern about potential overreach.  
Agencies, we claim, do not simply “go for broke” when wrestling with 
problems of fit. Instead they proceed strategically, cognizant of the prefer-
ences of their political overseers and the risk of being overturned in the 
courts. Sometimes agencies interpret their enabling legislation so as to 
expand their jurisdiction; other times, agencies manage problems of fit by 
intentionally shrinking their jurisdiction, proceeding incrementally, and 
engaging in deliberate restraint.4 Our examples show that agencies can be 
persistent, flexible, bold, cautious, expert, political, and, above all, strategic. 
The examples also suggest that even—and perhaps especially—when 
adapting old statutes to new problems, agencies are surprisingly accountable, 
not just to the President, but also to Congress, the courts, and the public. 
There is a significant literature on statutory “obsolescence,” dating to the 
1920s, on which we hope to build, in which prominent jurists, such as 
Roscoe Pound, Justice Cardozo, and Judge Calabresi, lamented “static law” 
and expounded on the need to update regularly both common law and 
statutes.5 This literature has historically focused on the role of the judge in 
statutory interpretation; the central debate has been over the extent to 
which judges should feel free to declare law obsolete and fill in the gaps 
themselves. Judge Calabresi’s seminal work on outdated statutes, which 
 
3 These new developments might stem from changing economic or social circumstances 
beyond those anticipated or fully addressed by the statute, technological innovation or evolving 
scientific understandings that change the circumstances on the ground, or new information about 
the costs and benefits of different regulatory strategies based on experience with them over time.  
4 For an article describing agency techniques of strategic restraint, inaction, and delay as 
salutary rather than evidence of shirking, see Sharon Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive 
Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
5 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 33 (1982); 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921) (“Legislature and 
courts move on in proud and silent isolation.”); Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges 
Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792 (1963) (“What I do lament is 
that the legislator has diminished the role of the judge by occupying vast fields and then has failed 
to keep them ploughed.”); Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 142, 
144 (1920) (describing “institutions, doctrines, and rules which have survived the original reasons 
of their contrivance . . . , but now impede effective administration of justice”). 
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spawned considerable commentary,6 was unambiguously negative about the 
prospect of agencies filling those gaps; he was skeptical that agency officials 
are adequately trained or sufficiently independent to assess legal principles 
and make accurate findings of obsolescence. More recently, however, legal 
scholars have recognized that the agencies entrusted by Congress with 
statutory implementation may in fact be the most appropriate “statutory 
updaters” in our separation of powers system, because they are more nimble 
than Congress, more accountable than courts, and more expert than both in 
responding to changing conditions.7 The discussion about statutory obsoles-
cence overlaps naturally with the vast literature on statutory interpretation; 
both lead inexorably to debates over the merits of different interpretive 
methodologies and the normative justification for more or less deferential 
judicial review. 
Yet while this literature has identified the problem of static statutes, it 
has not fully explored the implications for agencies and courts in an era of 
unprecedented congressional paralysis. Indeed, because of its historical 
origins and the limitations of available institutional reforms, congressional 
paralysis is likely to be enduring.8 The challenge of managing statutes over 
time is profoundly important in a period of rapid change and limited 
congressional productivity. When agencies charged with a regulatory 
 
6 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (arguing 
against roving authority to engage in judicial common law revision of statutes); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 n.7, 1530-34 (1987) 
(advocating for judges to engage in dynamic statutory interpretation to counteract the effect of 
legislative inattention to general public interests, claiming that judges are more trustworthy than 
agencies because they are less influenced by regulated groups, and expressing the view that his 
proposal “stops far short” of Calabresi’s proposal); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal 
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 197 
(1986) (criticizing Calabresi’s proposal on grounds that the concept of “statutory obsolescence” is 
too vague to constrain judicial behavior, among other reasons); Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands 
of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 540-43 (1982) (reviewing CALABRESI, supra note 5) 
(proposing an alternative solution to the problem of obsolescence, namely that lawmakers make 
“specific and limited delegations” of updating power to courts). 
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Shuren, Essay, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to 
Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292 (2001) (“[O]ne of the primary reasons for 
granting agencies broad judicial deference in the implementation of statutory mandates is that 
agencies are the governmental entities best equipped to respond to changing circumstances.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2102-03 (1990) 
(concluding that agencies “are far better situated than courts to soften statutory rigidities or to 
adapt their terms to unanticipated conditions” due to their “fact-finding capacities, electoral 
accountability, and continuing attention to changed circumstances”). 
8 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy 
in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (2011) (arguing that polarization cannot be addressed 
effectively by various institutional solutions, is caused by long-term historical processes, and is 
likely to be enduring). 
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mission fail to address new policy problems that arguably fall within their 
core domain, society might be deprived of important gains—public health, 
safety, environmental benefits, consumer protection, and market efficien-
cies—which may be hard to recapture later. Yet if agencies exceed their legal 
authority when addressing new problems, they realize our worst fears about 
bureaucracy run amok.9  
This is of course the central challenge posed by the modern administrative 
state: how to balance the pragmatic need for administrative flexibility with 
respect for the rule of law and democratic values. Our point is simply that 
typical statutory obsolescence made worse by atypical congressional dysfunc-
tion puts tremendous pressure on agencies to do something to address new 
problems, making that central challenge all the more acute. 
We focus on examples from environmental law and energy law, the regu-
latory domains we know best. Congress has not passed a major environmental 
statute in nearly a quarter-century, nor has it produced more than incremental 
reforms to federal energy legislation during that time, despite dramatic 
technological, economic, and social changes in these fields that would seem 
to demand a legislative response. There are notable instances in other fields, 
such as telecommunications10 and food and drug regulation,11 where agencies 
 
9 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in City of Arlington, 
[t]he administrative state “wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily 
life.” The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s “vast and varied federal bu-
reaucracy” and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, 
social, and political activities. . . . It would be a bit much to describe the result as 
“the very definition of tyranny,” but the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.  
City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878-79 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). But cf. Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (Roberts, J.) (adopting an expansive view of FERC’s authority under the Federal Power Act 
to spread the costs of new transmission investment). 
10 The Communications Act is arguably again out of date, as the FCC continues to strain to 
adapt it to emerging technologies. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(rejecting the FCC’s attempt to adopt “net neutrality” rules requiring broadband providers to 
adhere to open-access network requirements given that only common carriers are subject to such 
requirements and the FCC did not classify broadband providers as such). 
11 The FDA’s governing statute has been amended in numerous small ways over the years, 
but there have also been long periods during which the FDA struggled to implement the statute 
under the supervision of the courts. See Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney 
Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 3-13 (1988) (recounting the FDA’s struggle to adapt the language of the “Delaney Clause,” 
which prohibited FDA approval of food additives that “induce cancer,” when post-enactment 
advances in science revealed a multitude of popular food additives pose at least a minimal risk of 
cancer). The food safety regime under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was not 
significantly updated until 2011. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 
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have been left for relatively long periods to adapt existing law to new 
challenges, leading to problems of fit between an older statute and contem-
porary reality.12 The same might be said for financial regulation, which has 
failed to keep pace with market innovation, leaving the responsible regulatory 
agencies scrambling to adapt old tools to new problems.13 Thus, the lessons 
learned about the consequences of congressional dysfunction in the envi-
ronment and energy domains may apply more generally to policymaking in 
other fast-moving fields where Congress fails to “modernize” statutes on a 
regular basis.  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we describe how Congress’s 
capacity to enact legislation has diminished over time. Drawing on theoretical 
and empirical work by political scientists, we illustrate why congressional 
gridlock has reached levels unseen in the last fifty years. Briefly stated, 
Congress’s ability to cobble together legislative majorities has traditionally 
been a function of its ideological heterogeneity. For the last two decades, 
parties have been at once more ideologically homogenous and farther apart 
ideologically than at any time in the modern regulatory era, making legislative 
action more difficult and leaving agencies to deal with new policy problems 
using old and aging statutory mandates.  
In Part III, we provide two detailed examples of how federal agencies 
have responded to problems of bad fit by adapting existing laws to new 
challenges: the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) implementation 
 
Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2012)); see 
also infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
12 In the mid-twentieth century, Congress repeatedly failed to amend the Federal Communi-
cations Act in the face of sweeping technological and economic innovations, despite numerous 
pleas from both the FCC and commentators. As a result, the FCC struggled to apply its dated 
statute to modern radio, television, and cable, and the D.C. Circuit often overruled its efforts. See 
John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case Study of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L. REV. 143, 146-47 (2000) (describing a fifty-year period during 
which Congress repeatedly rebuffed FCC appeals to modernize the Communications Act to 
address new technologies, leaving the FCC to “stagger blindly” on its own); see also Jessica Litman, 
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 342-54 (1989) (noting that new 
communications media and increased private use outpaced the inflexible statutory provisions in 
the Copyright Act of 1976).  
13 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role 
of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 673-74 (1987). Only after the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 did Congress adopt a variety of reforms intended to curb the risks of 
new financial products (such as mortgage-backed securities) and new market practices (such as 
proprietary trading by banks) that had produced extremely high systemic risk. See Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C. (2012)).  
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of the Clean Air Act (CAA)14 to address climate change and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) implementation of the Federal 
Power Act (FPA)15 to modernize electricity policy. The two examples are 
not identical. EPA’s authority under the CAA has remained literally 
unchanged for over twenty years, while Congress has modified FERC’s 
authority over electric power in targeted ways over that time. Still, they 
illustrate a common problem. In both policy domains, the responsible 
federal agencies have had to wrestle with the rise of important new problems 
requiring attention, but in neither domain has Congress spoken decisively 
and comprehensively about the central pressing issues.  
In Part IV, we discuss the implications of this dynamic for the institutions 
in our separation of powers scheme: the President, Congress, the courts, 
and the agencies. It stands to reason that if Congress is unable to speak via 
legislation, agencies face a reduced likelihood that their decisions will be 
overridden. To the extent that agencies do the President’s bidding, congres-
sional weakness can also enhance presidential influence over policy. Of 
course, the courts become relatively more important too, since they will 
decide whether an agency may follow the course it has chosen.  
Put most plainly, congressional dysfunction invites agencies and courts 
to do the work of updating statutes. We argue that agencies are better suited 
than courts to do that updating work and that the case for deferring to 
agencies in that task is stronger than ever with Congress largely absent from 
the policymaking process. Indeed, because the agency is the legally desig-
nated custodian of the statute (so designated by the enacting Congress), the 
agency has the superior claim to interpret the statute’s application to new 
problems during periods of congressional quiescence. Persistent congres-
sional gridlock also means that agency policy initiatives that do survive 
judicial review could prove to be quite durable. Once an agency charts a 
new policy course, and the regulated community begins to respond, it may 
be difficult to reverse the consequences. In this way, an agency’s adaptive 
strategy is not merely a stopgap; it meaningfully changes the policy status 
quo, reconfiguring the options for Congress should it ultimately choose to 
act.  
 
14 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
15 Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–
828c (2012)). 
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I. CONGRESSIONAL “DYSFUNCTION” 
A central premise of our argument is that Congress’s capacity to react to 
changed circumstances by lawmaking has diminished sharply over time, 
particularly its ability to respond to new developments that arise at the 
intersection of environmental and energy policy. We are not the first to 
recognize the lack of congressional action in these fields. Others have 
lamented the failure of Congress to pass major environmental legislation 
over the past two decades, particularly legislation addressing climate change, 
but also legislation to update environmental statutes last amended in the 
1970s and 1980s.16 Congress has produced a few pieces of significant energy 
legislation over that same time period,17 but in both the energy policy and 
environmental policy realms, Congress appears to have lost the capacity to 
react to new policy challenges as efficiently or effectively as it did in the 
past. 
A. Congressional (Un)Responsiveness 
The twentieth century is replete with examples of Congress responding 
to emerging energy and environmental policy exigencies with legislation. 
For example, New Deal energy legislation like the FPA and the Natural Gas 
Act of 1938 (NGA)18 responded to concerns about state regulation of energy 
in interstate commerce,19 market power of public utilities,20 and the need for 
federal coordination of rapidly changing energy technologies, such as 
 
16 See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles for Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 253, 253-54 (2013) (claiming that “[m]ajor environmental policy reform is long 
overdue” and lamenting the application of twentieth century regulatory measures to twenty-first 
century problems); Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for 
the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (“For almost 20 years, 
political polarization and a lack of leadership have left environmental protection in the United 
States burdened with obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies.”). 
17 See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
18 Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z 
(2012)). 
19 The Federal Power Act, in particular, was partly a response to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-
90 (1927) (striking down state regulation of cross-border electricity sales on Commerce Clause 
grounds); see also Natural Gas: Hearing on H.R. 11662 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 13 (1936) (statement of Dozier A. DeVane, Solicitor, 
Fed. Power Comm’n) (discussing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
20 The Supreme Court has said that the primary aim of the NGA was “to protect consumers 
against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.” Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural 
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610-11 (1944). 
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natural gas pipelines.21 Likewise, the CAA of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 
1972 (CWA),22 and the spate of environmental legislation of the 1970s23 
embody Congress’s response to newly understood threats to health and the 
environment posed by pollution.24 These examples were more than legisla-
tive tinkering; they were legislative responses to important new problems. 
Moreover, until the mid-1990s, Congress showed the willingness and 
ability to modify these existing regulatory regimes in substantive ways as 
necessary to adapt to new and changing understandings of the policy 
environment. For example, Congress amended the CAA a mere seven years 
after its passage to fill gaps it had identified in the statute.25 Congress 
amended the statute again in 1990 in response to a newly understood air 
pollution problem (acid rain) and to dissatisfaction with aspects of EPA’s 
regulation of toxic air emissions under the law.26 Similarly, Congress 
responded to the energy crises of the late 1970s by passing the Natural Gas 
 
21 In section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, Congress delegated to FERC the power to site interstate 
natural gas pipelines, in part because natural gas (unlike electricity) could not be produced 
everywhere it was needed, therefore necessitating transmission of natural gas across state lines. See 
15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2012). A variety of other New Deal-era statutes addressed energy needs. See, 
e.g., Rural Electrification Act of 1936, ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 901–918c (2012)) (seeking to promote electricity service in rural areas not served by investor-
owned utilities); National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 701–712 (1934)) (seeking to relieve boom-bust cycles and price volatility in the 
domestic oil production industry), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (overturning the law on nondelegation grounds).  
22 Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)).  
23 The period from 1969 through 1980 is sometimes referred to as “the environmental decade.” 
See generally LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 1, 15-19 (1982) 
(chronicling the proliferation of environmental laws in the decade following the passage of the 
National Environmental Policy Act in 1969).  
24 Several other foundational environmental laws were enacted during this period, including 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)), the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2012)), the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901–6987 (2012)), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012)), better known as “Superfund.” 
25 Among other things, the 1977 amendments codified the “prevention of significant deterio-
ration” (PSD) permit program, which imposed emissions limits on sources of air pollution in 
attainment areas—that is, areas in compliance with national ambient air quality standards. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492 (2012). 
26 The 1990 amendments established the acid rain program for coal-fired power plants, see 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7651–76510 (2012), and strengthened the regulation of toxic emissions by listing 189 
specific toxics and substituting technology-based standards for health-based ones, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412 (2012). 
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Policy Act of 197827 and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(PURPA)28 to promote the development of domestic energy sources and 
new, cleaner sources of electricity. All of this legislative activity helped guide 
the agencies to which Congress had delegated regulatory responsibility over 
these problems—EPA and FERC—as they tackled these new environmental 
and energy challenges, respectively. 
Since the mid-1990s, EPA and FERC have continued to confront new 
and important environmental and energy challenges, but Congress has been 
largely absent from the policy response. During this time, we have come to 
new and better understandings of the ways in which our use of energy poses 
significant threats to our environment, health, and security. Just as a scientific 
consensus coalesced in the 1980s around the conclusions that acid rain was a 
real problem caused by emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides29 
and that a variety of common aerosol products were eroding the stratospheric 
ozone layer,30 a new scientific consensus coalesced in the first few years of the 
twenty-first century around the conclusion that greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, largely from burning fossil fuels for energy consumption, are 
driving climate change.31 Unlike the cases of acid rain and ozone depletion, 
 
27 The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3432 (2012)), was a response to the natural gas price spikes and shortages of 
the 1970s, which were themselves, by most accounts, the product of regulatory dysfunction caused 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of 
the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 18 (1987) (noting that in 1954, “the federal 
government began regulating the price of all producer sales of gas for resale in interstate 
commerce under the Natural Gas Act”).  
28 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 
43 U.S.C. (2012)), established incentives for the construction of non-utility-owned electric 
generating facilities using renewable resources or more efficient technologies.  
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2012) (finding that “acidic compounds . . . in the atmos-
phere . . . represent[] a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public 
health” and that “the principal sources of the acidic compounds and their precursors in the atmos-
phere are emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from the combustion of fossil fuels”). 
30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671a–7671q (2012) (authorizing EPA to phase out production and import 
of ozone depleting substances); Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). 
31 See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, 37 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (stating that warming of the climate system is “unequiv-
ocal” and reporting with “very high confidence” that the net effect of human activities since 1750, 
primarily fossil fuel use, has been one of warming); see also CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 17 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), available at http:// 
www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf (reporting that human 
activities are the dominant cause of observed warming since the twentieth century). 
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however, the identification of the problem has not been followed by a 
congressional policy response.  
Over the same period of time, technology and competition transformed 
electricity markets. A drastic increase in the number and distance of bulk 
power sales now strain an aging transmission system; meanwhile, revolu-
tionary technological innovations known collectively as the “smart grid,” and 
a sea change in thinking about the role of competition and market pricing in 
those markets, has transformed them in other ways.32 Congress’s responses 
to these developments have stopped short of giving FERC the clear guidance 
it needs to adapt to these changing circumstances. As the agencies charged 
with primary responsibility for managing this new policy environment, 
EPA and FERC have tried to discharge what they see as their statutory 
responsibilities nonetheless, prompting concern that they may be stretching 
their statutes too far. 
B. Legislative Action and Gridlock 
Of course, the policymaking process has always been characterized by 
principal–agent problems that can grow more pronounced as time passes. 
Congress routinely delegates regulatory authority and policy discretion to 
agencies, and statutes perpetually age, raising questions about how well they 
“fit” the new circumstances.33 Yet we contend that these fit problems are more 
severe now than at any time in the modern regulatory era. Understanding the 
basis for this claim requires an explanation of the determinants of legislative 
action—the conditions under which legislation is more or less likely to pass 
and how those conditions have changed over time. 
Political scientists offer competing explanations of why regulatory legis-
lation passes or fails to pass at any given point in time. Rational choice 
models (and other approaches based on purposive behavior) conceive of the 
legislative process as the product of pressure exerted by interest groups on 
legislators concerned with reelection. This family of explanations, which 
 
32 See infra Section II.B. 
33 Over time, circumstances change, and the preferences of voters, regulatory agencies, and 
successive congresses may diverge from those of the enacting Congress, while agencies continue to 
operate under the legislative mandate established by the enacting Congress. Some scholars call this 
“legislative drift” or “coalitional drift.” See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on 
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and 
Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 503-07 (1989) 
(noting the “multifaceted nature of ‘drift’” and the inseparability of bureaucratic and legislative 
drift); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 94-99 (1992) (critiquing the use of procedural rules to address 
bureaucratic drift).  
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includes both traditional interest group theory and public choice models,34 
emphasizes the advantages that smaller, more tightly organized groups (like 
business interests) have in the contest to influence legislative decisions.35 
Such groups may be able to use their advantages to kill or forestall regulatory 
legislation. By contrast, organization theorists conceive of the policy process 
as far more anarchic—the product of inertia, luck, and other forces.36 For 
example, the “garbage can model” of politics posits the existence of 
“streams” of problems, politics, and policies that must intersect in particular 
ways in order to produce legislative decisions.37 Only rarely, say organization 
theorists, do these conditions exist.  
Despite their differences, however, both sets of models explain the passage 
of major regulatory legislation as the product of interaction between public 
pressure and a partisan environment in Congress that is conducive to 
building a majority. In group pressure and rational choice models, the 
advantages enjoyed by business interests can be overcome when siding with 
business interests exposes legislators to electoral risk.38 This can happen 
when an issue becomes particularly salient and important to the general 
public. Public pressure, however, is necessary but not sufficient to produce 
 
34 For a summary of the enormous public choice literature on delegation to agencies, see 
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 
102-06 (2000). 
35 Mancur Olson’s analysis of group formation implied that policy processes would systemat-
ically undervalue the preferences of large diffuse groups compared with those of small cohesive 
groups. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 128 (1965). For a good 
summary of economic analysis of interest groups following Olson, see RUSSELL HARDIN, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 (1982), which offers a discussion Olson’s work on the relationship 
between group size and group success, and TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY 
AND APPLICATIONS 63-94 (1992), for information on developments in collective action theory.  
36 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 124-31 (2d ed. 
2003); Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 
2 (1972) (“[O]ne can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of 
problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated.”); Charles E. Lindblom, 
The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 81-83 (1959) (describing the method 
of successive limited comparisons and its role in policy formulation); Herbert A. Simon, The 
Proverbs of Administration, 6 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 53, 62-67 (1946) (addressing criticisms of the 
administrative theory and proposing broader solutions).  
37 KINGDON, supra note 36, at 87. For a critique of Kingdon’s model, see Gary Mucciaroni, 
The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A Critique, 24 POLITY 459, 466-67, 473-74 
(1992), where Mucciaroni criticizes the model’s indeterminacy and questions its usefulness. 
38 Scholars sometimes call these groundswells of public interest “republican moments.” This 
idea comes from James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the 
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 310-13 (1990). Dan Farber adapted it to 
environmental politics in Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66-67 (1992). 
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legislative action. Public concern must actually produce electoral risk for a 
sufficient number of otherwise reluctant legislators to produce legislation.  
Garbage can models describe this same phenomenon as the product of 
policy cycles.39 In other words, legislation (rather than inaction) is the likely 
outcome when (i) people perceive the problem as important, (ii) the policy 
community has identified the apparent solution, and (iii) the partisan political 
environment is conducive to the formation of a legislative majority.40  
These explanations imply that regulatory change is possible given the 
right combinations of public pressure and partisan conductivity: that is, when 
the partisan environment in Congress is particularly conducive to regulatory 
change, less public pressure is required; when the partisan environment is 
particularly resistant, it takes more public pressure to produce that change. 
This theory easily explains the environmental and energy legislation of the 
1970s. In the early 1970s, high-profile pollution problems led voters to 
perceive air and water pollution problems as serious, leading to the passage 
of the CAA, CWA, and other environmental laws.41 Likewise, when energy 
supply and security issues became salient to voters in the late 1970s, Congress 
responded by passing the energy legislation of the Carter administration.42 
These laws were passed in large part because politicians responded to 
bottom-up electoral pressure and cobbled together legislative majorities that 
crossed party lines.  
 
39 KINGDON, supra note 36, at 93. Economist Anthony Downs, a rational choice political 
theorist, also conceived of republican moments as cyclical. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with 
Ecology—The “Issue-Attention Cycle,” 28 PUB. INT. 38, 38-43 (1972) (noting that only during times 
of intense public pressure for action is it possible to overcome the usual legislative inertia and 
produce major regulatory legislation). 
40 Cf. supra note 39. 
41 See Farber, supra note 38, at 67-69. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. 
Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-334 (1985) (noting that public pressure to fix pollution problems led to 
stringent environmental legislation). 
42 Carter-era energy legislation included major regulatory initiatives like the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301–
3432 (2012)), which deregulated wellhead prices of natural gas, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8484 
(2012)), which restricts uses of natural gas, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 
U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C. (2012)), which established incentives for alternative 
energy projects. Earlier in the decade, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
(2012), 42 U.S.C. (2012), and 50 U.S.C. App. (2006)), creating national fuel economy standards for 
automobiles (commonly known as “CAFE standards”) and establishing the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve. 
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Today the political environment in Congress is far less conducive to legis-
lation than it was in the 1970s or than it was even two decades ago. This is 
because Congress is more likely to produce legislation, all else equal, when 
the ideological middle in Congress is strong—that is, when legislators’ 
preferences are not ideologically polarized. Today, however, the ideological 
middle is unprecedentedly weak and growing weaker. 
As illustrated in the Appendix, spatial modeling and data on congres-
sional ideology, drawn from a burgeoning literature in political science, can 
demonstrate more precisely why this is true.43 To summarize the key 
insight, imagine a legislative chamber in which the preferences of legislators 
are distributed normally (as a bell curve) along an ideological dimension 
from left to right, with some members of the left-leaning party lying to the 
right of some members of the right-leaning party. Now imagine a second 
legislative chamber in which the distribution of preferences is bimodal, with 
all the members of one party clustered near the left pole and all the members 
of the other party clustered near the right pole. Assume that in both 
legislatures there is a majority party that controls the legislative agenda and 
that the minority may prevent legislative action by a filibuster that can be 
overcome only by supermajority vote.  
It is not difficult to intuit why, at any given level of public or interest-
group pressure to change the status quo policy, passing legislation to do so 
will be more difficult in the second chamber than in the first. In the second 
chamber, each party’s preferences lie far from the middle, making any 
proposal to move the policy closer to the middle that much more unappealing 
to party members. In such a situation, the majority party is more likely to 
use its agenda-setting power to prevent consideration of, or the minority 
party is more likely to filibuster, any such proposals. Political scientists refer 
to this domain of policies that cannot be moved toward the center as the 
“gridlock interval.”44  
By any of several measures, Congress is more ideologically polarized 
(and the gridlock interval larger) than ever before in the modern regulatory 
era. The parties have grown steadily farther apart ideologically since the 
1970s, making bipartisan action to address important problems significantly 
more difficult. A large and growing academic literature has documented this  
 
 
43 See Appendix. 
44 For an overview of the literature from which this notion is derived, and for a fuller and 
more precise explanation of this intuition, see id. 
  
2014] Old Statutes, New Problems 15 
 
growing polarization.45 Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s DW-
NOMINATE dataset places members of Congress on an ideological 
spectrum based upon members’ voting behavior,46 and Poole and Rosenthal 
conclude from their data that polarization in Congress is at its highest level 
since the end of Reconstruction.47  
This situation stands in stark contrast with the 1970s, when a Republican 
(Richard Nixon) created EPA and a Democrat (Jimmy Carter) signed 
legislation to deregulate portions of the natural gas industry. As late as the 
early 1990s, the Republican George H.W. Bush signed major CAA amend-
ments and ran for office claiming to be “the environmental president.”48 
Today, not only are the parties’ ideologies farther apart, there are also fewer 
moderates of either party in Congress. Based on the Poole and Rosenthal 
data, it appears that moderates in the House and Senate have fallen from 
more than thirty percent in both chambers in 1970 to less than ten percent 
in both chambers today.49  
This is not to say that Congress is incapable of enacting regulatory legis-
lation. Rather, the current partisan and ideological makeup of Congress 
 
45 For an overview of the data on and theories of congressional polarization, and for an appli-
cation of some of those data to the theories, see JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE 
ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 82-96 (1995); KEITH T. 
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & CONGRESS 301-05 (2d rev. ed. 2007); SEAN M. 
THERAIULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 11-42 (2008); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. 
Abrams, Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008) (highlighting 
a divergence between elite polarization and mass polarization); Morris P. Fiorina, Whatever 
Happened to the Median Voter? (Oct. 2, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://web.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/Fiorina%20Web%20Files/MedianVoterPaper.pdf (discussing possible 
explanations for increasing polarization between candidates). 
46 For a thorough explanation of these data and how they document increasing polarization 
in American politics, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, 
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 15-70 (2006). For a 
striking visual illustration of polarization in Congress, see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & 
Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, VOTEVIEW.COM, 
http://voteview.com/polarizedamerica.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9X5B-8XY4.  
47 See MCCARTY, POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 46, at 23-28. 
48 Lynda Lee Kaid et al., An Analysis of George Bush’s 1988 and 1992 Campaign Advertising: 
Revisiting the Definition of a Presidential Candidate, in HONOR AND LOYALTY: INSIDE THE 
POLITICS OF THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE 8 (Leslie D. Feldman & Rosanna 
Perotti eds., 2002). 
49 See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, 
VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp (last updated Jan. 19, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/CA74-8R6E. There are a number of competing explanations for why ideologi-
cal polarization has intensified, including safer and more homogenous legislative districts and 
institutional changes in Congress that strengthen veto points in the policy process, leading 
members to behave in more partisan and retributive ways and making them less willing to share 
credit and compromise to enact legislation. See generally supra note 45.  
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renders such action much less likely, all else equal, than at any time in the 
modern regulatory era. Certainly, highly salient emergencies can create the 
kind of electoral risk that motivates members of Congress to reach agree-
ment, or (in the language of garbage can models) causes the streams of 
problems, politics, and policies to intersect in ways that produce significant 
legislation. The Dodd–Frank Act, for example, which responded to the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009, seems to have been the result of this dynamic,50 
and there are other examples as well.51 Many of the agency policy choices we 
examine in this Article, however, arise at the intersection of the environment 
and energy (GHG regulation, renewable energy, conservation), where the 
partisan divide seems especially wide and strong and where debates over 
fundamental issues, such as the scientific basis for regulatory action, are 
particularly intense.52 This suggests that an especially significant and salient 
 
50 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C. (2012)). The financial crisis of 2008–2009 
mobilized public support for additional regulation of the financial services industry, and the support 
was sufficiently strong to overcome prior partisan divisions on the issue. Cf., e.g., Karlyn Bowman & 
Andrew Rugg, 5 Years After the Crash, What Do Americans Think of Wall Street, Banks, and Free 
Enterprise?, AMERICAN (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.american.com/archive/2013/september/five-years-
after-the-crash-what-do-americans-think-of-wall-street-banks-and-free-enterprise, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/ZZ3R-ZT84 (summarizing public opinion toward Wall Street before and after the financial 
crisis).  
51 Congress finally updated the FDCA in the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C. (2012)). The 2011 reforms shifted the FDA’s focus from reactive to preventive, expanded 
FDA powers to inspect and recall, established risk-based priorities, and addressed major weak-
nesses in import safety assurances. These changes were in part a response to a number of crises 
involving contamination, but also were prompted by developments such as greater consumption of 
imported and unprocessed foods, new technologies like genetically modified organisms, and an 
evolution in regulatory thinking about the benefits of risk analysis and cost–benefit analysis. 
52 For example, Republican leaders in Congress continue to express skepticism about climate 
science and oppose GHG regulation on that basis, despite an overwhelming scientific consensus that 
the climate is warming largely as result of human fossil fuel consumption. See, e.g., Ned Resnikoff, 
Senate Committee Again Debates Existence of Climate Change, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/ 
all/senate-republicans-what-climate-change (last updated Jan. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
C25R-6YCN (highlighting Senator Jim Inhofe’s view that climate change science is a hoax); see also 
BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 31 (summarizing the scientific consensus); NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESS-
MENT & DEV. ADVISORY COMM., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REPORT: DRAFT FOR 
PUBLIC COMMENT 25, 27 (2013), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/sites/globalchange/files/ 
NCAJan11-2013-publicreviewdraft-chap2-climate.pdf (stating that “[g]lobal climate is changing now” 
and the “primary drivers of [climate] change are human in origin”). Poole and Rosenthal describe the 
ideological divide captured by their data as one centered on the role of government intervention in 
the economy. See Royce Carroll et al., DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, 
VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/95KT-5MZN (“[T]he first dimension can be interpreted in most periods as 
government intervention in the economy or liberal-conservative in the modern era.”). Because 
 
  
2014] Old Statutes, New Problems 17 
 
crisis would be required to produce congressional action in these policy 
domains.  
II. POLICYMAKING IN THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESS 
The obsolescence of numerous federal environmental statutes initially 
passed in the 1970s has already prompted significant academic commentary 
and spurred a number of reform proposals.53 Time, science, and experience 
have revealed many deficiencies in this suite of laws, some of which can be 
addressed administratively, but many of which require congressional action. 
Commentators have noted, for example, that the CWA would benefit from 
a substantial update to address modern challenges.54 The CAA too, which 
has produced both the most beneficial and the most costly federal regula-
tions,55 has not been amended since 1990 and could use an overhaul to fix 
flawed programs and address new problems.56 The Endangered Species Act 
 
regulation of the energy industry provides a diffuse public benefit while ostensibly imposing 
concentrated costs on firms, it seems like a quintessential example of a policy domain in which the 
divide is growing wider.  
53 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL  
REFORM FOR THE NEW CONGRESS AND ADMINISTRATION (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Breaking 
the Logjam Project ed., 2009), available at http://www.breakingthelogjam.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/23/2014/06/BreakingLogjamReportfinal.pdf (proposing specific reforms targeted at 
improving the efficiency and efficacy of environmental regulations). For a comprehensive set of 
recommendations on these topics and many others (not exclusively aimed at Congress but 
including many recommendations for federal legislation), see BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., AMERICA’S 
ENERGY RESURGENCE: SUSTAINING SUCCESS, CONFRONTING CHALLENGES (2013), available at 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20SEPI%20Energy%20Report%202013.pdf. 
54 For example, recent science has suggested that the CWA’s assumption that waters could be 
returned to their full state of integrity was an unrealistic one. See Adler, supra note 16, at 260-61. 
Scholars have also pointed out that Congress did not fully recognize the dynamic nature of aquatic 
ecosystems in enacting the CWA, and misguidedly focused on concepts of stability and equilibrium 
rather than resilience. While the CWA was written primarily to address industrial water pollution, 
urban sprawl is currently the more pressing challenge to protection of waterways. The CWA is 
also faulted for failing to protect marine ecosystems adequately, see Robin Kundis Craig, Climate 
Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 914 (2008), and for 
not taking climate change explicitly into account, see H. M. Zamudio, Note, Predicting the Future 
and Acting Now: Climate Change, the Clean Water Act, and the Lake Champlain Phosphorus TMDL, 35 
VT. L. REV. 975, 994-95 (2011).  
55 See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2011 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf (concluding 
that rules from EPA produced sixty-two to eighty-four percent of the total monetized benefits and 
forty-six to fifty-three percent of the total monetized costs of all federal regulations—with most of 
the benefits and costs stemming from air quality rules). 
56 Among other things, scholars have argued that Congress should revise the New Source Review 
program—which requires sources to control their emissions as they “modify” their facilities—and the 
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(ESA), last amended in 1988, seems ripe for reconsideration as well, given 
that some of its core assumptions have been called into serious question.57 
So too with the National Environmental Policy Act (passed in 1970 and 
never substantively amended), which governs federal agency environmental 
impact assessment,58 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which 
sought to address risks to the public and the environment posed by the 
manufacture and sale of chemicals.59 These are just a few examples of 
statutes widely believed to be in need of makeovers. 
While Congress more frequently revisits energy legislation than it does  
environmental statutes, it has nevertheless let languish a host of energy-related 
policy questions in recent decades. Commentators have called for significant 
reforms to meet an array of new challenges in the energy domain. These 
include proposals to, among other things, amend the federal regulatory 
process for both onshore and offshore oil and gas drilling to respond to 
dramatic technological advances and new risks;60 address the economic and 
 
regime for addressing interstate pollution, both of which have been highly controversial, heavily 
litigated, and minimally effective. See SCHOENBROD ET AL., supra note 53, at 10-13. 
57 These assumptions include the belief that there are a limited number of species at risk of 
extinction and that recovery programs are most effective when targeted to listed species. See 
Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion Over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 490, 492-99 (2008) (noting the failings of the statute’s listing process for at-risk 
species); see also Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 182-83 (2010) (criticizing the ESA as implemented for its inflexibil-
ity). For reform proposals, see John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 572-73 (1994), where the author suggests a shift from 
focusing on endangered species to endangered ecosystems. 
58 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)); see also Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environ-
mental Policy Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 275, 290-93 (1997). 
59 TSCA’s central provisions have not been reformed since the law was first passed in 1976. 
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2012)). 
60 Congress has not updated the regulatory and liability schemes governing oil and gas extrac-
tion offshore, despite technological change that has enabled offshore drilling in environments and 
at depths previously unimaginable. To offer an illustration of the difference between past 
congresses and more recent ones, compare Congress’s response following the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in Alaska, with Congress’s reaction to the 2010 blowout in the Gulf of Mexico. After the 
Exxon Valdez spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which required new regula-
tions for oil tankers traveling in U.S. waters, adopted a liability regime for recovering damages, 
and created a national incident response system for coordinating the government’s response to oil 
spills. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 14 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 
and 46 U.S.C. App. (2012)). Yet in the wake of the 2010 Macondo well blowout—the worst oil 
spill in U.S. history—Congress took no steps to reform the existing regulatory and liability 
system, notwithstanding numerous reports, including one from a bipartisan commission created by 
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reliability implications of natural gas displacement of coal in the electric 
power sector; promote efficiency and conservation in state-level utility rate 
setting; and revise the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to address the festering 
problem of long-term storage of nuclear waste.61  
Each of these examples could merit its own article because each has  
created monumental challenges for the agencies charged with implementing 
outdated statutory provisions. Our focus here, though, is on two dramatic 
examples of agency adaptation in an era of congressional dysfunction: EPA’s 
deployment of the CAA to address climate change and FERC’s use of the 
FPA to modernize electricity policy. These examples illustrate the predicament 
in which agencies find themselves as they grapple with problems of fit and 
obsolescence. They show how agencies approach this task deliberately and 
strategically and suggest they are anything but out-of-control. The stories 
also highlight the crucial dialectic between agencies and courts, which 
determines policy during periods of congressional inaction. 
 
the President, indicating that the system had become inadequate and outdated. See NAT. COMM’N 
ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE 
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING—REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT 55-127, 249-87 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOOILCOMMIS 
SION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf (finding that numerous regulatory failures contributed 
to the spill and recommending legislation to address them). Nor has Congress responded to 
concerns that onshore drilling requires additional oversight given technological advances, such as 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which have introduced new risks at a large scale. In 
fact, so-called “fracking” is exempt from federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1860 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-9 
(2012)), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (2012)), and the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012)), and is regulated primarily by the states. See David B. Spence, 
Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 447-
52 (2013) (describing the federal regulatory regime governing fracking); Jody Freeman & David 
Spence, Should the Federal Government Regulate Fracking?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495104578314302738867078, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PW8W-TRVZ (debating the merits of federal versus state regulation). 
61 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012)). The Nuclear Waste Policy Act set a deadline of 
1998 for the federal government to take possession of the nation’s nuclear waste, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 10222 (2012), and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 created a process for 
establishing a permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 10172–10175 
(2012). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) and Department of Energy’s (DOE) 
attempts to discharge their responsibilities under these laws have been fraught with legal and 
political conflict over the Yucca Mountain site. Most recently, litigation has ensued over whether 
DOE has discretion to withdraw its license application for approval of Yucca as a repository. See In 
re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 437-38 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the NRC is required by 
statute to review DOE’s license application to use Yucca Mountain as a repository). Congress has 
remained silent on these questions throughout this decades-long ordeal. 
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A. EPA’s Application of the Clean Air Act to Climate Change 
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of an agency wrestling with 
problems of “fit” is EPA’s application of the CAA to address climate change. 
EPA undertook this task in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Court held that GHGs are “pollutants” 
subject to regulation under the CAA.62 The Court also deemed unlawful 
EPA’s policy reasons for failing to determine whether GHG emissions from 
new cars and trucks endanger public health or welfare, a threshold finding 
necessary to trigger standard-setting, and remanded the decision to EPA.63  
Following this decision, it was widely anticipated that Congress would 
amend the CAA, either to add a specific regulatory program designed to 
reduce GHGs cost-effectively or to clarify that EPA lacked the authority to 
address climate change under the existing law. Such action was believed to 
be necessary because, while it is possible to regulate GHG emissions under 
several of the CAA’s programs, and while Congress may have intended to 
provide EPA with the flexibility to address such new risks, the statute as 
written is not especially well designed for controlling GHG pollution.64 
The general consensus among economists is that an economy-wide cap-and-
trade regime, or a carbon tax, would reduce GHG emissions more cost-
effectively than deploying the CAA as-is.65  
Yet while the House of Representatives passed the American Clean  
Energy and Security Act of 2009,66 which would have established an 
 
62 549 U.S. 497, 528-32 (2007). 
63 Id. at 532-35; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(finding that “elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger the public health and to endanger the public welfare of current and future 
generations”). 
64 The statute arguably reflects a conception of air pollutants as substances that do harm 
when inhaled or ingested since it focuses on establishing both safe concentrations of so-called 
“criteria” pollutants in the ambient air (national ambient air quality standards) and emissions 
limits for both toxic and criteria pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7412 (2012). These programs 
are not well suited for GHG regulation. The CAA’s other significant programs, however, which 
establish performance standards for both mobile and stationary sources of air pollution, may have 
the flexibility to address GHG emissions effectively. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012) (establishing the 
New Source Performance Standards program); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492 (2012) (formalizing the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program); 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (addressing mobile 
sources of air pollution). Still, as we explain below, they must be adapted to do so. 
65 This consensus, however, may overstate the CAA’s inflexibility. See Nathan Richardson & 
Arthur G. Fraas, Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price 12-15 (Res. for the Future, 
Discussion Paper 13-13) (2013) (arguing that the CAA may not be as inflexible as economists 
suppose and might allow cost-effective GHG reductions, at least in the short term). 
66 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).  
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economy-wide cap-and-trade system to reduce GHGs, the bill foundered in 
the Senate.67 Numerous other proposals to adopt a modified national cap-
and-trade scheme,68 a more limited utility sector-based approach,69 a 
national clean energy standard,70 or a carbon tax71 also failed, as did efforts 
to override Massachusetts v. EPA and strip EPA of its authority to regulate 
GHGs.72 All such policies, it seems, fell within the gridlock interval. 
Without clear congressional direction then, EPA has been left to manage 
climate change with the 1990 Clean Air Act—a statute written before the 
scientific consensus on the nature and causes of climate change and its 
attendant risks had crystallized. As a result, the agency has been forced to 
engage in interpretive jujitsu to wrest a GHG control program from a 
statute not principally designed for that purpose. Part of EPA’s strategy to 
do so has been quite prosaic. For example, the agency has issued rules aimed 
at reducing conventional and toxic pollution but which would also deliver 
 
67 See id. Following passage of the House bill, the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works reported the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. 
(2010), which would have reduced GHG emissions twenty percent below 2005 levels by 2020. 
Republican committee members boycotted the markup, and the bill was not taken seriously by 
Senate leadership. See Lisa Lerer, Senators Look Past Boxer Bill, POLITICO, Nov. 6, 2009, at 1 
(describing opposition from both parties towards climate change legislation). Senators John Kerry 
(D-Mass.), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) began working on a new 
piece of climate legislation, but failed to secure a floor vote in Congress. See id.; see also Darren 
Samuelsohn, Closed-Door Talks Might Not Save Climate Bill, POLITICO, July 22, 2010, at 1 (discuss-
ing the decision to abandon a proposed climate change bill in 2010). 
68 For example, Senators Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and Susan Collins (R-Me.) argued for a 
“cap-and-dividend” proposal, under which proceeds from the purchase of carbon credits would be 
returned to U.S. taxpayers in the form of an annual dividend. Maria Cantwell & Susan Collins, 
An Energy Bill That Pays Dividends, WASH. POST, June 18, 2010, at A27. 
69 For example, Senator Tom Carper (D-Del.) proposed a multi-pollutant trading scheme. 
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 2010, S. 2995, 111th Cong. (2010). 
70 Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) introduced legislation calling for a clean energy stand-
ard of thirteen percent for 2013–2014 to increase incrementally to fifty percent in 2050. See Clean 
Energy Standard Act of 2010, S. 80, 111th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(B) (2010). An alternative proposal by 
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), based on carbon intensity, would begin at twenty-four percent 
in 2015, ramping up to eighty-four percent by 2035. See Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012, S. 
2146, 112th Cong. § 2(c)(2) (2012). 
71 Carbon taxes were introduced in Congress but failed to gain traction. For example, the 
Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Representative Pete 
Stark (D-Cal.-13) and three others, proposed a ten dollar per ton fee on carbon dioxide, increasing 
each year by ten dollars until climate objectives were met; America’s Energy Security Trust Fund 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Representative John Larson (D-Conn.-1) 
and twelve others, proposed a tax of fifteen dollars per ton, increasing by ten dollars each year; and 
the Raise Wages, Cut Carbon Act of 2009, H.R. 2380, 111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Repre-
sentatives Bob Inglis (R-S.C.-4), Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.-6), and Dan Lipinski (D-Ill.-3), proposed a 
fifteen-dollar per ton tax, increasing incrementally. None of the bills passed. 
72 See Stop the War on Coal Act, H.R. 3409, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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important GHG reduction “co-benefits.”73 Yet other aspects of EPA’s plan 
have required notable legal and technical ingenuity. And EPA has  
approached this challenge in a considered stepwise fashion. 
1. The “Tailpipe Rule” 
In response to Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA made a formal endangerment 
finding, issuing a rule stating that GHGs from new cars and trucks endanger 
health or welfare.74 This finding automatically triggered a non-discretionary 
duty under the CAA to set emission standards for these sources,75 which EPA 
promulgated in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
setting both fuel efficiency and GHG standards in the so-called “Tailpipe 
Rule.”76 This first rule regulating GHGs under the CAA was novel, taking 
the form of a joint rulemaking that harmonized the two agencies’ standards 
and created a uniform compliance program. The rule was especially notable 
because it garnered the support of the entire auto industry, which pledged 
not to challenge it if the final version substantially conformed to the 
agencies’ initial proposal.77 Importantly, the new rule rendered GHGs a 
“regulated pollutant” under the CAA for the first time, which in turn 
tripped another wire in the statute requiring the agency to set standards for 
GHG emissions from stationary sources as well.78  
 
73 For example, EPA has set national emission standards under section 112 of the CAA that 
will reduce both toxic pollutants and GHG emissions. See National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and 
Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63); see also Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,539 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
60, 63) (limiting emissions of volatile organic compounds, but in the process, requiring capture of 
methane, a potent GHG).  
74 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1). 
75 See Clean Air Act § 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).  
76 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85, 86, and 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, and 538). 
77 That proposal reflected the pains the two agencies took to ensure that every auto manufac-
turer, regardless of its product mix, could meet the stringent new requirements. See Jody Freeman, 
The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 343 346-58 (2011) (describing the unique rulemaking process and the variety of compliance 
flexibilities made available by the government). 
78 For an explanation of the trigger, see id. at 351-53. The Prevention of Significant Deterio-
ration Program in the CAA requires all new and modified sources to obtain permits and apply 
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The immediate consequence of the Tailpipe Rule was to trigger a  
permitting requirement for stationary sources of pollution under the law’s 
“prevention of significant deterioration” (PSD) program, which is aimed 
chiefly at ensuring that good quality air does not get worse because of new 
construction that brings additional air pollution. Under the PSD program, 
it is unlawful to construct or modify a “major” stationary source in certain 
areas of the country (those designated as “in attainment” with at least one 
national air pollution standard) without first obtaining a permit79 and meeting 
emission standards that reflect the “best available control technology” 
(BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the CAA.80 For 
this program, the CAA defines “major” facilities as having the potential to 
emit (depending on the type of source) either 100 or 250 tons per year 
(TPY) of “any air pollutant.”81  
Once EPA set a standard for GHGs under any part of the statute (as it 
had done for new cars and trucks), the agency considered them to be 
regulated pollutants to which the PSD requirements would apply. Because 
GHGs tend to be emitted in amounts that are orders of magnitude greater 
than conventional pollutants, however, many thousands of small sources that 
had never been regulated under the CAA would be swept into the PSD 
program and made subject to onerous permitting requirements with the 
100/250-TPY threshold.82  
In addition, the Tailpipe Rule triggered another permitting program for 
stationary sources. Under Title V of the CAA, all major sources, defined as 
those emitting over 100 TPY of “any air pollutant,” must obtain a general 
operating permit.83 Applying for a Title V permit can be time-consuming 
and expensive for sources, even if the operating permit itself does not 
impose any regulatory requirements. Again, because of the low numerical 
threshold to reach “major” source status, literally millions of small sources 
of GHG pollution—including large residential complexes, farms of a 
 
“best available control technology” for all pollutants “subject to regulation” under the CAA. Under 
the statute and EPA regulations, once a standard for GHGs is set under the mobile source 
provisions of the statute, the pollutant becomes “subject to regulation.” See id. 
79 See Clean Air Act § 165(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2012) (requiring preconstruction review); 
see also id. at § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012) (defining “major emitting facility”). 
80 Id. at § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012). 
81 Id. at § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012). 
82 For a discussion of the implications of this situation, see Prevention of Significant Deteri-
oration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,533 ( June 3, 2010) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71) (projecting the number of sources expected to 
require permits under the PSD and Title V programs and proposing to tailor the program initially 
to the largest sources). 
83 Clean Air Act §§ 502–504, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a–7661c (2012).  
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modest size, and municipal landfills—which had never before needed a 
CAA permit for anything, would be required to obtain one for the first 
time. How to manage these automatic triggers in the CAA thus raised 
crucial strategic questions for EPA.  
EPA’s plan to address emissions from stationary sources under these 
programs required the agency to balance different kinds of risks. If the low-
emission thresholds for triggering permit requirements applied, EPA would 
need to approve permits for literally millions of small sources. This burden 
would have overwhelmed the agency and the states, frustrated small busi-
nesses, and led to accusations that the Obama administration was over-
regulating while the economy was still recovering from an economic crisis. 
Moreover, imposing permitting burdens on these sources would yield 
relatively little in the way of meaningful reductions while imposing significant 
costs. Yet to relieve these small sources from regulation would require risk-
taking of a different kind. The agency would either have to declare that the 
PSD program could not be triggered by GHGs—reversing its thirty-year-
old legal position that pollutants other than the six criteria pollutants could 
trigger the program’s application—or ignore the specific numerical thresholds 
Congress had written into the law.84 
2. The “Tailoring Rule” 
Of course, the obvious solution would be to ask Congress to fix this  
feature of the statute by adjusting the thresholds upward for GHGs. In the 
past, this kind of small fix might have been routine; it makes good economic 
and political sense to limit the program to major emitters and ultimately 
reduces a regulatory burden. But Congress was gridlocked over climate 
policy. With little chance of congressional resolution, EPA issued a rule 
“tailoring” the permitting requirements of both the PSD and Title V 
programs by administratively raising the thresholds for “major” source 
status to cover only the largest stationary sources—those producing over 
100,000 TPY of GHGs.85 The agency justified this approach by relying on 
 
84 See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,550-31,551 (noting that since 1977, EPA has interpreted 
the PSD program to apply to any air pollutant subject to regulation). 
85 The Tailoring Rule also specified a lower threshold—75,000 TPY—for so-called “anyway” 
sources: those sources required to obtain permits “anyway” because of their emission of conven-
tional pollutants. See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,540-31,541 (exempting smaller sources but 
otherwise allowing the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration program to begin 
to require “best available control technology” to control GHGs at new and modified sources); see 
also EPA, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, EPA-457/B-11-001, PSD AND 
TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 17-46 (2011) (describing how states 
should determine “best available control technology” for new and modified sources). 
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the little-used doctrines of absurd results and administrative necessity, 
arguing that a temporary suspension of the statutory thresholds was neces-
sary to deal with the volume of new permits.86 Applying the low thresholds 
literally, EPA argued, would radically expand the program and render it 
“unrecognizable” to the Congress that adopted it.87 Notably, in this instance, 
EPA sought to narrow rather than enlarge its regulatory responsibilities and 
to reduce the burdens imposed on industry, believing it to be the more 
rational, cost-effective, and politically palatable approach.  
Industry groups and a number of states challenged the rule.88 The peti-
tioners made three main arguments.89 First, the PSD program should not 
be read to apply to GHGs at all, since the program was intended by Con-
gress to prevent backsliding from the national ambient air quality stand-
ards.90 Second, and alternatively, sources that emit only GHGs should not 
trigger the program’s permit requirements (even if sources covered by the 
program anyway may need to control their GHGs along with their emissions 
of other pollutants).91 Finally, claimed petitioners, EPA lacks the authority 
to rewrite the numerical statutory thresholds in the CAA to make them four 
hundred times higher due to an “administrative necessity” that the agency 
itself created by interpreting the PSD program to apply to GHGs.92  
The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s view that the program applied to GHGs 
on a plain reading of the statute.93 The court noted that the CAA mandates 
pre-construction review and permitting under the PSD program whenever 
“any pollutant” is emitted over the threshold amount and that in Massachusetts 
v. EPA the Supreme Court had interpreted the word “pollutant” to include 
 
86 See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,541-31,549. 
87 Id. at 31,555.  
88 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The 
litigation challenged four rules that EPA promulgated under the CAA: (1) the Endangerment 
Finding, (2) the Tailpipe Rule, (3) the Timing Rule, and (4) the Tailoring Rule. In upholding the 
rules set forth by EPA, the court dismissed challenges to the endangerment finding and the 
Tailpipe Rule on their merits and found that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the Timing 
Rule and the Tailoring Rule. Id. at 113-114.  
89 Petitioners’ Joint Opening Brief at 14-23, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 
684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1322). 
90 On this view, Congress meant to exempt GHGs from the phrase “any air pollutant” in the 
definition of major facility (for purposes of the program’s applicability) and to exclude them from 
the requirement that BACT apply to “each pollutant subject to regulation” under the CAA (for 
purposes of the program’s coverage). See Clean Air Act § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012) 
(defining “major emitting facility”); see also id. at § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012) 
(requiring BACT for “each pollutant subject to regulation” under the CAA).  
91 Petitioners’ Joint Opening Brief at 18, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 
F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1322). 
92 Id. at 22-23. 
93 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 136. 
  
26 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1 
 
GHGs.94 The court never reached EPA’s administrative necessity justifica-
tion for temporarily raising the thresholds, finding that none of the peti-
tioners could demonstrate the harm required for standing because the 
agency’s rule had relieved them of a regulatory burden.95  
The Supreme Court granted review on whether the PSD program  
applied to GHGs—the interpretive question on which EPA had taken the 
greatest legal risk.96 The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, finding that the 
definition of “any air pollutant” in the PSD program was ambiguous and that 
EPA’s interpretation to include GHGs was, in these circumstances, unrea-
sonable.97 EPA could not, in the Court’s view, reasonably adopt an interpre-
tation that it had conceded would render the program unrecognizable to 
Congress and then resort to rewriting the statutory thresholds out of a 
claimed “administrative necessity.”98 The Court also struck down the 
Tailoring Rule as an impermissible rewriting of clear statutory thresholds.99 
At the same time, the Court upheld the agency’s view that it was required 
to regulate GHGs from those stationary sources that trigger preconstruction 
 
94 Id. at 134. 
95 Id. at 146. The petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the D.C. Circuit over a strong 
dissent by Judge Kavanaugh, who explained how EPA could have avoided the need for the 
Tailoring Rule and saved itself from the overwhelming administrative burdens of which it was 
complaining by simply interpreting the ambiguous phrase “any pollutant” to mean (at least in the 
context of this one program) only conventional pollutants. See Order on Petitions for Rehearing 
En Banc, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *14-16 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
96 See Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1146, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 23, 2014) (noting 
that the Court had been asked to “decide whether it was permissible for EPA to determine that its 
motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the 
[CAA] for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases”); Jody Freeman, Symposium: Soft Landings 
and Strategic Choices, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 5, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/ 
symposium-soft-landings-and-strategic-choices/, archived at http://perma.cc/J66U-ZXWS (explaining 
how EPA might have interpreted the program to exclude GHGs and apply only to NAAQS 
pollutants without losing too much). 
97 Utility Air Regulatory Grp., No. 12-1146, slip op. at 15-16 (“[T]here is no insuperable textual 
barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to 
encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the 
statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are 
emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and 
render them unworkable as written.”). 
98 Id. at 20 (“[I]t would be patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for EPA to insist 
on seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not designed to grant.”).  
99 Id. at 21 (“An agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewrit-
ing unambiguous statutory terms. . . . It is hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous than the 
precise numerical thresholds at which the [CAA] requires PSD and Title V permitting.”). 
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review “anyway” because they emit over the 100/250–TPY threshold for 
conventional pollution.100  
Practically, the decision amounts mostly to a victory for EPA, since  
regulating these “anyway” sources (which tend to be the biggest emitters of 
both conventional pollutants and GHGs) allows the agency to control the 
overwhelming majority of the GHGs it would have otherwise regulated had 
the agency’s Tailoring Rule been upheld.101 Indeed, the agency had signaled 
in its brief that it could accept precisely the mixed result the Court deliv-
ered,102 and there is some reason to think that the agency even prefers it.103 
Yet any loss in the Supreme Court—even a partial one—leaves a sting, and 
the decision is replete with stern warnings about regulatory overreach that 
could prove troublesome in future cases.104 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia noted that when an agency’s interpretation will “bring about an 
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority 
without clear congressional authorization . . . [and the] agency claims to 
discover . . . an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the 
American economy,’” the Court will greet that interpretation with skepti-
cism.105 Notably, the Court also appeared to retreat somewhat from its 
 
100 Id. at 28 (“[A]pplying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and 
need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s 
interpretation is unreasonable.”). 
101 In announcing the Court’s decision from the bench, Justice Scalia reportedly said that, 
“EPA is getting almost everything it wanted in this case. It sought to regulate sources that it said 
were responsible for 86 percent of all the greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources 
nationwide. . . . EPA will be able to regulate sources responsible for 83 percent of those 
emissions.” Robert Barnes, Justices: EPA Can Regulate Emissions, WASH. POST, June 24, 2014, at A1.  
102 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 33-34, Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-
1146 (Jan. 21, 2014). 
103 The agency had opted for the most ambitious reading of its authority, even where nar-
rower alternatives were available that might not have cost the agency much, a risk that in 
retrospect may not have been worthwhile. See Freeman, supra note 96 (explaining why losing on 
the issue of PSD applicability is likely better for EPA as a practical matter).  
104 Indeed, the Court remarked,  
Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in the Tailoring Rule, we 
would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers. . . . The Pow-
er of executing the laws . . . does not include a power to revise clear statutory 
terms that turn out not to work in practice. . . .  
. . . EPA asserts newfound authority to regulate millions of small sources . . . and 
to decide, on an ongoing basis and without regard for the thresholds prescribed by 
Congress, how many of those sources to regulate. We are not willing to stand on the 
dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery. 
Utility Air Regulatory Grp., No. 12-1146, slip op. at 23; see also id. at 12 (“It takes some cheek for EPA 
to insist that it cannot possibly give ‘air pollutant’ a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in 
the PSD and Title V contexts when it has been doing precisely that for decades.”). 
105 Id. at 19. 
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decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, by rejecting the view that GHGs are 
always “air pollutants” under the CAA and requiring the agency to justify 
its regulation of GHGs program-by-program.106  
The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) case is the third case related to 
climate change to have reached the Supreme Court since 2007.107 It is 
unlikely to be the last. EPA had already announced additional GHG 
regulations for the electricity sector when UARG was handed down.108 The 
Court’s sharp rebuke of EPA, its skeptical tone, and its new gloss on 
Massachusetts v. EPA can be interpreted as cautionary signals to EPA as it 
continues to pursue GHG regulation under different CAA programs. Above 
all, however, this back-and-forth dynamic between EPA and the courts 
shows which two institutions are now driving U.S. climate policy—and 
neither one of them is Congress. 
3. Greenhouse Gas Standards for New Power Plants 
In its New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) program, the CAA 
requires EPA to set baseline pollution standards for all industrial source 
categories that emit pollution found to endanger public health.109 The 
general principle motivating the NSPS program is that as new sources come 
online or are modified, they are expected to meet increasingly stringent 
emission standards made possible by the best demonstrated system of 
emission reduction, taking into account cost and other considerations.110 
 
106 Id. at 14 (“Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from 
the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the [CAA] where their inclusion would be 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme. . . . [It] does not foreclose the Agency’s use of statutory 
context to infer that certain of the [CAA’s] provisions use “air pollutant” to denote not every 
conceivable airborne substance, but only those that may sensibly be encompassed within the 
particular regulatory program.”). 
107 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 
S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
108 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Power Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1462-1463 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, and 98). 
109 Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012). President Obama announced that he 
would direct EPA to establish a standard for new power plants and to set standards for existing 
power plants. Michael O’Brien, Obama Aims to Sidestep Congress with New Initiatives to Reduce 
Carbon Emissions, NBC NEWS ( June 25, 2013, 3:11 AM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/ 
2013/06/25/19119744-obama-aims-to-sidestep-congress-with-new-initiatives-to-reduce-carbon-
emissions?lite, archived at http://perma.cc/6QSJ-HMTY. 
110 See Clean Air Act § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (defining “standard of perfor-
mance”); Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2012) (requiring the EPA Administrator to 
set performance standards for categories of stationary sources). 
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The program is meant to ratchet up standards as the potential for pollution 
control increases over time due to new technology and expertise. Based on 
EPA’s past practice and prior court precedent, “best demonstrated” systems 
may be forward-looking and technology-forcing, and are not limited to 
technology already in operation at the time standards are set.111  
These NSPS standards differ from the PSD program described above in 
two principal ways: NSPS standards are set by EPA, not the states, and 
they apply uniformly to entire industrial categories as defined by EPA, 
rather than to individual sources.112 The PSD program, which is implemented 
by the states, is more of a gap-filling program meant to keep air quality 
from backsliding during periods (typically eight years or longer) between 
rounds of NSPS. As individual facilities propose to build or refurbish their 
equipment in areas that already comply with one or more of the national air 
quality standards, these sources must apply for state permits and apply “best 
available control technology” (BACT), which must be at least as stringent 
as NSPS.113 Thus, because it is federally driven, technology-forcing, national 
in scope, and applicable to entire source categories, NSPS is the much more 
significant driver of emissions reductions—for all pollutants, including 
GHGs—than is the PSD program.114 
In 2012, EPA proposed for the first time to set NSPS for carbon dioxide 
from new power plants. These sources have long been subject to NSPS 
regulation for other pollutants that endanger health or welfare,115 which they 
emit in abundance along with carbon dioxide.116 In EPA’s view, GHGs from 
 
111 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1463 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98) [hereinafter Second Proposed Power Plant Rule] 
(discussing technical feasibility and citing Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
in support of EPA’s authority to set technology-forcing standards). 
112 Compare Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring standards for 
source “categories”), with Clean Air Act § 169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012) (defining individual 
“major emitting facilities” subject to preconstruction review under section 165). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012). Note that as EPA sets new NSPS, EPA also establishes a new 
floor for BACT. 
114 Compared with the NSPS program, the PSD program is far less uniform. State admin-
istration allows for greater variation not just across states, but also across sources in the same 
industrial category, since state regulators establish BACT on a case-by-case basis through plant-
level analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d) (2012) (describing the state permitting process). PSD is 
also small in scope; the states generally entertain fewer than three hundred PSD permit applica-
tions each year. See RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/rblc/ (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GC74-SBDN. 
115 See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2013). 
116 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter First Proposed Power Plant Rule].  
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these sources now qualify for regulation because they are “pollutants” that 
have been found to pose an endangerment to health and welfare and are 
emitted by power plants in large quantities.117 Setting a standard for new 
sources is especially important from a policy perspective because the utility 
industry is expected to invest billions of dollars in new electricity generation 
in the coming years—infrastructure that will presumably be long-lived.118  
The proposed rule went through two very controversial and highly visible 
iterations. This in itself is not unusual; agencies propose and reconsider 
rules all the time. Indeed, that is the point of notice-and-comment. Yet this 
particular rule, freighted with significant policy and political implications, 
illustrates the careful calibration process required when agencies adapt 
statutes to new problems. EPA initially proposed to set a single standard for 
both coal and natural gas–fired electricity-generating units, based on what 
the most efficient natural gas plants can achieve and which coal-fired units 
cannot achieve without applying carbon capture technology.119 The proposal 
attracted a firestorm of comment.120 Industry stakeholders objected to the 
unprecedented grouping of the two categories, arguing that it was a weakly 
veiled effort to circumvent the statutory requirement that technology be 
both demonstrated and available; that the agency never could have required 
carbon capture as the best demonstrated technology standard for coal units 
as a separate category, because the technology is not yet commercially 
available.121  
In response, EPA withdrew the 2012 proposal and issued a new one setting 
separate targets for natural gas–fired and coal-fired units and easing stringency 
 
117 Id. 
118 See Ralph Cavanagh, Reinventing Competitive Procurement of Electricity Resources, ELECTRICITY-
POLICY.COM, http://electricitypolicy.com/cavanagh-10-2-10-correct.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/4DV2-CLL3 (explaining that U.S. utilities have announced the intention 
to invest up to $2 trillion in “resource procurement and integration” over the next two decades). 
119 First Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 116, at 22,395 (classifying different electric 
generating units as a single source category); id. at 22,396-22,398 (proposing to require that all 
new fossil fuel–fired EGUs emit no more than 1000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour 
on an average annual basis—a target which is based on the carbon dioxide emissions from an 
efficient, natural gas combined cycle facility). 
120 EPA received 2.5 million comments. See Second Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 
111, at 1445. 
121 See, e.g., Comments Submitted by the American Public Power Association, on Standards 
of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units ( June 25, 2012) (on file at Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-10039; Comments Sub-
mitted by The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, on Standards of Performance for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (June 25, 
2012) (on file at Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-9916. 
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somewhat for the latter.122 While EPA claims that it has always enjoyed 
considerable flexibility to define industrial categories under the NSPS 
program,123 in this instance it chose to rethink its decision to conflate the 
different types of electricity generating units—presumably to reduce the 
rule’s legal vulnerability. Yet the new proposal does not eliminate legal risk 
entirely. It relaxes the limits applicable to coal-fired generators only slightly, 
from 1000 to 1100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour, such that 
“partial” carbon capture will be necessary for new coal-fired power plants to 
comply.124  
As a result, the new proposal still raises a difficult legal question: whether 
carbon capture and storage is “demonstrated” and “available” technology 
within the meaning of the CAA. The D.C. Circuit has held that NSPS 
standards may be technology-forcing125; the question is how much so. EPA 
relied in its proposal on the fact that four power plants with carbon capture 
and storage are currently either under construction and expected to be 
operational within a few years, or under active development.126 But a 
reviewing court may nevertheless determine that it is arbitrary or capricious 
to base a standard on technology that has yet to be deployed at commercial 
scale for power plants and which remains extremely expensive.127  
 
122 See Second Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 111, at 1433 (proposing to allow coal-
fired units to emit 1100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour). 
123 See id. at 1465-67. 
124 See id. at 1436. EPA also offered an alternative compliance option that would permit averag-
ing over seven years to allow units to emit more in early years and less in later years through 
application of carbon capture and storage. Id. at 1482. EPA’s stated intent in designing the rule was 
to ensure a viable pathway for coal to continue to be a part of the nation’s energy mix, even in a 
carbon-constrained world. Id. at 1468-69. At the time the rule was proposed, the Energy 
Information Administration was already predicting that few if any new coal plants would be built 
by 2025, due largely to low natural gas prices. The new standard is essentially a regulatory hedge; 
in the event that natural gas prices rise, or electricity consumption spikes, new coal plants cannot 
be built without being carbon capture–ready. Indeed, EPA explicitly justified the rule as necessary 
to “lock in” the market-driven dynamic. Id. at 1433-34. 
125 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Section 111(a) requires EPA 
to set reductions based on what is “achievable” using the “best system of emission reduction” that 
the Administrator determines to be “adequately demonstrated.” The D.C. Circuit has interpreted 
the “achievable” standard for “best system of emission reduction” as technology that is “available” 
to new plants. See Second Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 111, at 1434, 1463.  
126 The four plants are Southern Company’s Kemper County Energy Facility, which was 
seventy-five percent complete in 2013, SaskPower’s Boundary Dam project, which was expected to 
be operational in 2014, Summit Power’s Texas Clean Energy Project, which was under develop-
ment, and the Hydrogen Energy California Project, which was also under development. Second 
Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 111, at 1434. 
127 Industry argues that this standard is a major obstacle to the construction and development 
of any new coal-fired generation capacity because, as EPA concedes, the limits cannot be achieved 
by a new coal-fired EGU using presently available technology. See The American Energy Initiative, 
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The fate of this first power plant standard is important for three reasons. 
First, a restrictive interpretation of “demonstrated” and “available” could rule 
out carbon capture and storage as a basis for these standards, and in the 
longer term, by setting a precedent, limit EPA’s ability to promote technolog-
ical innovation. Second, the carbon standard for new power plants is the 
first of many anticipated standards EPA expects to set, sector-by-sector, for 
categories of stationary sources that produce the largest share of the nation’s 
GHGs.128 Reversal by the D.C. Circuit would delay implementation of 
these regulations for new and modified sources, at a minimum. Third, 
losing a legal challenge to the new source standard under section 111(b) 
would delay EPA’s plan to set standards for existing power plants under 
section 111(d), which, as discussed below, are a much more important 
regulatory target than new facilities.  
4. Greenhouse Gas Standards for Existing Power Plants 
While carbon standards for new power plants may be necessary as a 
backstop measure to prevent a new generation of coal-fired plants from 
being built should natural gas prices once again rise and make coal-fired 
generation more competitive, these standards arguably are most important as 
a legal predicate to regulating emissions from the existing fleet—the nation’s 
oldest and dirtiest power plants, which produce nearly forty percent of the 
nation’s carbon dioxide emissions.129 Congress largely immunized the 
existing fleet from many of the CAA’s regulatory requirements130 as a political 
 
Part 25: EPA’s Proposed Greenhouse Gas New Source Performance Standards for Utilities and the Impact 
this Regulation Will Have on Jobs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 16 (2012) (statement of Thomas F. Farrell II, Chairman, 
President, and CEO, Dominion Resources, Inc.) (contending that “performance standards will not 
succeed at forcing the adoption of [carbon capture and storage] technologies” because the standard 
“will create an insurmountable hurdle to obtaining financing and securing public utility commis-
sion approval for new coal stations”). 
128 A number of consent decrees now require the agency to promulgate additional standards for 
GHG pollution from other new sources, such as oil and gas refineries. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement 
Between New York et al., and EPA (2010), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
2013-09/documents/refineryghgsettlement.pdf (announcing that EPA has agreed to set GHG New 
Source Performance Standards for refineries). 
129 Electricity generation accounts for 38.6% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from energy. 
See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2012 tbl.3-1 
(2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-
Inventory-2014-Chapter-3-Energy.pdf. 
130 For example, section 111 New Source Performance Standards generally apply only to 
categories of new and “modified” sources. See Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)–(b) 
(2012). The CAA’s New Source Review program similarly applies only to new and modified 
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compromise, on the theory that older sources were expensive to retrofit and 
would in any event retire within a reasonable period of time.131 Yet these 
sources have defied congressional expectations and lived much longer than 
anticipated, notwithstanding efforts to modernize the fleet.132 If EPA were 
to succeed in imposing significant carbon limits on these electricity sector 
sources in addition to the emission standards it already set for the transpor-
tation sector in 2010 and 2011, it will have brought nearly two-thirds of U.S. 
carbon dioxide emissions under a program of control.133 Yet EPA’s effort to 
reach these plants under 111(d) is the greatest test to date of its strategy to 
adapt the CAA to climate change.  
Once EPA sets a standard for new sources of pollution under section 
111(b), the states are obligated to set standards for existing sources as well, if 
certain conditions are met.134 To avoid duplicative regulation, Congress 
required such standards only for pollution other than the six “criteria” 
pollutants (for which states already submit implementation plans) and for 
pollution not emitted from a source category already regulated as a hazardous 
air pollutant.135 Because GHGs are neither criteria pollutants nor hazardous 
pollutants, they appear to qualify for regulation under section 111(d).  
It is worth noting that the NSPS program is a viable means of addressing 
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants only because of 
another crucial legal judgment EPA has made: electing not to treat carbon 
dioxide as a “criteria pollutant” and establish a national concentration 
 
sources in attainment zones. See Clean Air Act §§ 165, 169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479 (2012); see 
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503(a) (2012). 
131 That is, unless they modify their equipment in ways that significantly increase emissions, 
in which case they trigger “new source review.” See Richard L. Revesz, Op-Ed., Old Power Plants 
Need New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/old-
power-plants-need-new-rules.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZCH2-6DLU; see also Jonathan 
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and 
Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1688 (2007) (describing EPA’s policies 
requiring a New Source Review when a modification would cause a large net increase in emissions). 
132 The average age of U.S. coal-fired generation plants is forty-three years. See Steven 
Mufson, Coal’s Burnout, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2011, at G1.  
133 See id.; see also EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, http:// 
www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8L3B-CUQ7.  
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring states to set performance standards for 
existing sources for any air pollutant “for which air quality criteria have not been issued . . . or 
emitted from a source category which is regulated under section 7412 of this title but . . . to 
which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new 
source”). 
135 Id. 
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limit.136 Although some stakeholders have urged EPA to do so, the agency 
has declined because it views the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) program as inappropriate for addressing global pollutants.137  
Nevertheless, EPA’s regulation of existing power plants, even using its 
preferred regulatory strategy under the NSPS program, poses substantial 
legal and political risks. EPA’s longstanding practice under section 111(d), 
which courts have approved,138 is to issue “guidelines” under which the 
states must set “standards of performance” for existing sources under their 
jurisdiction.139 The guidelines serve as minimum goals that state perfor-
mance standards must meet. EPA’s authority to issue the guidelines (and 
thereby set the floor for the stringency of the state standards) stems from 
section 111(a). Section 111(a) defines a “standard of performance” as a 
“standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emis-
sion limitation achievable through the application of the best system of 
emission reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been 
adequately demonstrated.”140 On EPA’s reading, the statute plainly tasks the 
agency with establishing what is achievable and requires the states to file 
plans to meet that goal. State plans under section 111(d) are akin to the 
implementation plans they submit under section 110 showing how they will 
comply with the six national ambient air quality standards. And as with the 
section 110 implementation plans, EPA must approve state plans under 
section 111(d) or disapprove them and file a federal implementation plan.141 
 
136 Indeed, there are plausible arguments that by setting a national standard for GHG pollu-
tion and requiring states to submit implementation plans, EPA could achieve deep, nationwide 
emissions reductions while allowing states to use trading schemes to do so. See, e.g., Steven D. 
Cook, Emissions Trading: EPA Can Use Clean Air Act Authority to Establish Carbon Dioxide Program, 
39 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 304 (Feb. 15, 2008) (describing former EPA general counsel Donald Elliott’s 
proposal that ambient quality standards could be adapted to GHGs if EPA established a 
percentage reduction target instead of setting a numerical concentration limit).  
137 EPA has said NAAQS are inappropriate because the concentration of global pollutants in 
the atmosphere cannot be controlled exclusively by the United States. See Regulating Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,363-44,364 (proposed July 30, 
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R ch. 1). A petition requesting that EPA set a NAAQS for GHGs is still 
pending. See Petition from Center for Biological Diversity & 350.org, to EPA (Dec. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_litigation/clean
_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf (requesting that EPA establish a NAAQS 
for carbon dioxide at no greater than 350 ppm). 
138 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,879 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60) (describing EPA guidelines and relevant judicial decisions). 
139 Id. at 34,834 (describing requirements for state implementation plans).  
140 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012). 
141 Section 110 explicitly affords the states considerable flexibility to adopt whatever mix of 
measures they deem necessary to achieve the federal ambient air quality standards, and courts have 
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The key legal and policy question is how stringent the standards can be, 
and the answer turns on the meaning of “performance standard” in this 
context. This in turn depends on the definition of “best system of emission 
reduction.”142 Typically, air pollution standards for stationary sources are set 
as rate-based standards applicable to the individual source (or a small group 
of sources treated as if they were under a “bubble”).143 Such standards 
generally require that emissions from that source not exceed, for example, 
so many pounds of pollution per some measurable unit of output. Tradi-
tionally, a source might comply through a variety of strategies, including by 
installing “scrubbers” or other equipment upgrades, improving operational 
efficiency through process changes, reducing hours of operation, or co-firing 
with a cleaner fuel.144  
The challenge is that there may be relatively few cost-effective ways for 
older electricity-generating units to reduce carbon dioxide emissions at the 
source.145 There are, however, many cost-effective ways to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions from the electricity sector as a whole, by looking for 
opportunities to do so more broadly, across the system. This is a seemingly 
sensible thing to do because the electricity system is interconnected. A 
variety of steps that can be taken outside a particular electricity-generating 
unit might help to lower demand at that source, thereby reducing its 
emissions. So, for example, greater use of natural gas–fired units could 
reduce demand for coal-fired generation, while greater energy efficiency 
could reduce demand for both, cutting carbon dioxide emissions considerably.  
Thus, the difficult legal question facing EPA is whether “best system of 
emission reduction” in the definition of performance standard in section 
111(a) must be limited to considering what individual units at power plants 
can do on-site (within the so-called “fence line”) or whether it authorizes 
the agency to take into account the much larger reductions achievable from 
 
said EPA must approve any plan that meets the section 110 criteria. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 
427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976) (holding that EPA has no power to reject a State Implementation Plan 
under section 110 based on economic or technological infeasibility). 
142 See Clean Air Act § 111(a).  
143 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,893-34,894. 
144 See, e.g., id. at 34,926.  
145 See id. at 34,856 (indicating that adopting best practices at coal-fired steam electric gener-
ating units could reduce average carbon dioxide emissions by 1.3 to 6.7%); id. at 34,877 (concluding 
that “while heat rate improvements qualify as a system of emission reduction, they are not in 
themselves the [best system of emission reduction] as there are additional strategies that can be 
utilized in combination with [it] that are technically feasible, can be implemented at reasonable 
cost, and result in greater emission reductions than would be achieved through [heat rate 
improvement] strategies alone”). 
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system-wide measures that could shift from higher to lower emitting 
generation and reduce demand for electricity.146 
In 2014, EPA proposed its section 111(d) rule, in which it embraced the 
broader interpretation of “best system of emission reduction.”147 The 
proposed rule sets individualized emission reduction targets for each 
state.148 These targets are expressed as carbon intensity goals (i.e., pounds of 
carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour), not mass-based emissions caps. If 
achieved as projected by EPA, these targets would result by 2030 in a thirty 
percent reduction in electricity sector carbon dioxide emissions compared 
with 2005 levels. EPA’s methodology for establishing the targets depends on 
EPA’s assessment of what can be achieved by each state using some  
combination of four main strategies the agency calls “building blocks”: 
improving the efficiency of their coal plants by at least six percent; running 
existing natural gas plants more, up to seventy percent utilization; using 
more “clean” energy, including by relying on new renewable energy sources 
and by keeping existing nuclear plants from retiring; and reducing demand 
through end-use energy efficiency measures adopted outside the power 
plants by at least 1.5% annually.149 The stringency of the targets varies 
considerably across the states (ranging from eleven percent to seventy-two 
percent),150 depending on each state’s current energy mix and the extent to 
which emissions reduction opportunities are projected to be reasonably 
available using the four strategies. Generally, heavy-coal states are assigned 
a lower burden than states with a cleaner energy mix. The stringency of the 
numbers, however, can be misleading: it may be much more difficult for a 
coal-dependent state with little renewables potential, no existing nuclear, and 
no history of energy efficiency to meet a low target, than for a renewables-rich 
 
146 See Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Innovative NRDC Plan Featuring Federal-
State Partnership Saves Americans More than $25 Billion in Climate and Health Costs While 
Unleashing Billions in Clean Energy Investments (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/ 
media/2012/121204.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/7U7R-F597 (describing a “groundbreaking 
proposal to sharply cut carbon pollution from America’s power plants” by “setting system-wide 
standards, rather than smokestack-by-smokestack ones”). 
147 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,845. 
148 Id. at 34,837. 
149 Id. at 34,836, 34,851.  
150 See Brad Plumer, How the EPA’s New Climate Rule Actually Works—in 8 Steps, VOX, 
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/4/5779052/how-to-figure-out-which-states-get-hit-hardest-by-obamas-
climate-rule (last updated June 4, 2014, 4:25 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/DUH4-W7HR; see 
also EPA, DOCKET ID NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT 
(TSD) FOR THE CAA SECTION 111(D) EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS 7 
(2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-
goal-computation.pdf.  
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state highly dependent on hydro power and poised to ramp up a successful 
energy efficiency program to meet a much higher target.  
EPA’s proposed rule provides considerable compliance flexibility to the 
states. They may meet the targets through any combination of the four 
pathways used to establish stringency, or through other strategies: by 
making equipment upgrades at coal plants or retiring some coal-fired units; 
by delaying or cancelling planned nuclear power plant retirements; by 
increasing use of existing natural gas units; by implementing renewable 
portfolio standards; or by promoting aggressive energy efficiency programs.151 
States may also choose to adopt market-based strategies, including cap-and-
trade programs.152 They can file multi-state plans and join regional trading 
schemes if they wish.153 By offering these flexibilities, the rule is designed to 
build on efforts many states have already made to reduce GHGs and to 
promote renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
There is no question that EPA’s interpretation is novel and far-reaching. 
EPA has set performance standards under section 111(d) several times 
before, but in very different circumstances,154 and these precedents offer 
little guidance on the fundamental interpretive issue, which concerns the 
breadth of best system of emission reduction.155 The agency has promulgated 
standards under section 111(d) for non-NAAQS pollutants emitted by 
sources such as municipal waste combustors, sulfuric acid plants, and 
 
151 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,835-34,837. 
152 Although EPA does not use the term “cap-and-trade,” it certainly suggests in the rule that 
mass-based trading systems are an acceptable compliance option: “A state could adopt the rate-
based form of the goal established by the EPA or an equivalent mass-based form of the goal.” Id. 
at 34,837. “States can tailor their regulatory mechanisms to recognize differences, for example by 
creating budgets on a company-wide basis or using market-based mechanisms such as mass-based 
trading systems, to ensure that requirements are achievable.” Id. at 34,887. The proposal also 
mentions the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade regime, roughly thirty times. 
153 Id. at 34,897 (“The EPA expects this flexibility [to enter into multi-state plans or programs] 
to reduce the cost of achieving the state goals and therefore expects it to be attractive to states.”).  
154 See KATE KONSCHNIK & ARI PESKOE, HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW PROGRAM, 
EFFICIENCY RULES: THE CASE FOR END-USE ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS IN THE 
SECTION 111(D) RULE FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS 4-5 (2014), available at http:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2013/03/The-Role-of-Energy-Efficiency-in-
the-111d-Rule.pdf (discussing previous section 111(d) regulations). 
155 The only two section 111(d) performance standards that have explicitly authorized states 
to adopt emissions trading plans for facilities are the Clean Air Mercury Rule, Standards of 
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 
70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, and 75) [hereinafter 
CAMR], which was struck down, and the emissions guidelines for large municipal waste combus-
tors, Emission Guidelines for Municipal Waste Combustor Metals, Acid Gases, Organics, and 
Nitrogen Oxides, 40 C.F.R. § 60.33b(d) (2012). See Jonas Monast et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions From Existing Sources: Section 111(d) and State Equivalency, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law 
Inst.) 10,206, 10,208-09 (2012).  
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phosphate fertilizer plants.156 Yet the schemes for these pollutants do not 
approach the scope and complexity of EPA’s proposal for existing sources of 
GHGs.157 Moreover, there is sparse precedent on the limits of section 
111(d). During the George W. Bush administration, EPA promulgated the 
Clean Air Mercury Rule, using section 111(d) to create a cap-and-trade 
regime for mercury and other pollutants.158 The D.C. Circuit struck down 
the rule, however, finding that because Congress listed mercury as a hazardous 
air pollutant under section 112, it must be regulated under that provision.159 
The court did not reach the question of whether a cap-and-trade approach 
would be lawful under section 111(d).160  
The Supreme Court, for its part, has offered little guidance on how it 
would interpret the word “standard” in this context.161 It thus remains an 
open question whether EPA has the discretion to define “standard” under 
the NSPS program to include what can be achieved beyond the boundaries 
of a regulated unit or discrete source.162 
In addition, because of the peculiarities of how section 111(d) was adopted, 
EPA faces an even more fundamental, and unusual, problem over its 
 
156 See Legal Memorandum for Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Electric Utility Generating Units 9-10 (2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/2014-06/documents/20140602-legal-memorandum.pdf. 
157 Monast et al., supra note 155, at 10,215. 
158 See CAMR, supra note 155.  
159 See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. dismissed, 555 U.S. 1162 
(2009), and cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009). 
160 See id. at 584. 
161 The Court has defined the term “standard” to include more than simply numerical emis-
sion levels for specific units like engines, extending it in one case to cover state imposed fleet 
purchase requirements based on emission characteristics of the engines. But this was in the context 
of interpreting the reach of a CAA provision preempting state “standards” for motor vehicle 
engine emissions. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255 
(2004) (“A command, accompanied by sanctions, that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles 
with particular emission characteristics is as much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’ as a 
command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a manufacturer’s sales volume 
must consist of such vehicles.”). Writing for the Court in an 8–1 decision, Justice Scalia began by 
looking at the dictionary, defining “standard” as “that which ‘is established by authority, custom, or 
general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.’” Id. at 252-53 (quoting WEBSTER’S 
SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2455 (1945)). 
162 Depending on the content of the final rule, there are other matters that could invite legal 
challenge, such as EPA’s approach to enforcement. EPA has asked for comment on how to hold 
third parties (such as end use energy efficiency providers) accountable for fulfilling their 
obligations under state plans. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,902-34,903 (proposed June 18, 
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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authority to regulate existing sources under this program.163 Recall that the 
text of section 111(d) requires states to set standards for existing sources of 
pollutants only if the pollutants are not from sources already subject to 
regulation under the air toxics program in section 112. Existing power 
plants, however, are now regulated under EPA’s air toxics standard.164 Read 
literally, then, the statute appears to foreclose regulating GHG emissions 
from these sources. 
Yet EPA interprets section 111(d) to preclude it from regulating only 
pollutants already listed as hazardous under the air toxics program regardless 
of whether the sources of those pollutants are subject to regulation under 
that program for emitting other pollutants.165 The legislative history reveals, 
in a truly bizarre turn of events, that in the 1990 amendments to the CAA, 
the House and Senate each enacted a different amendment to section 
111(d)—one that precludes regulation of pollutants subject to section 112 and 
another that precludes regulation of sources. In an astonishing glitch that 
illustrates the vagaries of the legislative process, the Conference Committee 
never resolved the differences between the two amendments and both were 
enacted in Public Law 101-549 as parenthetical options.166 The U.S. Code, 
 
163 See generally Adam M. Kushner & Judith E. Coleman, Lessons from Mercury: Ensuring 
Legal Certainty for New GHG Performance Standards for Existing Fossil Fuel Plants (Oct. 24, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
164 In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), which held that federal 
common law nuisance claims for harms caused by GHG pollution are precluded by the CAA, the 
Court described EPA’s authority to set standards for existing power plants under section 111(d) 
and then specifically described the exception for pollutants regulated under section 112: “There is an 
exception: EPA may not employ § 7411(d) if existing stationary sources of the pollutant in 
question are regulated under the national ambient air quality standard program, §§ 7408–7410, or 
the ‘hazardous air pollutants’ program, § 7412.” 131 S. Ct. at 2537 & n.7. Yet this was in a footnote, 
and the question of how to interpret the exception was not before the Court. In addition, the case 
was decided before EPA issued its section 112(d) rule setting toxics standards for power plants. See 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric 
Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam 
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012).  
165 See supra note 156. Indeed, this was the posture adopted by EPA under George W. Bush 
when it sought to regulate mercury from existing utility units under section 111(d). See Revision of 
December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units from the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
166 See id. at 16,030 (“The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish a 
procedure similar to that provided by section 7410 of this title under which each State shall submit 
to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes standards of performance for any existing source 
for any air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included 
on a list published under section 7408(a) (or emitted from a source category which is regulated under 
section 112) [House amendment,] (or 112(b)) [Senate Amendment,] but (ii) to which a standard of 
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however, mysteriously omits the parenthetical reference to the Senate 
amendment.167 EPA has concluded that the United States Code does not 
control and that the Statutes at Large “constitute the legal evidence of the 
laws.”168 The agency has reasoned that the best reconciliation of the two 
amendments, in light of the legislative history from both the 1977 and 1990 
amendments, is to read the provision as precluding duplicative regulation, 
meaning that EPA may not under section 111(d) set standards for pollutants 
already regulated under section 112.169 
Thus, to succeed in this adaptive effort, EPA must first convince the 
D.C. Circuit, and perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court, that the U.S. 
Code does not mean what it appears to say on its face about the agency’s 
threshold authority.170 It must then prevail in its view that the stringency of 
performance standards based on the “best system of emission reduction” for 
“any existing source” may be based on emissions reductions that result not 
only from equipment upgrades or efficiency improvements at the electric 
 
performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new source.”) (quoting 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467, 
2574). “These changes were not discussed in committee hearings, in floor debates, or in conference. 
Ultimately, both amendments to Section 111(d) were contained in the legislation signed by the first 
President Bush. The House Amendment is located in Section 108 of the Statutes at Large (under 
‘Miscellaneous Guidance’); the Senate Amendment is found 107 pages later (under ‘Conforming 
Amendments’).” Kate Konschnik, EPA’s 111(d) Authority—Follow Homer and Avoid the Sirens, LEGAL 
PLANET (May 28, 2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/05/28/guest-blogger-kate-konschnik-epas-111d-
authority-follow-homer-and-avoid-the-sirens/, archived at http://perma.cc/5W4Y-BLJF.  
167 As Konschnik explains, “The conflict presented itself to an obscure shop in Congress 
charged with incorporating the Statutes at Large—the law as passed by Congress—into the 
topically organized U.S. Code. A scribe encountered the House amendment first, struck “Section 
112(b)(1)(A)” and added the House replacement language. The scribe then found it impossible to 
incorporate the Senate text. The U.S. Code notes this explicit and irreconcilable conflict.” Id. 
168 Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding, 70 Fed. Reg. at 16,030 (“The codifier’s 
notes to this section of the Official Committee Print of the executed law state that the Senate 
amendment ‘could not be executed’ because of the other amendment to section 111(d) contained in 
the same Act. The United States Code does not control here, however. The Statutes at Large 
constitute the legal evidence of the laws, where, as here, Title 42 of the United States Code, which 
contains the CAA, has not been enacted into positive law.”). 
169 Id. at 16,031-16,032 (reconciling the two provisions and reasoning that the purpose of the 
House amendment in 1990 was to prevent duplicative regulation). 
170 On August 1, 2014, West Virginia and eleven other states filed a suit challenging EPA’s 
authority to promulgate carbon rules under section 111(d) of the CAA. See Petition for Review at 
1-2, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 14-1146 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 1, 2014); see also Petition for Extraor-
dinary Writ at 5, 29, In re Murray Energy Corp., No. 14-1112 (D.C. Cir. filed June 18, 2014) (asking 
the court to prohibit EPA from continuing with its rulemaking, still in the proposal stage, for lack 
of authority to regulate existing sources). While such suits usually do not proceed until rules are 
finalized, the D.C. Circuit on September 18, 2014, ordered EPA to file a response within thirty 
days and will permit Murray Energy to respond within fourteen days, if it so chooses. Order, In re 
Murray Energy Corp., No. 14-1112 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2014). 
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generating units or plants themselves but also from actions taken at other 
locations by other entities, including end-use efficiency that lowers demand 
for electricity.  
It is certainly possible that EPA will succeed on both counts.171 Based on 
the relevant legislative history and on rules of interpretation the Supreme 
Court has traditionally used to resolve such conflicts, EPA appears to have 
the stronger argument on the threshold question about whether it possesses 
the necessary legal authority.172 EPA’s view that “best system of emission 
reduction” allows it to consider reductions beyond the “fence line” of the 
unit is also entirely plausible based on the plain meaning of the text, and is a 
sensible interpretation in light of the interconnected nature of the electricity 
system and the unique characteristics of carbon dioxide emissions. Under a 
Chevron analysis, one can imagine this view being upheld as at least  
“reasonable.”173  
Still, the sheer scope of the rule may give even favorably disposed judges 
pause and inevitably will invite questions about whether the agency has 
exceeded its traditional authority to regulate air pollution and is now 
improperly making energy policy by interfering with the states’ energy 
mix.174 A reviewing court might also ask whether there is a limiting principle 
to its “system-wide” approach, which in theory could count any measures that 
would reduce energy demand (including limits on per capita energy consump-
tion) toward stringency175 and why EPA’s four pathways (including energy 
efficiency) are not also relevant to setting new source standards for other 
pollutants.176 In addition, it remains unclear how EPA will enforce the new 
rule: whether it will hold the states legally responsible for the commitments 
in their plans or enforce plan requirements directly against the owners of 
 
171 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
172 See Konschnik, supra note 166, for an explanation of why the industry arguments in this 
regard are “weak.” 
173 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
174 See Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Challenges to Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, N.Y. 
L.J., Sept. 11, 2014, at 3 (identifying this and other key legal issues). 
175 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,885-34,886 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60) (noting that the CAA does not define “system” but suggesting the Oxford dictionary 
definition as “[a] set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or interconnecting 
network” and then claiming that “anything that reduces the emissions of affected sources may be 
considered a ‘system of emission reduction’ for those sources”). 
176 The authors thank Richard Lazarus for raising the question about the applicability of this 
version of BSER to other pollutants. See E-mail from Richard Lazarus, Howard & Katherine 
Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law Sch., and Kate Konschnik, Policy Director, Envtl. Law Program, Harvard Law Sch. 
( June 2, 2014) (on file with author). 
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electricity generating units or third parties for their share of the promised 
emissions reductions.177 The government may have good answers to all of 
these questions,178 but there is a significant possibility that in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s UARG decision, it will face considerable skepticism.179  
5. Bad Fit, EPA, and the Courts 
The recent history of EPA’s response to the problem of climate change 
illustrates the thesis with which we began: during periods of congressional 
dysfunction, agencies must adapt aging statutory authority to new problems, 
shifting the locus of policymaking first to agencies and then to the courts. 
The endangerment finding and the Tailpipe Rule represented EPA’s initial 
response to the problem, triggering additional regulation that may ultimately 
lead to GHG limits for the transportation, electricity, industrial, and 
manufacturing sectors—an economy-wide climate change program that one 
might have expected to come more directly from Congress. In executing 
this strategy, EPA has behaved strategically, consistent with its mission; it 
has carefully calibrated and moderated its approach in light of prevailing 
legal, policy, and political considerations. On the one hand, EPA has 
adopted an expansive view of its mission by fully embracing GHG regulation. 
It has acted boldly in adopting standards for both new and existing power 
plants (in the former case, treating carbon capture and storage as “demon-
strated” and “achievable,” and in the latter, by relying on an expansive 
 
177 Cf. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,901 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60) (discussing enforcement options). 
178 For example, on the question whether EPA is inappropriately regulating the energy sup-
ply, the government may argue that because air pollution standards necessarily affect the cost of 
supply, they have always influenced choices about the energy mix, including whether to retire or 
retrofit units, or switch fuel sources. Thus the distinction between environmental and energy 
policy is somewhat artificial. See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014). EPA might also defend its reliance on energy efficiency in this context 
but not others as justified by the absence of readily available, cost-effective technological options 
for controlling GHGs at existing plants. And there are no doubt sensible limiting principles that 
could constrain the agency’s application of “best system” to an interconnected physical network 
like the electricity system. 
179 The government will likely rely for support on the Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v. 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., No. 12-1182, slip op. at 29, 32 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2014), in which the 
Court upheld EPA’s cross-state air pollution rule in a 6–2 decision. The Court deferred to the 
agency’s methodology for allocating emissions reductions among states based largely on cost as 
reasonable, noting that the agency “must have leeway in fulfilling its statutory mandate.” Id. at 31. 
Yet industry will likely draw heavily on the Court’s decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 
No. 12-1146, slip op. at 29 (U.S. June 23, 2014), discussed supra, at notes 96-108 and in accompanying 
text, in which the Court rejected EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s “prevention of significant 
deterioration” program as triggered by GHG emissions. 
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interpretation of “best system of emission reduction”). On the other hand, 
the agency has in some instances opted for self-restraint and curtailed its 
own jurisdiction (targeting only the largest emitters in the PSD program), 
declined to use statutory programs it has deemed too risky (the NAAQS 
program), set standards on a sliding scale, phased in certain requirements 
over time, and allowed for considerable compliance flexibility.  
Applying an old statute to this new problem has forced EPA to interpret 
statutory terms in ways the enacting Congress may not have anticipated and 
perhaps could not have foreseen. In the process, the agency has revisited 
interpretations that appeared settled (does the term “any pollutant” mean 
all pollutants, or just a subset?), considered some questions for the first time 
(can “performance standards” be based on system-wide changes that reduce 
demand for fossil fuel–fired generation?), and grappled with how to define 
the targets of regulation (can coal-fired plants and natural gas–fired units be 
grouped together in the NSPS program?). Of course EPA is doing these 
things simultaneously. Because of their novelty, EPA’s answers to these 
questions, and others, will continue to flood the courts. And judges, in turn, 
will review agency decisions knowing that the chances of congressional 
intervention are low. All of the players in this scenario are well aware that 
the outcome of litigation—not new legislation—will probably determine the 
scope of U.S. climate policy for the foreseeable future. 
B. Managing Changing Electricity Markets Under the Federal Power Act  
As with EPA, the CAA, and climate change, FERC faces the task of 
fitting an old statute (the FPA) to new problems. Electricity markets have 
experienced drastic changes over the last twenty years, including a sea of 
change in economic thinking about the regulation of network industries, 
significant technological advancement, and the need to integrate renewable 
generation (wind and solar) and “smart” information technology into the 
grid. These developments have spurred a transformation of the industry 
from one characterized by vertically integrated investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs) providing bundled, monopoly service at regulated prices, to one 
characterized by inter-firm bulk power transactions at market prices and 
competitive wholesale (and some retail) power markets. In a relatively short 
period of time, historically speaking, the business of delivering electricity 
has been “unbundled” from the business of selling it, and robust, competitive, 
and geographically broad wholesale markets have replaced what were once 
mostly local, intra-firm transactions. The rapid growth in the development 
of renewable sources of electricity, first wind farms, and, more recently, 
solar power, over the last several decades has added another layer of  
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complexity for managers of the electric grid, further complicating the 
process of developing well-functioning, competitive electricity markets. 
While this process began as a cooperative, iterative effort involving both 
FERC and Congress, Congress went mostly silent after 1992.180 The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 was Congress’s lone significant intervention in electricity 
markets over that time period,181 leaving FERC to manage this transfor-
mation mostly on its own, using statutory guidance that dates to 1935. 
1. Congressional Participation in the Early Stages of Restructuring 
The Federal Power Act of 1935182 charged FERC with (i) regulating the 
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and the sale of electricity 
at wholesale in interstate commerce, and (ii) ensuring that the rates charged 
for these services were “just and reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory.”183 For 
approximately sixty years following the passage of the Federal Power Act, 
FERC discharged this responsibility by establishing rates for the provision 
of bundled wholesale electric service184 by electric utilities—meaning that 
the buyer paid one price for electric service, rather than paying separately 
for the electricity and the service of delivering it. 
In the late 1970s, municipal utilities and industrial customers began to 
challenge IOUs’ monopoly control of the electric grid,185 while economists 
began to challenge the traditional model of electric power service that 
treated bundled electricity service as a natural monopoly.186 Congress 
 
180 Perhaps not coincidentally, it was about this time that the widening of the ideological 
divide in Congress began to accelerate. See Appendix, fig.A-8 (depicting the trend using the Poole 
and Rosenthal data through the increasing slope of the “Republicans” line and the decreasing slope 
of the “Democrats” line around 1992).  
181 Not coincidentally, the 2005 Act was passed during a rare episode of single party control 
of the legislative and executive branches, enacted by a Republican-controlled House and Senate, 
and signed into law by a Republican president. 
182 Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828c 
(2012)).  
183 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(b). 
184 Following well-established ratemaking principles that predated the Federal Power Act, 
FERC set rates at a level that would enable utilities to earn a reasonable return on prudent 
investments and recover reasonable costs. The seminal case describing the application of the “just 
and reasonable” standard is Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605-06 
(1944), in which the Court declined to overturn a ratemaking decision on the grounds that the 
commission had underestimated elements of the utility’s costs. 
185 These entities wanted to be able to purchase power from other suppliers and to use the 
IOUs’ transmission lines. FERC, however, had been loath to order IOUs to “wheel” power for 
third parties. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1973) (holding that 
the regulated industries exemption does not insulate IOUs from all antitrust liability).  
186 Economists began to argue that while the management of a network (in the case of elec-
tricity, the transmission and distribution “wires” business) was a natural monopoly, the sale of 
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nudged unbundling and competition forward by passing the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),187 which encouraged independent 
“merchant” generators to enter electricity markets previously unconnected to 
electric utilities and granted FERC limited authority to order IOUs to make 
their transmission lines available to third parties.188 PURPA stoked demand 
among the IOUs’ captive industrial customers for the right to purchase 
wholesale power directly from these new, non-utility generators, but did not 
change the fact that the IOUs still controlled the transmission system.189 In 
the fifteen years following PURPA’s passage, FERC led the way toward 
more competitive markets by using the regulatory levers it had, arguably 
going beyond what Congress had anticipated. For example, FERC moved 
incrementally to promote competition by authorizing individual firms to 
charge market-based rates190 and by requiring individual firms to provide 
open access to transmission lines as a “voluntary” concession in a series of 
adjudicative cases in which utilities sought merger approval or approval of 
market-based rates.191  
It was not until the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that  
Congress provided FERC with clear authority to order competitive wheeling 
 
energy was not. To the contrary, there could be efficiency gains by unbundling the wires business 
from the sale of electricity and introducing competition to the latter part of the business. See, e.g., 
Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 597-603 (1979) (“To decide that a firm is a natural monopolist with respect 
to one of its products and that it should be regulated does not decide the extent to which classical 
regulation should apply to other, related products of the firm.”).  
187 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 
U.S.C. (2012)).  
188 PURPA authorized FERC to order wheeling, but only if no “uncompensated economic 
loss” or “undue burden” on the transmission owner would result. If ordering wheeling would 
jeopardize existing relationships (including, presumably, the loss by the IOU of a valuable 
customer), then FERC could not order wheeling. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117, 3138-39, repealed by Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2916.  
189 Indeed, the federal courts had interpreted PURPA to prohibit FERC from ordering open 
access to transmission lines solely to enhance competition. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 
FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (holding that FERC “lacks the authority to 
require electric utilities to provide wheeling even on a reasonable request”); N.Y. Elec. & Gas 
Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 402 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the public interest and enhance-
ment of competition cannot alone compel wheeling). 
190 See, e.g., Dartmouth Power Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,117 (1990) (authorizing a 
nonutility generator to charge market-based rates based upon a determination that the generator 
did not possess market power in the relevant market). 
191 See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory 
Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 794-95 (explaining that 
FERC imposed open-access terms as a condition of approval for market-based rates and used its 
merger authority to impose these terms on a case-by-case basis). 
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(transmission of power over IOU lines for third parties),192 essentially 
ratifying FERC’s experiments with limited wheeling orders.193 The 1992 law 
added considerable momentum to the restructuring process and paved the 
way four years later for FERC Order No. 888,194 which ordered functional 
unbundling of wholesale electricity sales from transmission services, 
required owners of transmission lines to provide open-access transmission 
services on nondiscriminatory terms195 and opened wholesale electricity 
markets to competition.196 Although it was not evident at the time, the 1992 
law marked the end of Congress’s meaningful participation in the restruc-
turing process. Congress did pass the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which 
concerned mostly distributive policy issues,197 such as grants and subsidies 
designed to promote various types of energy development.198 But on the 
 
192 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905-10. 
193 In the Energy Policy of Act 1992, Congress also helped to facilitate competition by  
removing some restrictions on the growth of the independent power industry imposed by the 
Public Utility Holding Act of 1935. See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33739, THE 
REPEAL OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (PUHCA) AND ITS 
IMPACT ON ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 4 (2006) (explaining that the Energy Policy Act of 
1992 created an exemption from PUHCA for wholesale electricity generators).  
194 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmis-
sion Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting 
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). Order 888 
required transmission line owners to separate the firm’s transmission functions from its electricity 
sales functions. It did not require full legal separation of business units. See id. at 21,552. 
195 A companion order to Order No. 888, Order No. 889, specifies the specific terms according 
to which transmission line owners must make transmission services available on an open-access, 
nondiscriminatory basis. See Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time 
Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,740-41 (May 10, 1996) 
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). 
196 While buyers on wholesale markets were always free to purchase power from third-party 
buyers, Order 888’s requirement that transmission line owners treat transmission as a common 
carrier service, open to all on equal terms, led some integrated IOUs to spin off their generation 
assets and to acquire more power on wholesale markets from third parties. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, 
Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UTIL. POL’Y 95, 103 (2005) (describing Orders 888 and 
889 as the “primary federal foundation for the obligations imposed on transmission owners to provide 
to third parties unbundled transmission service, ancillary network support services, and information 
about the availability of these services to support both wholesale and retail competition”).  
197 Theodore Lowi has posited that it is easier for Congress to legislate distributive policies, 
because they promote logrolling and other forms of coalition building, while regulatory policies, 
which involve winners and losers, are inherently more divisive. Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of 
Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298, 299-300 (1972). 
198 Indeed, both the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 offered incentives to invest in specific generation technologies and grid innovations. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided incentives for hydroelectric production incentives in 
section 242, natural gas production from deep wells in shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico in 
section 344, diesel emissions reductions in section 795, and cellulosic biofuels production in 
section 942. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
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difficult regulatory questions of the day, Congress remained mostly quiet. 
FERC has thus managed the transition to robust, competitive wholesale 
power markets since 1992—a monumental shift in policy—in the absence of 
congressional guidance. 
2. Adapting the “Just and Reasonable” Standard to Market Rates 
After Order No. 888, FERC accelerated the process of authorizing 
wholesale sellers to sell power at market rates, rather than setting the rates 
itself in a traditional ratemaking proceeding. To accomplish this, FERC 
interpreted its traditional duty to set “just and reasonable rates” as encompass-
ing the authority to approve market-based rates. There was some precedent 
for the notion that market-based rates could be “just and reasonable” under 
the FPA. Under the long-standing Mobile–Sierra doctrine, FERC routinely 
authorized rates negotiated in long-term bilateral agreements between 
sophisticated parties, concluding that such rates satisfied the just and 
reasonable standard;199 Mobile–Sierra, however, had never been applied to 
sales in the new, fast-moving spot markets for electricity. Thus, authorizing 
the broad use of market rates represented a rather momentous shift away 
from historical understandings of cost of service regulation, which the 
agency undertook without the benefit of congressional amendment to the 
FPA.200  
FERC executed this strategy as part of a difficult transition from regu-
lated, localized electricity markets to geographically broader, more robust 
markets. The California electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001 illustrates the 
 
U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). Title XIII of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided tax incentives relating to electricity infrastructure, 
domestic fossil fuel security, conservation and energy efficiency, and alternative motor vehicles and 
fuels. See id. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 provided incentives for research 
and development of biofuels and geothermal energy. See Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386 (2012)). 
199 The Mobile–Sierra doctrine stands for the proposition that freely negotiated rates are 
presumed to be just and reasonable under both the FPA and NGA. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. 
Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. 
Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1956). 
200 Although the 1992 Energy Policy Act ratified FERC’s Open Access Order, it did not go 
so far as to authorize market rates explicitly. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 
§§ 721–722, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-19 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k (2012)). 
FERC’s previous jurisprudence interpreting the “just and reasonable” standard stressed that rates 
must reflect “a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests,” but emphasizing the fairness 
of the end result rather than any particular formula for the determination of rates. See, e.g., Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (reinforcing a focus on the 
outcome rather than “various permissible ways in which any rate base on which the return is 
computed might be arrived at”).  
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challenges FERC has faced trying to ensure that prices for power and 
transmission services remain “just and reasonable,” while seeking to promote 
efficiency in organized markets. During the crisis, wholesale energy prices 
in California skyrocketed to more than fifty times historical norms, driving 
one utility into bankruptcy.201 As a result, wholesale buyers flooded FERC 
with claims that prices charged by sellers violated the FPA’s just and 
reasonable standard, entitling them to refunds.202 In sorting out these 
claims, FERC learned that in the dysfunctional California market, sellers 
were able to charge exorbitant prices not only because their product was 
scarce, but also because sellers took steps to increase its scarcity, such as 
withholding generation from the market on high demand days203 or collud-
ing with affiliate companies.204 
FERC struggled with how to apply the statutory “just and reasonable” 
standard to these transactions. One cannot capture the efficiency of markets 
without letting prices fluctuate to signal the relative scarcity of the good, 
and high prices in the California market ought to have invited increases in 
supply and decreases in demand—at least in the long run. The California 
market, however, did not react in these ways because it was broken, a victim 
of manipulation made particularly easy by the market’s poor design.205 The 
FPA is silent on the question of what “just and reasonable” means in this 
context, and Congress has not spoken on the matter. Thus, it was left to the 
 
201 See Michael W. Lynch & Adrian Moore, Power Tripped, REASON, June 2001, at 32. 
202 In petitions to FERC after the crisis, buyers on California’s wholesale market claimed to 
have been overcharged by more than $9 billion. FERC ultimately decided that the figure was 
about half that. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, THE COMMISSION’S RESPONSE TO THE 
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS AND TIMELINE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF REFUNDS 14 (2005), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/comm-response.pdf. 
203 FERC has made a distinction between “economic withholding” and “physical withholding” 
of power on spot markets. Economic withholding refers to a seller’s practice of charging an 
exorbitantly high price for a product simply because the seller knows that the product is scarce and 
that buyers have no choice but to take it at the offered price; physical withholding refers to a 
seller’s practice of withholding from the market generation from one of the seller’s generating 
plants to create sufficient scarcity that the seller could demand exorbitant rates for power from its 
other plants. See Order Establishing Refund Effective Date and Proposing to Revise Market-Based 
Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220 (2010).  
204 For examples, see generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON 
MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS (2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/ 
electric/indus-act/wec.asp, which describes how some California market participants manipulated 
the market by scheduling phony spot market transactions designed to create congestion in the 
system so that they could be compensated for relieving congestion by forgoing those transactions. 
205 Of course, retail price caps in California prevented, or at least dampened, the reductions 
in demand one would expect to see from high prices. Indeed, during the crisis, retail customers in 
most of the state did not experience price increases. 
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courts to decide whether broadly applied market-based rates are “just and 
reasonable” under the FPA.  
In California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC,206 the Ninth Circuit determined 
that market-based rates are consistent with the just and reasonable standard, 
reasoning that FERC’s regulation of electricity rates under the FPA had 
long contemplated (and authorized, in the context of bilateral negotiations) 
market-based rates.207 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Lockyer 
case208 but took up another challenge arising out of the California crisis in 
the case of Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of 
Snohomish County.209 Morgan Stanley involved a challenge not to rates 
charged in the California spot market, but rather to rates paid by buyers 
who entered into long-term wholesale power purchase contracts at the tail 
end of the California crisis.210 The buyers argued that (i) manipulation in 
the California market artificially increased the negotiated contract rates, 
rendering them unjust and unreasonable, and (ii) the Mobile–Sierra doctrine’s 
presumption that such rates are just and reasonable is inapplicable to these 
contracts because FERC did not have an opportunity to approve the 
contract rates, and the contract rates were so high as to violate the public 
interest.211 The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, but remanded 
the case to FERC on procedural grounds.212 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
went out of its way to stress that the Court was not resolving “the lawfulness 
of the market-based-tariff system” under the FPA.213  
Thus, the courts have left FERC’s broad authorization of market-based 
rates intact. As for the question of how to control abuse of market power in 
electricity markets, eventually, the agency determined that sellers ought to 
be able to charge scarcity rents, but not to create scarcity where none exists.214  
 
206 383 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2004). 
207 Id. at 1013. 
208 551 U.S. 1140 (2007).  
209 554 U.S. 527 (2008). 
210 Id. at 540.  
211 Id. at 541. 
212 Id. at 530, 553-55. 
213 Id. at 538; see also id. at 548 (“We reiterate that we do not address the lawfulness of 
FERC’s market-based-rates scheme . . . . [A]ny needed revision in that scheme is properly 
addressed in a challenge to the scheme itself, not through a disfigurement of the venerable Mobile–
Sierra doctrine.”). 
214 FERC reasoned that sellers need to be able to charge scarcity rents and that abuse of 
market power is best addressed through close monitoring of seller behavior and the revocation of 
the authority to charge market rates where market power arises. For a detailed description of how 
FERC’s thinking on this issue evolved after the California crisis, see David B. Spence & Robert 
Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 131, 159-64 (2012).  
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The process by which FERC came to this conclusion reflects the same 
kind of strategic behavior EPA used when adapting the CAA to address the 
problem of GHG emissions—proposals of bold action followed by more 
measured action in the final analysis. FERC tried several approaches, only to 
withdraw them in response to public reaction. The agency initially suggested 
aggressive “market behavior rules” limiting the ability of sellers to engage in 
economic withholding215 and a “standard market design” for all transmission 
and wholesale power sales markets,216 but abandoned those proposals after 
they met widespread opposition.217 In the end, while Congress did not 
address the question of whether broad use of market pricing is consistent 
with the FPA, it did eventually address the question of how FERC ought to 
manage abuses of market power in wholesale electricity markets. In the only 
case in our sample in which Congress intervened to resolve a regulatory 
dilemma facing the agency, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed FERC 
to adopt an approach to market manipulation borrowed from the securities 
laws—one that focuses on the use of fraud or deceit in electricity markets.218  
3. Adapting the Transmission Grid to New Market Realities 
The rapid growth of competitive wholesale electricity markets has  
presented FERC with another problem that is ill-suited to an FPA regulatory 
regime from another, bygone era: namely, the problem of helping geograph-
ically broader, more active and robust wholesale markets grow and thrive on 
an aging, balkanized transmission grid. Increasingly, long-distance transmis-
sion of power is both economically desirable and technically efficient. 
Wholesale buyers now have the (at least theoretical) option of purchasing 
power from a larger universe (both numerically and geographically) of 
potential sellers;219 at the same time, engineers have improved the efficiency of 
transmitting power over greater distances.220 Consequently, more generating 
 
215 See Order Amending Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,218 
(2003), reh’g denied, 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,175 (2004). 
216 Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 
(proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).  
217 Order Terminating Proceeding, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,140 ( July 26, 2005). 
218 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 315, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2012)). 
219 See, e.g., COMPETE, RTO AND ISO MARKETS ARE ESSENTIAL TO MEETING OUR 
NATION’S ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 1-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.competecoalition.com/files/RTO%20White%20Paper_update%2010.6.10.pdf (describing the 
benefits of competitive energy markets, including lower prices for consumers). 
220 See Matthew L. Wald, Giving the Grid Some Backbone, SCI. AM. EARTH 3.0, Mar. 2009, at 
52, 56 (describing the possibility for a new system of high-voltage lines controlled by state-of-the-
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plants are being built farther and farther from loads. The last two decades 
have seen new wind and solar farms,221 almost all of which are located far 
from cities and often far from existing transmission lines.222 This has been 
spurred by a combination of technological advances,223 public policy incen-
tives like tax credits,224 and state renewable portfolio standards.225 Finally, the 
advent of the “smart grid” makes it possible to integrate information 
technology into the electricity transmission system,226 enabling grid opera-
tors to identify and avoid congestion problems, price power transfers more 
efficiently, and allow demand-side resources to participate in energy mar-
kets,227 all of which can enhance the value of long-distance power transmission. 
 The United States cannot capture this value if it cannot resolve to build 
interstate transmission lines, but finding that resolve has been difficult. 
 
art transmission centers); see also OFFICE OF ELEC. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION, U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, “GRID 2030:” A NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100 YEARS 11-15 
(2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/files/20050608125055-grid-2030.pdf (discussing 
possible technologies to expand delivery systems).  
221 According to the Energy Information Administration, in the decade between 2000 and 2011, 
renewable generating capacity grew from about sixteen gigawatts to more than sixty-one gigawatts. 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2011 tbl.4.2 B (2013), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/2011/pdf/epa.pdf. 
222 The best onshore wind resources are located in the upper Midwest and Great Plains, while 
the best solar resources are located in the desert Southwest. See Wind Maps, NAT’L RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/wind.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/UC3K-VEWU; Solar Maps, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/ 
gis/solar.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5VCZ-M2T9. 
223 For a summary of the improving competitiveness of renewable resources, see Benjamin 
K. Sovacool & Charmaine Watts, Going Completely Renewable: Is it Possible (Let Alone Desirable)?, 
ELECTRICITY J., May 2009, at 95, 98-99. 
224 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Renewed Tax Credit Buoys Wind-Power Projects, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2013, at B3 (describing an increase in development of wind projects in response to 
Congress’s renewal of the production tax credit in January 2013). 
225 Generally, renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) require that electricity retailers secure a 
specified percentage of electricity they sell from renewable sources. State RPSs differ widely, 
specifying different goals and defining qualified “renewable” sources differently. For a good summary 
of state standards and their strengths and weaknesses, see Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The 
Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010). See generally DSIRE: Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. STATE UNIV., http://www.dsireusa.org/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D44G-QN6Z (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (providing an unofficial review of state 
standards and incentives). 
226 The smart grid holds promise for almost every part of the electricity market, including 
generation, distribution, and consumption, as well as transmission. For a full description of the 
potential benefits of a smarter electric grid, see PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE 
CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2010). 
227 See generally NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NETL-2010/1413, 
UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS OF THE SMART GRID 3 (2010), available at http:// 
www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/research/energy%20efficiency/smart%20grid/whitepapers/06-18-
2010_Understanding-Smart-Grid-Benefits.pdf (outlining the benefits of the smart grid). 
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Most experts estimate that modernizing the grid to meet new electricity 
market needs will require investment in tens of thousands of miles of new 
transmission lines at costs in the tens of billions of dollars.228 Because the 
1935 Congress never conceived of national or regional power markets, the 
FPA of 1935 did not grant FERC the power to site interstate transmission 
lines in the way that its companion statute, the Natural Gas Act, granted 
the agency the power to site interstate natural gas pipelines.229 For these 
historical reasons, siting approval for transmission lines has traditionally 
rested with the states, and even sometimes with local governments. This is 
an artifact of the original configuration of the grid, built by vertically 
integrated, state-chartered IOUs to provide monopoly service within their 
individual service areas. Consequently, FERC has used its power to set 
wholesale power and transmission rates and to authorize the charging of 
market-based rates, as leverage to promote the development of an efficient, 
reliable transmission grid that serves larger and more robust wholesale 
markets. FERC has used that leverage strategically, alternating between 
bold action and caution.  
As a first step, in 1996, FERC’s Order No. 888 encouraged owners of 
transmission lines (mostly IOUs) to create and join regional nonprofit 
entities known as Independent System Operators (ISOs)230 (later, Regional 
 
228 See Wald, supra note 220, at 55-57 (explaining several proposed grid investment plans, 
involving tens of thousands of miles of new transmission lines costing tens of billions of dollars); 
see also RICHARD W. CAPERTON & MATT KASPER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RE-ENERGIZE 
REGIONAL ECONOMIES WITH NEW ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES 4 (2011), available at 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/12/pdf/transmission_lines.pdf 
(suggesting that the United States needs to invest at least $298 billion dollars to upgrade the grid by 
2030); FOX-PENNER, supra note 226, at 89-92 (describing plans for a transmission “superhighway”); 
Jeff St. John, Tres Amigas Raises Money for US Grid Super-Hub, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/tres-amigas-raises-money-for-u.s.-grid-super-hub/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LY4Y-AHJX. 
229 Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act authorizes FERC to grant certificates of public conven-
ience and necessity to builders and operators of interstate natural gas pipelines. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717f (2012). With the certificate comes the power of eminent domain. Id. at § 717f(h). The 
Supreme Court has determined that the power granted to FERC under the NGA preempts state 
and local regulation of pipelines. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) 
(“[W]e conclude that [the state statute] regulates in a field the NGA has occupied to the exclusion 
of state law, and that it therefore is pre-empted.”). 
230 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Trans-
mission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmit-
ting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,591-21,597 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 
and 385). Transmission owners retain ownership of their lines when they join the ISO, but 
relinquish control over their use (including pricing and scheduling of transmission services) to the 
ISO. Id. 
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Transmission Organizations or RTOs231) to manage the grid, ensure system 
reliability, and guard against discrimination and the exercise of market 
power in the provision of transmission services.232 The new grid managers 
would be independent of any individual utility and would have operational 
control of multi-utility transmission networks; they would answer to 
FERC.233 Because FERC lacked the explicit authority under the FPA to 
mandate participation in such bodies, however, it used the levers it had to 
encourage their formation. FERC issued orders establishing “principles” for 
ISOs and RTOs and made clear it would strongly prefer all utilities to join 
them.234 FERC also conditioned other benefits, such as merger approval 
and approval of market-based rates, on utilities’ willingness to participate in 
ISOs/RTOs.235 In the end, however, the agency lacked the authority to 
force utilities to form or join ISOs/RTOs, and Congress declined to grant 
it. Nevertheless, in the Northeast, most of the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, 
Texas, and California, wholesale power markets and utilities’ grid assets are 
 
231 FERC’s Order No. 2000 established the parameters for creating RTOs. Regional Trans-
mission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 ( Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). RTOs 
operate similarly to ISOs. FERC originally hoped that RTOs would be much broader geograph-
ically. We now, however, use the terms RTO and ISO interchangeably. 
232 The transition to competition has meant that more energy producers are feeding power 
into the grid through an ever multiplying number of transactions, creating larger loop-flow 
problems than the networks had experienced before. 
233 It is FERC’s responsibility to ensure that transmission in power markets operates in ways 
that are consistent with the Federal Power Act. In the organized markets managed by RTOs, 
however, FERC oversees the RTOs, and the RTOs bear front-line responsibility for ensuring that 
wholesale electric markets function properly and provide reliable service. That is, RTOs ensure 
that the grid remains in balance and manage investment in the upkeep and expansion of the grid 
to meet changing market conditions. RTOs also monitor purchases and sales on the spot market to 
ensure that pricing is efficient and that neither buyers nor sellers are exercising market power. In 
most (but not all) places where there is not an RTO to manage wholesale markets, IOUs remain 
vertically integrated and traditionally regulated such that the volume and geographic reach of 
third-party wholesale transactions are smaller; in these settings, IOUs manage reliability 
collectively through informal power pools. During the 1990s, a sizable minority of states also opted 
to restructure their retail electricity markets, mandating the unbundling of electricity sales from 
distribution services, opening up retail sales to competition and authorizing market pricing. As a 
consequence of these changes, RTOs now manage organized and robust regional wholesale 
electricity markets in the northeastern and midwestern United States, as well as Texas and 
California, with FERC oversight. 
234 See Promoting Wholesale Competition, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,595 (encouraging utilities to 
form “properly structured” ISOs voluntarily and establishing principles to guide their formation); 
see also Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 811 (encouraging the formation of 
regional bodies and stating that FERC’s “objective is for all transmission-owning entities in the 
Nation, including non-public utility entities, to place their transmission facilities under the control 
of appropriate RTOs in a timely manner”).  
235 See Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in 
Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 573-82 (2005). 
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now managed by ISOs/RTOs.236 This represents a monumental change in 
the industry in these regions, one affected primarily by FERC’s creativity 
and persistence with very little assistance from Congress.  
FERC faced another obstacle in its efforts to usher the transmission 
system into the twenty-first century. ISOs/RTOs can encourage members to 
pursue transmission and generation investments that suit modern power 
markets, but they cannot force those investments. States and local  
governments often have little or no incentive to approve the construction of 
transmission lines that cross through their jurisdiction, but provide no 
benefits (for example, electricity service or jobs at the generating plant) 
within that jurisdiction. Indeed, many state permitting regimes deny the 
state public utility commission the authority to approve transmission lines 
that do not provide in-state benefits or are not constructed by utilities 
providing power service within the state.237  
Congress has not been oblivious to this problem, but its lone attempt to 
address it was timid and unsuccessful. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 tried 
to encourage states to form compacts to manage the process of transmission 
planning.238 More directly, section 216 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
attempted to provide FERC with limited “backstop authority” over siting 
transmission lines in regions suffering from severe transmission congestion 
problems and designated by the Department of Energy (DOE) as “national 
interest electric transmission corridor[s].”239 Specifically, section 216 
authorizes FERC to approve a transmission project in such a corridor—
preempting local law—if it concludes that the state (i) lacks the authority to 
approve the line or to consider the interstate benefits in rendering its 
decision240 or (ii) has “withheld approval for more than [one] year” or 
 
236 See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC, 
http://ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Aug. 26, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7U93-TRJ3 (showing current ISOs/RTOs). 
237 See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving 
Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 
705, 748-70 (2010) (discussing how recent developments have challenged the definition of “public 
interest”); Richard J. Pierce, Environmental Regulation, Energy and Market Entry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 167 (2005) (discussing three specific contexts—gasoline production, liquefied 
natural gas importation, and electricity transmission—where environmental regulation methods 
conflict with energy policy goals); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Bringing the Camel into the Tent: 
State and Federal Power over Electricity Transmission, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 100-02 (2001) 
(making recommendations about federal transmission legislation). 
238 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012) (authorizing three or more contiguous states to enter into 
an interstate compact that establishes regional siting agencies to carry out those states’ siting 
responsibilities). 
239 Id. § 824p(a)(2). 
240 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(A). 
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conditioned its approval so as to reduce substantially the congestion relief 
benefits of the line or render the line economically unfeasible.241 While 
DOE did designate a few national interest corridors,242 two circuit courts 
have overturned the rules FERC promulgated to guide its use of this 
authority,243 and FERC has been unable to deploy it. Significantly, the 
Fourth Circuit’s reading of the statute permitted any state to avoid the 
application of section 216 simply by denying approval to a new transmission 
line proposal.244 FERC has interpreted these judicial setbacks as “a significant 
constraint on the Commission’s already-limited ability to approve appropri-
ate projects to transmit energy in interstate commerce,”245 and many 
observers now consider the statutory provision ineffectual.246  
Although the FERC chairman has repeatedly asked Congress to provide 
more robust backstop transmission siting authority, Congress has failed to 
do so.247 Thus, in this instance, FERC has been unable to find a creative 
solution to the problem of state law impediments to transmission line siting. 
Unable to use federal siting as a stick to force more investment in transmis-
sion, however, FERC has instead tried to induce investment using a carrot 
of transmission rate pricing incentives.  
 
241 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C). 
242 See National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992 (Oct. 5, 
2007) (designating two national interest electric transmission corridors). 
243 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(overturning the rules for failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act); 
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding multiple 
problems with the rules).  
244 See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 310 (“The phrase [withheld approval of a permit application for 
more than one year] does not include, as FERC held, the denial of an application.”). 
245 Transmission Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 111th 
Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, FERC). The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in the Piedmont case. Edison Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl. Council, 130 S.Ct. 
1138 (2010).  
246 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 
ENVTL. L. 1015, 1037 (2009) (“[S]ome interpret the decision as seriously hobbling FERC’s ability 
to implement its backstop authority.”). The Waxman–Markey Bill contained a provision that 
would have strengthened FERC’s backstop siting authority, but only in portions of the western 
United States. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 151(b) (2009) (stating that the powers only apply to the Western Interconnection). The Obama 
administration briefly considered, then abandoned, a plan to continue to try and use section 216 
authority. See Lynn Garner, Energy Department Drops Plan to Cede Power to FERC for Siting 
Transmission Lines, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2297 (2011).  
247 Specifically, Congress failed to pass three bills that would have increased FERC’s back-
stop authority. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 151 
(2009); American Clean Energy Leadership Act, S. 1462, 111th Cong. § 121 (2009); Clean 
Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, S. 539, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). 
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Even if new transmission line projects are able to navigate state approval 
processes successfully, they face yet another hurdle stemming from the 
original provisions of the FPA. In order to finance new transmission 
investment, line owners must be able to recover their investment. The FPA 
requires that transmission rates be “just and reasonable” and not “unduly 
discriminatory or preferential,”248 and courts have interpreted this language 
to require that only ratepayers who benefit from a new transmission line 
bear the capital costs of constructing it. This raises the question of who 
benefits from new transmission investment: is it only the direct customers 
of the new line or also the indirect beneficiaries of the enhanced reliability 
and cleaner energy mix provided by the new line? The answer to this 
question can determine whether there are enough beneficiaries to justify the 
investment in the first place.  
FERC has faced the question of how to encourage new transmission 
investment in the shadow of this “beneficiary pays” rule, which seems to 
have had a chilling effect on investment in new transmission lines, particularly 
those designed to bring remote renewable power to the grid.249 Interestingly, 
transmission lines are being approved and built in Texas with relative speed 
and ease,250 where much of the grid lies beyond the jurisdiction of the FPA 
and FERC.251 The Commission has tried to help ISOs/RTOs and other 
 
248 See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012). 
249 The Seventh Circuit struck down a recent transmission rate proposal, which would have 
spread transmission costs widely, for failing to adhere to this principle. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n 
v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (“FERC is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme 
that requires a group of utilities to pay for facilities from which its members derive no bene-
fits . . . .”). The court, however, offered a qualification to the “beneficiary pays” principle: “We 
do not suggest that the Commission has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for that matter 
to the last million or ten million or perhaps hundred million dollars.” Id. at 477; see also K N 
Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding FERC cost-spreading 
order when “all segments of the industry . . . will nonetheless ultimately benefit from their 
resolution”). 
250 Investors have poured $6.8 billion into new transmission lines in Texas, which will deliver 
double the wind capacity to consumers as new wind farms develop. Texas to Double Wind Capacity, 
Deliver to Major Cities, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Apr. 1, 2013, 1:31 PM), http:// 
www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24725, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
LX63-PTS5. In 2005, Texas created “competitive renewable energy zones” (“CREZ zones”), areas 
suitable for development of wind resources. The state offered financial incentives for investment 
in renewable power within the CREZ zones, and decided to “socialize” the costs of building 
transmission generators in the CREZ zones eastward to those in San Antonio, Houston, and the 
remainder of central and east Texas. The presence of this new transmission, in turn, has sparked 
the development of more renewable generation in Texas than in any other state. See Matthew L. 
Wald, Wired for Wind, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at B1.  
251 The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) is an RTO that manages a grid 
that is functionally separate from the remainder of the American power grid, and comprises most 
of the grid within the State of Texas. See Jared M. Fleisher, ERCOT’s Jurisdictional Status: A Legal 
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transmission owners navigate this “beneficiary pays” rule by promulgating 
Order No. 1000,252 which establishes cost allocation guidelines for new 
transmission investments.253 Order No. 1000 incorporates language from a 
recent court decision applying the beneficiary pays principle,254 which 
reflects FERC’s awareness of the need to remain within judicial views of 
FPA boundaries. At the same time, FERC gently pushes those boundaries 
by authorizing ISOs/RTOs and other transmission owners to consider 
“public policy benefits” among the benefits to which transmission costs can 
be allocated.255 Presumably, this means that, when reviewing transmission 
cost allocation schemes, FERC will look relatively favorably on the alloca-
tion of costs to ratepayers who may not receive electricity over the new line, 
but rather receive only environmental and reliability benefits, so long as 
those benefits are not trivial.256 Indeed, FERC has already approved a 
proposal by the Midwest ISO to allocate the costs associated with a portfolio 
of new transmission lines designated as “multi-value projects”—lines that 
would, collectively, offer reliability and environmental and other benefits to 
the entire RTO system—to ratepayers across the entire RTO region.257 The 
Seventh Circuit recently affirmed FERC’s decision to approve Midwest 
ISO’s multi-value project portfolio,258 seemingly vindicating FERC’s 
approach to the problem. Indeed, during oral argument of the case before 
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Wood endorsed a broad view of the “beneficiary 
 
History and Contemporary Appraisal, 3 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 4, 4 (2008) (explaining that 
ERCOT is “the network of interconnected utilities that together cover approximately 75 percent 
of the land area in the state of Texas”). The reasons for this separation traced back to the desire of 
the Texas utilities to remain free from FERC jurisdiction. See id. at 10 (explaining that in response 
to the passage of the Federal Power Act in 1935, Texas utilities sought to cut themselves off from 
interstate commerce to evade federal jurisdiction). 
252 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
253 Id. at 49,918-49,930. 
254 Specifically, FERC borrows from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Illinois Commerce 
Commission v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 2009), by requiring that each of the costs assigned 
to utility ratepayers be “roughly commensurate” with the benefits the line will bring to those 
ratepayers. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,922.  
255 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,876 (“The Commis-
sion requires public utility transmission providers to amend their OATTs to describe procedures 
that provide for the consideration of transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements in 
the local and regional transmission planning processes.”). 
256 For an interesting analysis of the federalism issues posed by the transmission lines siting 
problem, see generally Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges 
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012). 
257 For additional information, see id. at 1851-55. FERC ultimately upheld the multi-value 
project. See FERC Upholds MISO’s MVP Transmission Cost Allocation Methodology, RESTRUCTURING 
TODAY, Oct. 21, 2011, at 1. 
258 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 777 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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pays” principle in language that highlights the poor fit between the statute 
and modern bulk power markets:  
[E]nergy is a much more tradable commodity than people thought in the 
1950s or the 1930s or what have you. There are enormous areas over which 
energy can be efficiently transmitted, so to say that [one part of the Midwest 
ISO] needs to be carved off as its own area just doesn’t make sense to me.259 
On the other hand, this same court recently overturned FERC’s approval 
of a cost allocation scheme for another RTO’s new transmission line on the 
grounds that FERC did not adequately support its conclusion that benefits 
of the line flow beyond the line’s immediate customer base.260  
Presumably, the question of how to implement the “beneficiary pays” 
principle will continue to hamper FERC’s and the ISOs’/RTOs’ attempts 
to implement Order No. 1000. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
the issue, and Congress has not spoken to it. The D.C. Circuit, however, 
recently upheld Order No. 1000,261 endorsing FERC’s use of the FPA’s just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rate mandate to compel transmission 
owners to consider public policy benefits262 in allocating the costs of new 
transmission lines.263  
Given its recent victory in the D.C. Circuit, FERC is likely to continue 
to try to adapt Depression-era statutory language to twenty-first century 
electricity markets—that is, to use its authority over transmission rates to 
push transmission owners to plan new investments and to facilitate financing 
by authorizing cost-spreading over as wide a ratepayer base as possible, 
consistent with the FPA.  
4. Adapting the Federal Power Act to Clean Energy Goals 
The proliferation of state and federal public policies promoting the use 
of clean energy and conservation has presented FERC with yet another 
 
259 Oral Argument at 16:19, Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(Nos. 11-3421, 11-3430, 11-3584, 11-3585, 11-3586, 11-3620, 11-3787, 11-3795, 11-3806, 12-1027), available 
at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2013/sk.11-3421.11-3421_04_10_2013.mp3. 
260 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Nos. 13-1674, 13-1676, 13-2052, 13-2262, slip op. at 5 
(7th Cir. June 24, 2014) (rejecting FERC’s approval of a plan to allocate some of the costs of a new 
line in the eastern part of the PJM RTO territory to utilities in the western part because FERC 
failed to make sufficient attempts to quantify the reliability and other benefits of the line to 
western utilities). 
261 See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, No. 12-1232, 2014 WL 3973116, at *17-20 (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 15, 2014).  
262 See id. at 17-24 (holding that FERC is entitled to deference given its “expertise and expe-
rience” in finding that “planning and cost allocation practices were unjust or unreasonable”). 
263 See id. at 39 (rejecting the challenge to FERC’s authority to adopt cost allocation reforms).  
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challenge to which the FPA does not speak clearly. Specifically, the rapid 
growth of wind and solar generation, and the development of smart grid 
technology enabling electricity consumers to reduce demand or shift it to 
off-peak periods, pose their own challenges to operators of newly robust 
regional wholesale markets. Since the 1980s, more than half of American 
states have adopted some form of renewable energy standard; some have 
gone further. California’s AB 32 established a statewide program of GHG 
emission regulation, and other states have been active promoters of clean 
energy as well.264 Aside from the problem of building transmission lines to 
connect these new, often remotely located facilities to the grid, the penetra-
tion of wind and other renewable sources in the market presents FERC 
with new questions of how these new sources of generation should be 
compensated and otherwise accommodated by wholesale electricity markets. 
As with other electricity market issues, beyond generalized expressions of 
support for clean energy and demand response,265 Congress has declined to 
offer guidance on the kind of zero-sum questions at the heart of integrating 
renewables into wholesale electricity markets, leaving those divisive questions 
for FERC and the courts.  
FERC has promoted clean energy by requiring changes to standard  
interconnection agreements to facilitate grid interconnection of renewable 
energy resources.266 It has also declined to use its enforcement authority 
against states setting favorable power purchase rates for renewable energy.267 
 
264 See 2006 Cal. Stat. 3419-3431; see also Memorandum of Understanding Between Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont (Dec. 20, 2005), available at 
http://rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf (forming the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), a cooperative effort between states in the northeast to regulate GHGs within their borders 
using a marketable permit system). In addition, in 2014, New York published for public comment a 
“draft energy plan” that would more aggressively promote clean energy and efficiency in the state’s 
power sector. N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ENERGY: 2014 
DRAFT NEW YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN (2014), available at http://energyplan.ny.gov/-media/ 
nysenergyplan/2014stateenergyplan-documents/2014-draft-nysep-vol1.pdf.  
265 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized FERC to promote the use of demand re-
sponse, stating that “[i]t is the policy of the United States that time-based pricing and other forms 
of demand response . . . shall be encouraged . . . and unnecessary barriers to demand response 
participation . . . shall be eliminated.” Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(f ), 119 Stat. 594, 966 (codified 
at 16 U.S.C. § 2642 (2012)). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 requested that 
FERC conduct a “[n]ational [a]ssessment” of demand response potential. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
§ 529, 121 Stat. 1492, 1664 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8279 (2012)). 
266 See Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 49,846 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring changes to pro forma 
large generator interconnection agreements to accommodate variable energy resources). 
267 See Notice of Intent Not to Act, 134 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,271 (Mar. 31, 2011) (declining to enforce 
PURPA requirements against the California Public Utilities Commission); Petition for Enforcement 
at 10-14 (FERC Jan. 31, 2010) (No. EL11-19). FERC’s regulations implementing PURPA require 
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Of course, most new utility-scale renewable electricity comes from wind 
energy, and wind power is intermittent. This poses a problem for grid 
operators, who must continuously balance loads. Wind power is dispatched 
to the grid whenever it is available because, in the usual case, generation 
sources are dispatched to the grid in ascending order of marginal cost.268 
Because grid operators cannot count on wind capacity, however, they may 
deny wind generation capacity credits available to more reliable sources of 
electricity, penalize wind generators financially for failing to provide 
forecasted amounts of energy, and charge wind generators for the additional 
“ancillary services” (which are compensated changes in supply or demand 
necessary to balance loads) necessary to back up wind.269 Wind generators 
claim that these practices are unfair and that wind forecasting has improved 
greatly, reducing the amount of regulation and reserves needed to supple-
ment wind power.  
In response, FERC issued Order No. 764 on the integration of “variable 
energy resources” (VERs) in June 2012.270 Order No. 764 requires transmis-
sion utilities (including RTOs and ISOs) to schedule transmission in 
smaller increments of time (fifteen minutes rather than sixty minutes), 
thereby increasing the likelihood that wind power will hit its projected 
generation target within the specified increment.271 To promote centralized 
wind forecasting, the rule also requires wind generators to provide wind 
forecasting data to transmission utilities and transmission utilities to 
provide regulation service necessary to support wind.272  
FERC has also promoted a cleaner energy mix by pursuing policies that 
support the widespread use of demand response,273 reasoning that the 
 
that rates paid for power from PURPA qualifying generators not exceed the cost of alternative 
generation. Cf. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2014). 
268 The marginal cost of wind generation is effectively zero, so it is dispatched even before 
cheap coal power. 
269 Joshua Z. Rokach, Bending to the Wind, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2011, at 86, 88. 
270 Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482 ( July 13, 2012) (to be codi-
fied at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
271 See id. at 41,491. 
272 See id. at 41,508. 
273 Some FERC commissioners may see such policies as an extension of their traditional 
authority to ensure open access to the grid on fair terms, rather than because they believe FERC’s 
mandate includes promoting clean energy. Others, however, may embrace a clean energy agenda 
more explicitly. Either way, integrating cleaner energy into the grid can have salutary effects on 
both reliability and prices. FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, named to the commission by 
President George W. Bush in 2006 and elevated to chairman by President Barack Obama in 2009, 
made no secret of his aims to take more concrete action in this regard:  
I have a vision of our energy future . . . . Where energy efficiency, demand re-
sponse, micro-generation, combined heat and power and other distributed resources 
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participation of demand-response resources in electricity markets can help 
to mitigate electricity prices by lowering demand at peak times by displacing 
other more expensive (and sometimes higher polluting) generation sources 
in those markets. Yet these policies have proven controversial. In Order No. 
719,274 FERC required ISOs/RTOs to accept bids from demand response 
resources for certain “ancillary services” on a basis comparable to other 
resources.275 FERC also required ISOs/RTOs to permit an aggregator of 
retail customers to bid demand response on behalf of a group of retail 
customers directly into the organized wholesale energy market.276 In 2011, 
FERC went further, issuing Order No. 745.277 Order No. 745 seeks to 
remove barriers to fuller participation of demand response in wholesale 
markets by requiring ISOs and RTOs to compensate such resources at the 
market price for energy (known as the locational marginal price or “LMP”) 
under certain conditions. The D.C. Circuit, however, struck down Order 
No. 745, concluding that it tramples on state jurisdiction over retail sales of 
electricity by luring retail buyers into wholesale power markets (as providers 
 
are the first source of energy services for most consumers. And those distributed re-
sources are fully supplemented with competitive procurement of large-scale wind, 
solar, hydro, geothermal and other renewable resources rounding out a significant 
share of our total energy resource mix for North America.  
Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, FERC, Statement at NARUC Summer Meetings: International 
Presentation on a Shared Energy Vision for North America: Regulations, Markets, and the Environment 
( July 20, 2009), available at https://www.ferc.gov/media/statements-speeches/wellinghoff/2009/07-20-
09-wellinghoff.pdf. 
274 Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 
(Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35), order on reh’g, Wholesale Competition in 
Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,776 ( July 29, 2009) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35). 
275 See id. at 64,103-64,104. 
276 The Commission explained:  
We find that allowing an [aggregator] to act as an intermediary for many small retail 
loads that cannot individually participate in the organized market would reduce a 
barrier to demand response. Aggregating small retail customers into larger pools of 
resources expands the amount of resources available to the market, increases compe-
tition, helps reduce prices to consumers and enhances reliability.  
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,119 
(Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
277 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 
16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (seeking to balance the strain on the 
electric system by giving customers incentives to reduce energy consumption when wholesale 
energy prices are high). For an analysis of Order No. 745, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on 
Demand Response and a Critique of Order 745, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102 (2012). 
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of demand response resources)278 and would overcompensate demand 
response providers, resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates.279  
For these two policy choices—integrating renewables and demand  
response into wholesale markets—FERC has taken an aggressive approach 
that leverages its power over wholesale rates to push clean energy goals. 
Given the proliferation of renewable generation and demand response 
aggregators in electricity markets, FERC did not have the option of ignoring 
the issue. The treatment of these resources in wholesale electricity markets 
is essentially an economic issue—one that implicates the FPA mandate that 
wholesale rates be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Absent congres-
sional guidance, FERC has been left to manage these twenty-first century 
issues using the regulatory levers it was granted in a 1935 law.  
5. Bad Fit, FERC, and the Courts 
Over the last two decades FERC faced a new competitive electricity 
market, demand for more bulk power transfers and insufficient investment 
in new transmission, challenges caused by the integration of more and more 
renewable resources, and opportunities posed by smart grid technology. 
Realistically, the agency had no choice but to respond to these challenges. 
Like EPA, FERC has approached problems of bad fit with a combination of 
gusto and caution but always with a strategic sense. And like EPA, FERC 
has not “gone for broke.” True, FERC rather boldly embraced the wide-
spread use of market-based rates for wholesale power (before, during, and 
after the California energy crisis) despite lacking clear congressional 
authorization to do so. Yet to promote competition, FERC forced the 
unbundling of electric power generation and transmission in interstate 
 
278 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486, slip op. at 16 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 2014). 
279 The court concluded that paying LMP for demand-response services improperly allows 
demand-response providers to “retain the savings associated with [the provider’s] avoided retail 
generation cost,” resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates. Id. at 15 (quoting Demand Response 
Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,680 (Mar. 24, 
2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting)). Petitioners claimed that 
LMP overcompensates demand-response providers because they incur no real costs in providing 
their “resource” to the market, while providers of power earn the LMP minus their costs of 
generation. See Brief of Robert L. Borlick, Joseph Bowring, James Bushnell, and 18 Other Leading 
Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18-20, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, No. 11-
1486 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 2012). In a vigorous dissent, Judge Edwards accepted FERC’s claim of 
jurisdiction based on the power to correct “practices affecting” wholesale rates. Indeed, he 
characterized that interpretation of the FPA as “straightforward and sensible” and consistent with 
precedent, and urged deference to the agency’s “well-reasoned and permissible interpretation 
of . . . the statute.” Elec. Power Supply Assoc., No. 11-1486, slip op. at 13-14, 22 (Edwards, J., 
dissenting). 
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markets only, stopping short of exerting similar authority over retail 
markets traditionally governed by the states. To create incentives for 
additional transmission capacity, FERC has bootstrapped its authority over 
rates in numerous creative ways yet has eschewed more aggressive mandates 
over market design. Under the auspices of its rate-setting authority, FERC 
midwifed the birth of new regional institutions capable of managing the 
increasingly complex electricity grid, but never required the states to join 
them. Finally, FERC has sought to force wholesale markets to be more 
welcoming to renewable resources and demand response, taking risks that it 
believes will survive judicial scrutiny.  
All of these efforts have involved interpretations of eighty-year-old stat-
utory language written by a Congress that could not have imagined most of 
the problems FERC now faces. Yet that Congress did give FERC broad 
authority to ensure that electricity rates are just and reasonable and  
nondiscriminatory. Most of the issues FERC must now confront involve the 
scope of that authority in light of new challenges in electricity markets. 
Thus the agency must ask: is the general use of market-based rates con-
sistent with this statutory mandate? May the agency specify cost allocation 
methods for new transmission investment to ensure that transmission rates 
are nondiscriminatory? Does requiring the payment of locational marginal 
prices to providers of demand resources yield prices that are just and 
reasonable? These are significant policy choices, which one might expect 
Congress to make—or at least to shape substantially through periodic 
interventions. Instead, at least for the foreseeable future, these judgments 
will be made not by Congress but by FERC, under the supervision of the 
federal courts.  
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION  
FOR REGULATORY POLICYMAKING 
As our examples show, when agencies adopt innovative methods to adapt 
an old statutory scheme to new problems, their strategic choices invite 
judicial scrutiny. Indeed, given the extent of congressional dysfunction 
noted by political scientists, and the aging regulatory statutes in the U.S. 
Code, courts are likely to face an increasing number of cases in which they 
must decide the legality of agency policy decisions on issues not foreseen by 
Congress when it enacted the agency’s enabling legislation. Surely, as courts 
encounter these increasingly high-stakes questions of statutory fit, they do 
so knowing that Congress will be unable, in all likelihood, to muster a 
legislative resolution. This prospect raises the question of how agencies and 
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courts can be expected to behave, and how they should behave, in such a 
strategic environment. 
A. The New Strategic Environment for Agencies 
Public choice scholars have conceived of agency policymaking as a  
principal–agent problem in which agency independence implies a democratic 
deficit: the elected branches, Congress and the President (the principals), 
struggle to control an agency (the agent), whose actions may reflect shirking 
and moral hazard.280 According to this view, the principals use the statute (a 
form of ex ante control) to steer agencies toward favored outcomes, in part 
by empowering interest groups to use litigation and the courts toward those 
favored ends;281 politicians also use monitoring and oversight (ex post 
controls) to keep the agency pointed in the right direction.282 Alternatively, 
the Wilsonian view conceives of agency policymaking from the agency’s 
point of view, as a kind of constrained optimization problem in which the 
expert agency pursues its statutory mission subject to both the boundaries 
of the statute (as defined by the courts) and political oversight by Congress 
and the President.283 Under both views, agencies are charged with statutory 
missions and must make policy decisions subject to (imperfect or limited) 
political controls and to statutory boundaries determined ultimately by the 
courts. Each of the four governmental participants in this ongoing dynamic 
is strategic: that is, each acts with an understanding of the others’ powers 
and in anticipation of what the others might do. Thus, the de facto removal 
of Congress from this game changes the strategic environment for the other 
actors and thus changes their decisions.  
The most obvious consequence of congressional dysfunction is that 
Congress cannot use legislation to determine or steer agency reactions to 
new policy challenges within its jurisdiction. It is also axiomatic that if 
 
280 For a summary of this literature, see George A. Krause, Legislative Delegation of Authority 
to Bureaucratic Agencies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 521-544 
(Robert F. Durant ed., 2010). 
281 This articulation of the political control hypothesis within the public choice literature is 
most associated with Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. See generally 
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. 
Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989). 
282 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (describing two models of ex post 
controls). 
283 See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887) (advocat-
ing for a “scientific” approach to public administration unfettered by political interference). 
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Congress is absent from the contest to influence agency decisions, this will, 
all else equal, inure to the benefit of the President in that contest.284 In 
addition to directing the executive agencies, whose heads he fires at will, the 
President can also influence the policy agenda of independent agencies, 
mostly through the power of appointment. While mobilizing agencies can 
be costly and time consuming for the President, when the political benefits 
of doing so are substantial enough and the legal means are readily available, 
it can be done by a motivated White House.285 Our two examples are 
illustrative; President Obama has invested significant political capital in 
EPA’s implementation of GHG regulation, and his appointments to FERC 
have spearheaded that agency’s effort to adapt electricity policy to the rise 
of renewable energy, smart grid technology, and geographically broader, 
more robust, and more competitive wholesale power markets.  
The President clearly chose to take ownership of executive branch policy 
on climate change—announcing important rulemakings from the Rose 
Garden,286 riding herd on potential inter-agency conflicts,287 and proclaiming 
a “climate action plan” instructing EPA to issue certain rules by specific 
deadlines.288 Although the President’s sway over FERC’s policy agenda 
seems less direct, it may be nearly as effective. During his first term, the 
President chose a commission chair with very sympathetic views about clean 
energy deployment, and the President supported him both publicly and 
privately.289 He raised the profile of a number of issues in FERC’s domain, 
 
284 See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAW &  
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 15-28 (describing the president’s tools of political influence 
over agencies). 
285 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2282-2303 (2001) 
(describing administrative policy initiatives led by the White House and claimed by President Bill 
Clinton as political victories). 
286 See Remarks by the President on National Fuel Efficiency Standards, WHITE HOUSE (May 19, 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-A-New-Consensus-on-Auto-Emissions, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7YTC-KK5G. 
287 See Memorandum of May 21, 2010: Improving Energy Security, American Competitive-
ness and Job Creation, and Environmental Protection Through a Transformation of Our Nation’s 
Fleet of Cars and Trucks, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (May 26, 2010) (directing EPA and NHTSA to 
work together on post-2017 fuel efficiency rules). 
288 See Memorandum of June 25, 2013: Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,535 ( July 1, 2013). 
289 Chairman Jon B. Wellinghoff had a long history of supporting such policies prior to his 
service as a FERC commissioner, and was chosen by the president as chairman in part because of 
them. Shortly before his nomination to FERC, Wellinghoff was focused on renewable energy 
policy, proposing Nevada’s renewable portfolio standards (RPS) legislation and consulting on RPS 
proposals in six other states. See Moeller and Wellinghoff Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Energy & Natural Res., 109th Cong. 10-13 (2006) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, nominee, FERC 
comm’r). 
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giving prominent speeches about topics like renewable energy, the Smart 
Grid, and energy efficiency.290 The White House also coordinated a number 
of inter-agency initiatives, and included FERC, bringing the agency 
somewhat “into the fold.”291 This is not to say that the President’s power 
over an executive agency like EPA versus an independent agency like 
FERC is identical, but it may turn out to be sufficient to allow him to 
pursue his goals effectively.  
Our two policy examples also highlight the importance of consistency 
between the President’s agenda and the agency’s mission in an era of 
congressional dysfunction. Where the President’s objectives and the agency’s 
mission are in conflict, as in the case of the George W. Bush administration’s 
resistance to GHG regulation, the result can be turmoil and struggle.292 
Where the two align, the President can be expected to support the kind of 
creativity and initiative exhibited by the agencies we have examined here. 
Thus, while the Bush administration opposed GHG regulation and justified 
inaction in ways that the courts ultimately claimed conflicted with the 
CAA,293 the Obama administration’s desire to address climate change was 
consistent with EPA’s environmental protection mandate and with Massa-
chusetts v. EPA. Neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations have 
seemed at odds with FERC’s mission to promote competition; both appear 
to have accepted the transformation of wholesale electricity markets  
(although the Obama administration may have been relatively more eager to 
promote the integration of renewable sources of electricity into those 
markets). In any event, we see no fundamental misalignment between 
 
290 E.g., Barack Obama, President, Remarks on Recovery Act Funding for Smart Grid Tech-
nology (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
recovery-act-funding-smart-grid-technology. 
291 See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (exploring coordination between agencies given overlapping and 
fragmented delegations of authority). 
292 Career staff can resist the direction of political appointees, and appointees may come to 
align themselves with the perspective of the agency rather than that of the President. By some 
accounts, both of these dynamics were at work during the tenure of Bush EPA Administrator 
Christine Todd Whitman and may have hastened her regulation. See, e.g., Christine Todd Whitman: 
The End of the Road, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 48 (discussing Administrator Whitman’s 
relationship with President Bush). 
293 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (rejecting EPA’s refusal to make a cause-
or-contribute finding for GHGs). The tension between the Bush White House and EPA produced 
several interpretations of the CAA that were overturned by the courts, but are beyond the scope of 
this Article. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 565-66 (2007) (rejecting 
EPA’s decision that certain repair and maintenance activities are not “modifications” that trigger 
emissions limits under the statute); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding 
EPA’s decision to regulate mercury emissions from power plants as a non-toxic pollutant 
inconsistent with the statute). 
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FERC and the White House on these issues. When agency leadership, 
agency staff, the White House, and powerful interest groups are all aligned, 
the agency will be in a position to act boldly.  
At the same time, there are both internal and external checks on reckless 
action. Our examples show that even in the absence of a credible threat that 
Congress will override their decisions, agencies still tread carefully. Perhaps 
this is because even when Congress is unlikely to legislate, congressional 
committees—and even powerful lone members—can conduct oversight 
hearings, order investigations, threaten to cut appropriations, and introduce 
disapproval resolutions, all of which can distract and drain both the agency 
and the White House. Rather than acting with impunity, both EPA and 
FERC in our examples looked for opportunities to engage in strategic 
moderation, paring back their proposals in anticipation of, or in response to, 
strong interest group and congressional reactions. EPA amassed a volumi-
nous scientific record to support its endangerment finding; sought the auto 
industry’s buy-in for its Tailpipe Rule; made a de-regulatory move with the 
Tailoring Rule; and reconsidered its initial standard for new power plants to 
mitigate at least some risk. In designing its rule for existing power plants—
its boldest move yet—EPA did go out on a limb, but took pains to set 
standards on a sliding scale in response to state differences. It also tried to 
diffuse what could be an explosive fight over federalism by affording states 
maximum compliance flexibility. Likewise, FERC’s efforts to manage the 
transition to modern electricity markets have stopped short of pushing the 
outer boundaries of its authority—abandoning its standard market design 
and market behavior rules for electricity markets, declining to require 
unbundling of transmission and generation rates in retail markets, and 
encouraging but not requiring states to join RTOs.  
Nor have these regulatory efforts been stealthy. The agencies have not 
sought to avoid detection by Congress, the public, or the courts. To the 
contrary, in both policy domains the President or the agency head, or both, 
has telegraphed the larger enterprise well in advance, practically begging 
Congress to act. And every step of the implementation process has been 
highly visible and broadly participatory. EPA and FERC have both pro-
ceeded to make policy through notice-and-comment rulemaking and in 
some instances have taken extreme efforts to secure input from interest 
groups, policy experts, and the public.294  
 
294 For a description of this process, see Carbon Pollution Standards, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/ 
carbon-pollution-standards/, archived at http://perma.cc/5CQ6-S3CD, which explains EPA’s 
proposals to reduce carbon pollution and inviting members of the public to participate in the 
regulatory process. 
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Furthermore, despite moving into new regulatory ground, both agencies 
also appear to have been meaningfully constrained by their own readings of 
the enabling statutes and by anticipation of judicial review. Agency political 
appointees do not operate in a vacuum but are guided by their general 
counsel and by career attorneys with long-term institutional perspective. 
Especially for controversial rules, agencies take pains to develop their legal 
strategies to ensure they are as robust as possible and likely to withstand 
attack. It is not hard to imagine then that agencies sometimes pare back or 
abandon initial proposals deemed too risky and that some tempting but 
problematic strategies never get off the ground.295 Also, because they are 
repeat players, appearing before a limited number of judges over time, 
agencies have an incentive to assess their prospects of success carefully and 
not to take needless risks that could prove embarrassing, in order to protect 
their institutional reputation in the courts.296 Even if an agency chooses to 
ignore all of those incentives in a particular case, there is an additional check 
on agency zealousness, which has proved remarkably effective and stable 
across administrations: mandatory regulatory review by the White House 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). As scholars have 
noted, when overseeing agency cost-benefit analyses required by Executive 
Order 12,291, OIRA has tended to press agencies to weaken, rather than 
strengthen, regulations out of concern about high regulatory costs.297 Thus, 
even when political staff in the White House and officials in an administra-
tive agency agree on the direction of policy, specific proposals must still be 
 
295 For example, in contrast to the approach taken by EPA and FERC, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) has been reluctant to deploy the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to 
address GHG pollution under section 7, which prohibits federal agencies from engaging in actions 
that will “jeopardize” listed species. FWS could have taken the position that this “jeopardy” 
prohibition requires federal agencies to grant permits for carbon-intensive projects, such as oil and 
gas exploration, only on the condition that applicants mitigate their GHG emissions. Yet the legal 
difficulty in adapting the ESA for this purpose was apparently too great. The burden of linking 
GHG emissions from, say, a particular oil and gas well to the melting polar ice caps that imperil 
the polar bear’s survival—not to mention the need for appropriate mitigation measures—would be 
daunting. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, What the Law and Lawyers Can and Cannot Do About Global 
Warming, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 33, 42 (2007) (observing that GHG lawsuits brought 
under common law theories “involve massive causation problems”). 
296 See David S. Tatel, Remarks, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2010) (providing a judicial perspective on agency rulemaking). 
Even if temporary political appointees wish to take significant legal risks, career lawyers in the 
government should be expected to push back. 
297 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1269-70 (2006) (describing the asymmetrical OIRA review that prefers 
underregulation to overregulation).  
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cost-justified, which at least traditionally has served as a meaningful con-
straint on agency regulatory action.298  
In our examples, FERC and EPA seem to have behaved in ways that 
reflect an appreciation for the new strategic policymaking environment—
one in which Congress as a body is largely absent and in which there is a 
premium on alignment with the President. They have pursued their ver-
sions of the “best possible” policy response not recklessly, but keenly aware 
of the “gridlock interval” and mindful of the constraints of their enabling 
statutes. Yet there is no question that the agencies have at times acted 
boldly and have taken significant risks. The courts will be the ultimate 
arbiters of these adaptive efforts, which means that judges will determine the 
policy course for all intents and purposes during periods of congressional 
dysfunction. This raises the question of whether courts should approach 
judicial review of agency action differently in this new strategic environment.  
B. Judicial Review in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction 
It is hard to know what courts think about statutory “obsolescence” and 
congressional dysfunction because judges do not typically reflect on it 
explicitly in their opinions. Their views on such matters tend to be subsumed 
in their approaches to statutory interpretation and their tendencies when 
applying the Chevron doctrine.299 Some judges might feel a heightened 
burden to scrutinize agency interpretations of outdated laws carefully, on 
the assumption that these are precisely the conditions under which agencies 
 
298 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2014) 
(commenting on the de-regulatory force exerted by OIRA, even during a Democratic administra-
tion that has publicly stated its support for environmental protection and public health). Cost-
benefit analysis may not serve as a constraint on agency action where the social cost of carbon 
(SCC) is included in the calculation, though, as in case of regulations targeting GHG emissions. 
The SCC, which OIRA requires all federal agencies to use, counts the global benefits of avoided 
emissions, not simply domestic benefits. Accordingly, the SCC will systematically overstate the 
benefits of a regulation to the U.S. population, skewing decisions in favor of more stringent 
regulation. See Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Benefits 
8-16, 18 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-20, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446522. 
299 Of course, the Chevron doctrine specifies that when reviewing agency interpretations of 
enabling legislation, courts should engage in a two-step analysis: at step one, determine whether 
the enabling statute speaks plainly to the question at issue; if not, at step two, determine whether 
the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). All of the agency decisions described in this paper involve EPA interpre-
tations of the CAA or FERC interpretations of the FPA. Therefore, judicial review of those 
decisions will invoke the Chevron doctrine.  
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will be tempted to scour mouseholes for elephants.300 Other judges might 
be inclined to defer to agencies struggling in good faith to adapt obsolete 
laws to new conditions, giving them the benefit of the doubt at least where 
the statutory language is plausibly ambiguous. In a few recent cases, both 
conservative and liberal judges have openly acknowledged problems of bad 
fit and appeared to sympathize with the agencies’ plight.301 Still, it is 
unclear whether such sentiments affect votes in particular cases. 
How should the courts respond to this new strategic environment in 
which Congress plays a diminishing role in the process of updating legal 
regimes to address new regulatory problems? Should they interpret the 
agencies’ authority narrowly to spur a dormant Congress into action? Or 
should they acknowledge the limits of Congress’s ability to act—and a 
gridlock interval that is wider than at any time in the modern regulatory 
era—and grant agencies wide latitude to fashion policy remedies to new 
problems from old statutory language? What are the implications of both 
approaches for democratic accountability in policymaking? And how do the 
applicable standards of judicial review of agency decisions influence the 
courts’ choices?  
C. Democratic Accountability Concerns  
Whether democratic accountability is served by granting agencies more 
latitude is a more complicated question than it appears at first blush. One 
 
300 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (noting that Congress does 
not “hide elephants in mouseholes”); see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 
S. Ct. 1836, 1842 (2012) (commenting that relying on sparse statutory language to support the 
agency’s position was like “hoping that a new batboy will change the outcome of the World 
Series”). 
301 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 16:19, Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Nos. 13-1674, 13-1676, 13-
2052, 13-2262 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014), available at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2013/sk.11-
3421.11-3421_04_10_2013.mp3 (acknowledging the bad fit between the statute and contemporary 
energy markets); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Nos. 13-1674, 13-1676, 13-2052, 13-2262, 
slip op. at 22, 28 (7th Cir. June 25, 2014) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (commenting that because of the 
challenge FERC faces in approving regional cost allocation schemes to site new transmission lines, 
FERC “has my sympathy as well as my respect” and arguing that FERC should be allowed to “be 
creative in addressing these unprecedented problems”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, 39, 
43, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., No. 12-1182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2013) (showing that 
Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Kennedy acknowledge the challenge for EPA in addressing interstate 
pollution within the terms of the statute and suggesting why deference may be appropriate); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1322) (recording Judge Sentelle’s response to counsel’s claim that 
Congress would respond if the court ruled in petitioners’ favor, “[w]ith respect, Counsel, any 
sentence that begins . . . by saying that [‘]Congress will surely,[’] whatever the sentence says 
after that, it’s not a very convincing sentence”). 
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might argue that by cabining an agency’s freedom to devise new policy 
solutions from old statutes, a reviewing court engages in laudable “democracy-
forcing.” In this view, a vote against agency “overreach” allocates more policy 
decisions to the elected branches and fewer to unelected bureaucrats. One 
might support this position on formal constitutional grounds (because 
Congress alone possesses Article I lawmaking power), on standard demo-
cratic legitimacy grounds (because members of Congress are elected and 
agency officials are not),302 or out of simple pragmatism (because one 
believes that even well-intended “adaptation” is likely to create a costly, 
ineffective regulatory mess and undermine the agency’s legitimacy in the 
process).303 
Certainly, agency policymaking does change the policy status quo facing 
Congress and, in the long term, can alter expectations, create new entitle-
ments, reallocate burdens and benefits, and shift incentives.304 In this way, 
the agency “adaptations” we examined above may prove quite durable, 
altering conditions in ways that are hard for Congress to disrupt later. EPA’s 
regulatory initiatives to adapt the CAA to climate change are intended, in 
part, to support natural gas substitution for coal in the electricity sector, 
spurring long-lived investments in new generation that will likely remain 
operational for decades. American electric utilities are poised to make two 
trillion dollars in infrastructure investments in the near term,305 and these 
investments will be influenced by the perception that new coal-fired electric 
power generation is increasingly uneconomic, not just for market but also 
for regulatory reasons. Similarly, FERC’s attempts to incentivize transmis-
sion investment, if successful, will yield changes to the electric grid that will 
last for decades, if not centuries. Furthermore, agencies may create new 
institutional structures that could prove “sticky” once established. Indeed, 
RTOs—nurtured by FERC in its effort to centralize control over transmis-
sion planning and to supervise the efficient operation of competitive 
wholesale energy markets—represent an important new governance struc-
ture in electricity markets, one ushered into existence by FERC rather than 
legislation. One might argue that only Congress ought to possess the 
 
302 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 
764 (2007) (arguing that judicial intervention is needed to ensure accountability when agencies 
ignore the wishes of Congress and the public ).  
303 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 229-30 (2006) (highlighting 
unnecessary complexity). 
304 Indeed, this is the essence of the notion of policy drift. See supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text. 
305 See Cavanagh, supra note 118, at 3. 
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capacity to produce such durable change and that courts ought to be skepti-
cal when reviewing agency attempts to fit old statutes to new problems. 
That view, however, treats Congress as a permanent but static construct. 
In fact, when courts review the consistency of agency policy choices with 
the underlying enabling legislation, they must consider two congresses—the 
Congress that passed the enabling legislation in question and the current 
Congress, which may or may not be moved to pass legislation. It is not  
self-evident that shifting more decisions about how to implement old 
statutes to the current Congress is more “democratic” than leaving those 
decisions with the agency until Congress affirmatively chooses to speak 
through bicameralism and presentment.306 To the contrary, as explained in Part 
II and the Appendix, the problem of bad fit arises in the first place because 
polarization has caused the gridlock interval to grow so wide that changes to 
the policy status quo—including changes that would move policy toward the 
ideological center—become impossible.307 In any event, the current Congress 
has no greater claim to decide how existing statutory language applies to new 
problems (indeed, how would it do so?), unless and until it passes legislation, 
than does the agency that has been entrusted with the statute by an earlier 
Congress. Indeed, because the agency has been designated the statute’s 
custodian, the agency’s claim is arguably the democratically superior one. 
That is, broad delegations of authority to agencies (and broad constructions of 
that authority by the agency subsequently) are consistent with democratic 
accountability because they represent a collective decision by the elected 
branch to leave certain policy choices to expert agencies.  
The question is whether the agency’s best judgment or the status quo 
should be the default policy during periods of congressional dysfunction. 
Those who favor the latter course sometimes contend that the American 
policymaking process is designed for gridlock; indeed, Justice Scalia is 
credited with holding this view.308 This is a fairly common refrain,309 perhaps 
 
306 But see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 41-42, 151-55 (2008) (arguing 
that default rules of statutory construction should favor the preferences of the current Congress—
or at least elicit the preferences of the current Congress). 
307 Indeed, assuming the public continues to support the agency’s mission, agencies may be 
more likely than Congress to produce outcomes that are consistent with the wishes of the median 
voter generally. For an explanation of this logic, see David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, 
Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 420 (2002) (pointing out that “information advantages” and 
partial political insulation make agencies more effective agents for the median voter).  
308 Bob Cohn, Scalia: Our Political System Is ‘Designed for’ Gridlock, ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2011, 10:25 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/10/scalia-our-political-system-is-designed-for-
gridlock/246257, archived at http://perma.cc/822N-V6RD; Justice Scalia Rejects Dysfunctional Govern-
ment Talk, REUTERS, Oct. 5, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-usa-court-
scalia-idUSTRE7946LB20111005. 
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because Federalist No. 10 holds such a lofty position in American civics 
education. As many scholars have noted, however, this view oversimplifies the 
Framers’ intent.310 Yes, the Framers feared the mischiefs of faction, but they 
also sought to replace a dysfunctional government under the Articles of 
Confederation with a more efficient government. Reflecting this goal, in 
Federalist No. 58, James Madison rejects the requirement of a supermajority 
to enact legislation (the current de facto rule in the Senate), arguing that 
“the fundamental principle of free [g]overnment would be reversed” under 
such a system because such a system would empower the minority to “take 
advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general 
weal.”311 Similarly, in Federalist No. 22, Hamilton denounces supermajority 
requirements as likely to “embarrass the administration [and] to destroy the 
energy of [g]overnment.”312 Hamilton notes that  
[w]hen the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to 
the doing of any [n]ational act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, 
because nothing improper will be likely to be done; but we forget how much 
good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power 
of hindering the doing what may be necessary and of keeping affairs in the 
same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular 
periods.313 
This does not sound like a celebration of the virtues of legislative gridlock or 
a sanctification of the status quo in the face of gridlock.314 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson,315 which held that the FDA lacked the authority to regulate 
 
309 See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 6 (1963) (“[O]ur system was designed for deadlock and inaction.”); 
ROBERT SHOGAN, THE FATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA’S ROCKY ROAD TO POLITICAL 
STALEMATE 5-8 (1998) (discussing the Framers’ efforts to create a government that was both 
robust and constrained). 
310 See, e.g., SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLA-
TIVE GRIDLOCK 7-11 (2003) (arguing that the Framers did not favor gridlock); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110-18 (2013) (describing the 
value of gridlock and of overcoming gridlock).  
311 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 409 ( James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1864). 
312 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1864). 
313 Id. at 144-45 (second emphasis added); see also Charles O. Jones, A Way of Life and Law, 
AM. POL. SCI. REV., Mar. 1995, at 1, 3 (“[T]he point was not solely to stop the bad from 
happening; it was to permit the good, or even the middling, to occur as well.”). 
314 John Rohr has made a careful and persuasive argument that administrative agencies now 
serve the deliberative function that the Framers envisioned for the Senate. JOHN A. ROHR, TO 
RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 32-39 (1986). That 
is, agencies may do a better job than a polarized Congress of producing policy decisions that 
correspond to the preferences of a fully informed median voter. 
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tobacco under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).316 The agency’s 
view—that the definition of “drug” in the FDCA encompasses nicotine and 
that the phrase “drug delivery device” encompasses tobacco—was struck 
down by the Court as precluded by the statute, notwithstanding the literal 
breadth of the definitional terms.317 The Court inferred an intent on the 
part of the enacting Congress and subsequent congresses to exclude nicotine 
and tobacco from the statutory definitions because those congresses were 
aware of tobacco and its unhealthy properties and addressed those issues in 
a series of other statutory enactments over time.318 The Court inferred from 
Congress’s behavior a statutory meaning that contradicted the FDA’s reading 
of the statute. By contrast, the Massachusetts v. EPA court distinguished Brown 
& Williamson, noting that no comparable legislative record precluded GHG 
regulation by EPA.319  
The Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson has been described as  
“democracy-forcing” because it embraces the view that Congress should 
speak clearly if it wishes to grant regulatory authority to agencies over 
matters of great social and economic importance.320 Indeed, one might 
argue that this presumption was vindicated by events: democracy was in fact 
forced. Nine years after the Court’s decision, Congress passed a law expressly 
granting the agency authority to regulate nicotine321 and authorizing a 
 
315 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
316 Id. at 131-33 (finding that the scope of the FDCA is not ambiguous and that the FDA had 
exceeded clear limits on its statutory authority). 
317 Id. at 127, 160-61.  
318 Id. at 143-56 (arguing that Congress “effectively ratified the FDA’s previous position that 
it lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco” by passing numerous pieces of tobacco legislation that did 
not grant the FDA explicit authority to regulate tobacco products). 
319 549 U.S. 497, 530-31 (2007). 
320  In other cases, the Court has opined similarly that Congress does not “hide elephants in 
mouseholes,” requiring much clearer statements from Congress. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001) (“Congress 
must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives . . . .”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 
AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the 
determination . . . to agency discretion . . . through such a subtle device . . . .”); cf. John F. 
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 227 (2001) 
(arguing that the Brown & Williamson court read the statute narrowly to avoid a nondelegation 
problem); Sunstein, supra note 303, at 245 (arguing that “those who are enthusiastic about the 
nondelegation doctrine” will favor the decision “because it requires Congress, rather than agencies, 
to decide critical questions of policy”). 
321 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C. (2012)). Moreover, it would 
be misleading to assume from the tobacco example that Congress would have acted eventually had 
the agency exhibited more patience. The FDA’s concerted effort to respond to changed conditions 
profoundly altered the terms of the public debate. Had the FDA not conducted an investigation of 
the industry, exposing its manipulation of nicotine levels; had it not supported its jurisdictional 
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regulatory program similar to the one the FDA originally proposed. Yet that 
congressional response is the exception that proves the rule in the era of 
ever widening gridlock intervals. If in the usual case there is little prospect 
of congressional action as a result of extreme polarization, there is no 
democracy to force in the Brown & Williamson sense, and either the agency’s 
preferred view, or the courts’, sets policy in the interim.322 In other words, 
the normative commitment to democracy-forcing is based on a flawed 
empirical assumption about the probability of congressional action. The 
logic of gridlock intervals simply belies the idea that by rejecting an agency’s 
interpretation, a court will “force” Congress to act. At the same time, the 
logic of gridlock intervals suggests that agencies will not stray too far from 
the ideological center, for if they do, Congress is more likely respond.323  
Returning to our examples, the Supreme Court may ultimately deem 
unlawful steps EPA has taken to implement the CAA to address climate 
change or invalidate important measures FERC has adopted to modernize 
electricity policy under the FPA, on the theory that doing so will force 
democracy. But the data on polarization suggest there is little prospect of 
congressional action in the reasonably foreseeable term (and of course the 
agencies have already been waiting for Congress to speak on these matters 
for, in some cases, decades). Meanwhile, the forgone social and economic 
benefits of waiting for Congress—what might be called the temporal costs of 
democracy-forcing—could be substantial. This is just to say that invalidating 
an agency’s adaptive plan and leaving matters to Congress is not neutral; it 
restores a status quo that over time might prove very costly to society. 
Moreover, our examples suggest that the agencies in question are anything 
but “out of control.” Perhaps because the stakes are so high, agencies in 
 
argument with compelling new science showing nicotine is addictive; and had the agency not 
forced the issue by promulgating regulations itself, Congress might never have been moved to act. 
The same may be true of EPA’s implementation of the CAA to address climate change, and 
FERC’s commitment to modernizing electricity policy; even if important aspects of these 
programs are ultimately struck down, they may lay the necessary foundation for future congres-
sional action.  
322 Moreover, because the Supreme Court grants review in so few cases, it also means that 
the circuit courts, and in particular the D.C. Circuit, have the final say on federal policy across a 
number of domains. See Adam Liptak, Justices Opt for Fewer Cases, and Professors and Lawyers Ponder 
Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A18 (explaining that the Supreme Court hears around eighty 
cases each term).  
323 Polarized parties cannot come together to support changes to the status quo that move 
policy away from the preferences of everyone in one party and toward those of everyone in the 
other party: if the majority party is opposed, it will use agenda control to prevent consideration of 
such changes; if the minority is opposed, it will filibuster. But if the agency produces a policy 
status quo that is outside the gridlock interval (so far from the middle that critical masses of both 
parties would prefer to see it changed), then Congress will be moved to action.  
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these situations do not necessarily seek to maximize their regulatory reach. 
Instead, they demonstrate acute sensitivity to countervailing pressures and 
heightened responsiveness to legal and political risk. They do subtle and 
nimble things to maintain credibility and preserve their institutional 
reputations.324 Wary of the courts, mindful of the White House, and con-
scious of the damage even a dysfunctional Congress can do, agencies calibrate, 
accommodate, and moderate their policies. All of which suggests that perhaps 
courts should resist the temptation to equate consequential policy choices 
with choices that ought to be thrust back at Congress, even when Congress 
shows little appetite for policymaking. Indeed, it may be more “democratic” 
to defer during fallow legislative periods to the agencies, rather than revert 
to a judicially imposed and indefinite extension of the status quo. 
More concretely, the decision facing reviewing courts is whether, under 
Chevron, an agency’s increasingly innovative interpretations of the relevant 
statutory terms are consistent with the statute’s plain meaning or are 
reasonable. Chevron is grounded at least in part in the Wilsonian view of 
agency policymaking, which recognizes that agencies have the best infor-
mation about how enabling statutes should be interpreted325 and may even 
have the best information about the political and policy context in which 
those statutes were enacted.326 The Chevron decision counsels deference to 
agency decisions not only when the statute is ambiguous on the question at 
issue, but also when it is silent on the matter;327 the Court has noted that 
delegation “necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of 
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”328 The case for 
deference seems especially strong when agencies seek to address problems 
unforeseen by the enacting Congress. 
This is exactly what EPA and FERC have tried to do with the CAA and 
FPA, respectively. EPA’s decisions were made pursuant to its authority 
under the CAA, a relatively detailed enacting statute. The agency had to 
interpret numerous specific terms from different parts of the statute, such as 
“pollutant,” “source,” and “standard.”329 FERC’s authority comes, by 
contrast, from a relatively simple statute containing a broad grant of authority 
 
324 See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 4. 
325 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative 
Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1060 (1998) (arguing that interpretation of 
regulatory statutes is properly “an administrative task, not a judicial one”). 
326 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 209 (2006). 
327 Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
328 Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
329 See supra Section II.A. 
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to ensure that the price and terms at which electricity is transmitted and sold 
at wholesale are “just and reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory.”330 Yet both 
regulatory regimes offer the agency room to adapt the statutory provisions 
to new circumstances, and both sets of agency decisions seem to represent 
sincere attempts to fashion a solution to new problems from aging statutory 
authority. And as we have shown, both EPA and FERC interpreted their 
enabling statutes strategically but transparently—conducting broad outreach, 
crafting initial proposals with significant industry and interest group input, 
and adjusting their proposals in light of comments. The Court has recognized 
that when agencies make interpretive decisions using formal, transparent 
processes, as EPA and FERC have done in our examples, the decisions are 
entitled to greater deference.331  
Thus far, courts have tended to be fairly deferential to these two agencies 
as they adapt their statutes to the problems we described, with a few 
important exceptions.332 With respect to all of the remaining pending 
reviews, the agencies can easily make straight-faced arguments that their 
policy choices fall within the boundaries of enabling legislation, despite the 
fit problems that arise when applying old statutes to new problems. That is, 
EPA’s and FERC’s policy choices seem to have been sincere attempts to use 
existing legislation to fashion solutions to problems within the agencies’ 
jurisdiction.  
 
330 See supra Section II.B. 
331 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume generally 
that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a 
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that 
should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic 
Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 555 (2006) (supporting this distinction between levels of 
deference for formal and informal actions on the grounds that agencies devote more resources to 
reaching the correct decision when using formal, transparent decision processes). 
332 The major exception was the Supreme Court’s decision overturning the Tailoring Rule, 
although, as we explained, the loss was limited and the Court did at least defer to EPA on the 
most important issue for the agency, which was whether sources triggered into the program 
anyway because of conventional pollution had to control their GHGs as well. See supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. Significant setbacks for FERC include the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Piedmont, overturning FERC’s interpretation of its backstop transmission line siting authority 
under FPA section 216, see Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 319-20 (4th 
Cir. 2009), and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Electric Power Supply Ass’n, overturning FERC’s 
demand response rule, see Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486, slip op. at 16 (D.C. Cir. 
May 23, 2014). 
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Nonetheless, as others have noted,333 Chevron offers reviewing courts 
ample opportunity to use both of Chevron’s steps instrumentally to achieve 
preferred policy outcomes or to vindicate a judge’s notion of the proper role 
of the bureaucracy in the constitutional order. One might imagine a left-
leaning judge reacting skeptically to the notion that the FPA’s just and 
reasonable standard implies the broad use of market-based wholesale power 
rates and basing his or her decision on the inferred intent of the 1935 
Congress. Alternatively, one might imagine a conservative judge reacting 
skeptically to the notion that EPA can compel the use of carbon capture at 
coal-fired power plants as an “adequately demonstrated” technology, or that 
it can set emission standards for existing sources based on what other actors, 
not just the sources themselves, could do. To a conservative jurist, both 
might seem unreasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in UARG split along such ideological lines, 
between the conservative majority, which rejected EPA’s Tailoring Rule, and 
a liberal minority that would have upheld it.334  
These ideological differences in the way judges apply Chevron deference 
now have higher stakes than ever, because courts cannot count on Congress 
to sort out the effects of overturning agency policy decisions. Moreover, if 
polarization trends continue, courts can expect to see more and more cases 
reviewing agency adaptations of old statutes to new problems. For some of 
the pending issues in our sample, reversal of the agency decision would 
invite more litigation because of the ways in which the statute links differ-
ent parts of the regulatory regime.335 This is particularly true of EPA’s 
interrelated efforts to address climate change; any loss, even a narrow one, is 
likely to invite litigation challenging other aspects of EPA’s climate change 
program.336  
 
333 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An  
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 842-51 (2006) (suggesting a correlation 
between judges’ ideology and their applications of Chevron to agency decisions). 
334 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1146 (U.S. June 24, 2014). The Chief Justice, 
Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia’s opinion that GHGs 
were not “any air pollutant” for purposes of triggering the program. Justice Breyer, writing for 
himself, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Kagan, and Justice Sotomayor, would have deferred to the 
agency’s view by reading an implicit exception into the phrase “any source with the potential to 
emit 250 tons per year,” excluding smaller sources for which regulation at that threshold would be 
absurd. See id. at slip op. 7 (Breyer J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
335 For a discussion of these links, see supra Section III.A. 
336 Losing even on a single narrow issue is still losing: a rebuke from the Court would surely 
be seen as a political setback as the agency prepares to roll out the rest of its GHG program. In 
recent years, EPA has suffered some notable losses in the High Court, including the rejection of its 
use of unreviewable compliance orders under the Clean Water Act in Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 
1374 (2012), which allowed an Administrative Procedure Act challenge to an EPA compliance order.  
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It is hard to predict the trajectory of cases that might fall within the 
“bad fit” category. Although we have focused here on examples from the 
energy and environmental law domains, as we noted at the outset, many 
regulatory agencies are similarly struggling to keep pace with new trends 
and must find a way to respond to the demands of modern policymaking in 
spite of aging statutes. In the wake of Brown & Williamson,337 recent years 
have brought us MCI v. AT&T, in which the Supreme Court invalidated 
the FCC’s effort to promote competition in the increasingly fragmented 
telecommunication industry because the FCC’s interpretation of the word 
“modify” went too far.338 Similarly, in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit 
struck down the FCC’s “net neutrality” rules (compelling broadband 
providers to adhere to open network management practices) because 
although the FCC has general authority to regulate in the area, it lacks the 
specific authority to adopt its chosen strategy.339 At the same time, the 
Supreme Court in City of Arlington v. FCC clarified that agency interpreta-
tions of their own jurisdiction are subject to Chevron review, reaffirming the 
notion that agencies (not courts) are best-suited to decide what their 
enabling legislation means in the face of gaps and ambiguities.340 All of 
these cases appear to have been decided ad hoc, with little concern for the 
challenges agencies confront in the strategic environment we have  
described. Yet in this new environment, the case for deferring to the 
agencies as they struggle to adapt statutes is stronger than ever. As courts 
are well aware, their decisions are likely to determine policy outcomes for 
the foreseeable future, with Congress absent from the policymaking process.  
CONCLUSION 
It is axiomatic that Congress cannot anticipate all of the ways in which 
an agency must apply its statutory mandate,341 and Congress sometimes 
chooses not to address particular applications of the mandate in the enabling 
legislation.342 Consequently, the agency’s implementation of the mandate 
may eventually deviate from either the enacting Congress’s wishes or from 
 
337 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see also supra note 315 
and accompanying text. 
338 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). 
339 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
340 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013). 
341 This is inherent in the task of writing a rule. Even the wisest legislator cannot anticipate 
every situation to which legislation will eventually apply. 
342 That is, it may be possible to maintain a legislative majority in support of the legislation 
only if the legislation omits provisions addressing particular policy issues. Consequently, the only 
way to secure passage of legislation is by delegating those decisions to agencies. 
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the wishes of subsequent congresses. We are concerned here with both 
forms of divergence. The first poses problems of statutory interpretation; the 
second implicates the politics of the policy process and the question of 
whether the current Congress will overturn the agency.  
As to the second form of divergence, for most of the modern regulatory 
era, as conditions diverged more and more from those anticipated by the 
drafters of the legislation, Congress could be moved to update the law, as 
Congress did when it amended the CAA several times between 1970 and 
1990, or when it revised the FPA in 1978 and 1992. This is no longer true, 
for reasons we have explained. Today, we face environmental and energy 
problems that are at least as pressing as those of the 1970s. Pressure to 
address at least some of these problems may be building.343 But the starkest 
difference between the 1970s and now is that the partisan political environ-
ment is far less conducive to legislation. The problem is not simply one of 
unified or divided partisan control of the branches of government, but 
rather one of ideological polarization between the parties. The unprece-
dentedly wide and widening gridlock interval makes bipartisan action to 
address important problems ever more difficult.  
Still, change continues apace in the environmental and energy fields, 
and while Congress absents itself from policymaking, the need to make 
policy choices continues. Since the mid-1990s, evidence about how our 
energy use produces carbon pollution that contributes to climate change has 
coalesced into a scientific consensus. At the same time, electricity markets 
have seen the rise of competitive, robust wholesale power markets, technolog-
ical advances, and the penetration of renewable technologies. As the agen-
cies charged with primary responsibility for managing these challenges, 
EPA and FERC have tried to discharge their statutory responsibilities with 
very little help from Congress.344  
Their efforts have yielded a suite of new policies, all fashioned from old 
statutory provisions that were not drafted with these new problems in mind. 
The policies reflect an appreciation for the new strategic environment of 
 
343 See Frederick Mayer et al., Americans Think the Climate Is Changing and Support Some  
Actions fig.2 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Duke Univ., Policy Brief 13-01, 2013), available 
at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-01_0.pdf (presenting poll 
data showing that sixty-four percent of Americans strongly or somewhat favor regulating GHGs); 
see also Tracking Public Attitudes—Latest Polls, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK, 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/hot-topics/climate-polling (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NWD2-BCR8 (collecting climate change polls). 
344 Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that over the last twenty years, Congress has 
been losing the ability to react legislatively to these changed circumstances or the policy choices 
EPA and FERC are making, riven by growing ideological and partisan polarization. 
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agency policymaking; they belie the public choice conception of agency 
policymaking as anti-democratic and of agencies as shirkers to be reined in 
by the courts. Unlike Judge Calabresi, we are not nearly as dismissive of the 
capacity of administrative agencies to adapt obsolete statutes responsibly to 
new circumstances. Indeed, we think they are in a far better position than 
courts to do so. There are many positives to agency statutory adaptation 
over time. Although the regulatory process may at times be glacial, agencies 
can move more quickly than Congress, and they face fewer obstacles or 
veto-gates to action. Moreover, agencies are subject-matter specialists 
organized around a specified mission, and they are equipped with relevant 
expertise, enabling them to adjust to changed circumstances more nimbly 
than Congress. At least in our examples, the agencies have applied scientific, 
economic, and technical expertise to emerging problems, and they are 
experimenting with different regulatory approaches. Entrusting statutes to 
agencies for certain periods of time could produce valuable learning about 
which policies tend to succeed, which tend to fail, and why. 
In terms of accountability, agencies are anything but out of control. 
Courts check them more than adequately (the threat of judicial review alone 
performs a disciplinary function) and presidents direct them in response to 
demands from a national constituency. In addition, agencies can still be 
expected to be at least somewhat responsive to congressional oversight even 
when it is well-known that Congress is unlikely to pass legislation. Our 
examples bear this out. Even if courts do not relish reviewing increasing 
numbers of agency decisions that fit enabling legislation awkwardly or 
poorly, judicial review of those decisions ought to be deferential not only in 
recognition of Chevron but also in light of the new strategic environment in 
which agencies operate.  
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APPENDIX: GRIDLOCK AND POLARIZATION 
In this appendix we explain in more detail: (1) the logic behind the 
claims that ideological polarization in Congress increases the probability of 
gridlock and decreases the capacity of Congress to take legislative action in 
response to changing circumstances; and (2) the evidence of increasing 
ideological polarization (and corresponding increasing probability of 
gridlock) in Congress in recent decades.  
Models of Gridlock 
Two competing explanations of congressional (in)action offer different 
explanations for gridlock, though each ties the problem to increasing 
ideological polarization among members of Congress and the electorate at 
large. The pivotal politics theory (associated with Keith Krehbiel and 
others) focuses on the importance of supermajoritarian institutions in 
Congress (like the Senate requirement of sixty votes to invoke cloture and 
stop filibusters or the requirement of a two-thirds vote of Congress to 
override a presidential veto) and the power those institutions give to certain 
pivotal members of Congress.345 By contrast, the party cartel theory346 
(associated with Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins) credits the role of 
parties, particularly as agenda setters, with driving legislative voting behav-
ior—including gridlock. Each of these theories can be illustrated simply 
using spatial models, or abstracted visual depictions used to convey the 
theory’s central insights.347  
Pivotal Politics 
We can use spatial models to illustrate the pivotal politics theory in 
steps. We begin with Figure A-1, which depicts the preferences, or ideal 
points, of legislators (in an eleven-member legislative body) over alternatives 
 
345 See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 
20-48 (1998). 
346 See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RE-
SPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005). 
347 Some people find these kinds of abstractions useful, as they distill a complex situation to 
its essence. Others find these models less useful, precisely because they omit the complicating 
forces and variables at work in the real world. We use spatial models here to depict these two 
competing explanations of gridlock, in part because the proponents of the two theories use spatial 
models and in part because they provide a visual illustration of the central concepts in a way some 
might find helpful. 
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along a policy dimension.348 In this legislature, simple majority votes 
determine outcomes, there are no political parties, and each legislator votes 
for or against policy proposals depending upon whether those proposals 
would move policy closer to, or farther from, her ideal point. If all decisions 
in this legislature are made by simple majority vote, the pivotal voter should 
be the median voter, denoted mv in the figure. In the absence of presidential 
vetoes or the possibility of a filibuster, the preferences of the median voter 
ought to drive the policy choices of this legislature.349 If the status quo in 
any particular policy lies to the left or right of the median voter’s ideal 
point, any proposal to move policy toward the median voter’s preferences ought to 
garner a majority of the votes in the legislature, and thereby prevail. In Figure 
A-1, the legislators’ preferences are not particularly polarized, but rather are 
relatively evenly distributed across the ideological spectrum; under these 
assumptions, however, the median voter’s preferences would control out-
comes even if preferences were polarized.  
 
Figure A-1: Single-Issue Majority Voting,  
No Supermajoritarian Institutions,  
No Parties, and No Gridlock 
 
 
Now assume that this legislature has adopted the filibuster rule and that 
the filibuster can only be overcome by a vote of sixty percent of the legisla-
ture (seven members), akin to the process of invoking cloture in the U.S. 
Senate. For any status quo policy that lies to the left or the right of the 
median voter, but no farther away than the ideal point of the immediately 
adjacent legislator on each side of mv, we can expect a filibuster to successfully 
 
348 This approach assumes that legislators’ preferences can be depicted as points distributed 
along a single dimension—e.g., liberal versus conservative or more stringent versus less stringent 
regulation of GHG emissions. These spatial models further assume the existence of a utility 
distribution around each legislator’s ideal point that reaches its peak at the ideal point; stated 
differently, they assume that the legislator’s utility over policy options declines as the distance 
between the ideal point in the policy option grows. In the parlance of spatial modeling, this 
depiction assumes that individual preferences are “single peaked.” In these models, voters seek 
policy outcomes at, or as close as possible to, their ideal points. 
349 This is true assuming single-issue voting. If the legislature were to face a vote on a pro-
posal that implicates several issue dimensions at once, the possibility of vote trading across issues 
means that any single issue outcome could diverge from the preferences of the median voter on 
that issue dimension.  
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block any new proposal to move the policy toward mv. To see why this is, 
consider Figure A-2. For any status quo policy that lies between mv and fL, 
all six of the legislators to the right of the status quo policy will support a 
proposal to move the policy to the right, and five will oppose it. If one of 
the opposing legislators filibusters the proposal, the legislature will be 
unable to muster the seven votes needed to invoke cloture to stop the 
filibuster. A mirror image phenomenon will arise for status quo policies that 
lie to the right of mv, such that no proposal to move policy toward the 
preferences of the median voter can be enacted when the status quo lies 
between fL and fR , the so-called “gridlock interval.”350  
 
Figure A-2: Pivotal Politics 
The Gridlock Intervals with Strong Middle, No Parties, But Filibuster 
 
 
Thus, the legislators at fL and fR become the filibuster pivots. The ideolog-
ical polarization of Congress over the last several decades has been widely 
documented,351 and as depicted in Figure A-3, it is easy to see how the size 
of the gridlock interval (the set of status quo policies that cannot be 
changed) grows when preferences within the legislature (the legislators’ 
ideal points) become more widely dispersed. As members of the legislature 
become more ideologically polarized, the status quo policy can persist even 
as the median voter’s preferences stray farther and farther from that status 
quo. As long as the status quo policy remains within the widening gap 
between the two pivotal legislators, fL and fR, the legislature will remain 
powerless to change it. In this configuration, the gridlock interval expands 
not because of political parties or party discipline, but simply because of the 
increasing ideological heterogeneity in Congress.352  
 
350 See KREHBIEL, supra note 345, at 34-39. 
351 For a full discussion of this phenomenon and the literature explaining it, see supra notes 
45-49 and accompanying text. 
352 Of course, ideology is a key determinant of partisan affiliation. We have already noted the 
ideological divergence between, and increasing ideological homogeneity within, American political 
parties. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 45, at 312-20. Indeed, parties may exacerbate these 
trends. See Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics, 
AM. POL. SCI. REV., May 2010, at 324, 324-27 (describing how party activists play a leading role 
in moving party rank-and-file away from the ideological middle and toward the poles—a process 
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Figure A-3:  Pivotal Politics 
The Gridlock Interval with Dispersed Preferences and No Parties 
 
 
From this simple insight, it is easy to see how divided government and 
the possibility of a presidential veto can further increase the size of the 
gridlock interval. In Figure A-4, assume that for a new policy to become 
law, it must be signed by the President and that a presidential veto can be 
overridden only by a two-thirds vote of the legislature (eight legislators). 
Note that the President’s ideal point, PL, lies farther from mv than the 
relevant filibuster pivot, in this case fR. This means that for any status quo 
policy between mv and vo, any proposal to move policy toward mv will be 
vetoed by the President, and the legislature will be unable to muster the 
eight votes necessary to override that veto. Since vo’s ideal point is even 
farther from mv than that of fR, the prospect of a veto further widens the 
gridlock interval. In this case, the gridlock interval expands to the right; of 
course, if the President’s preferences were sufficiently far to the left, it 
would expand in that direction.  
 
Figure A-4: Pivotal Politics 
The Gridlock Interval with Dispersed Preferences, No Parties, and Vetoes 
 
Thus, more generally, with ideological polarization in the legislature, the 
possibility of a filibuster and a presidential veto insulates a larger set of 
status quo policies from legislative change, even as the median voter’s 
preferences stray farther and farther from the status quo. If we assume that 
legislators’ ideal points reflect the preferences of their constituents, this 
 
the authors call “conflict extension”). In any case, the following Section depicts the potential 
influence of parties as causes of gridlock. 
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implies that policy lags behind voter preferences when the gridlock interval 
is wide.353  
Party Politics 
The introduction of parties into the model shows how party discipline 
can exacerbate the gridlock problem. Figure A-5 is identical to Figure A-2 
in that it depicts a legislature with relatively evenly distributed preferences 
(a strong middle), but differs from Figure A-2 in that the legislature is now 
divided into two (relatively) ideologically heterogeneous parties, a majority 
right party (with six members) and a minority left party (with five members). 
Let us first assume that the parties can (at least, sometimes) exert discipline 
over their members’ decisions, including decisions about whether to override 
a filibuster, such that the preferences of the median member of each party 
(depicted as points mL and mR in Figure A-5) will drive the behavior of all 
of the members of the party. This moves the filibuster pivots farther away 
from mv, expanding the gridlock interval. Now the gridlock interval covers 
the area from mL, the median left party voter, and mR, the median right 
party voter (depicted here as the midpoint between the third and fourth 
member of the right party354), an area significantly larger than the gridlock 
interval that existed without party discipline. These two points, mL and mR, 
represent the new filibuster pivot points when parties exert discipline over 
voting by their members. 
 
Figure A-5: Party Politics 
Gridlock Interval with Strong Middle, Filibuster, and Party Discipline 
 
We generally do not think of American political parties, however, as  
disciplined in this way; to the contrary, compared with parties in parliamen-
 
353 Of course, this raises a series of normative questions about the proper purpose—or  
performance—of the legislative policymaking process, questions that go to the Framers’ design of 
that process. One set of questions goes to theories of representation. Should the legislator’s ideal 
points reflect the current preferences of his or her median constituent? Or the median informed 
and interested constituent? Or should the legislator’s ideal point reflect what the median 
constituent would want if that constituent was fully informed about the issue? For discussion of 
these issues in the context of spatial modeling, see Spence & Cross, supra note 34, at 106-12.  
354 This assumes that the members of the right party will negotiate policy preferences that 
lie between the preferences of the third and fourth members of the six-member party.  
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tary systems, we think of them as relatively weak, exerting relatively little 
party discipline over voting behavior.355 Party leaders, however, do exert 
voting discipline on rare occasions, and according to some commentators, 
somewhat more frequently in the current era of ideological polarization.356 
Nevertheless, perhaps a more common way in which parties exacerbate 
gridlock is when the leadership of the majority party exerts control over the 
agenda. Agenda control can also expand the gridlock interval, even in the 
absence of party voting discipline. Both houses of Congress delegate agenda 
setting powers to committees; the chambers only consider bills reported to 
the floor by committee. Moreover, the House of Representatives delegates 
important agenda setting powers to its Rules Committee, which specifies 
the rules governing debate and amendment for bills that reach the floor in 
that chamber. According to the party cartel theory, the leaders and committee 
members holding these agenda setting powers act as fiduciaries of the party, 
such that they will “not use their official powers to push legislation that 
would pass on the floor against the wishes of most in their party.”357 One 
way to conceptualize this duty is to posit that it makes the median member 
of the majority party (but not the median minority party member) pivotal. 
This is because party members controlling the agenda will prevent the 
chamber from voting on proposals that would move policy away from the 
preferences of the median majority party member. Figure A-6 depicts this 
situation.358 This sort of logic produces a gridlock interval that is wider than 
in the absence of parties (Figure A-2), but not as wide as that depicted in 
Figure A-5 (where both parties exert voting discipline).359  
   
 
355 This argument is usually made in comparisons of American parties and European parties, 
or parties in Westminster systems. See, e.g., COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 346, at 29-31 
(ascribing discipline to institutions); Keith Krehbiel, Where’s the Party?, 23 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 
235, 260 (1993) (ascribing the relatively greater party discipline in parliamentary systems to 
greater ideological homogeneity of parties). 
356 The so-called “Hastert Rule,” named after former House Speaker Dennis Hastert, is that 
the majority should only bring to a vote bills supported by a majority of the majority party. In 
2013, Speaker John Boehner pledged to follow the Hastert Rule in managing the House of 
Representatives’s consideration of immigration reform bills. Molly K. Hooper, Boehner: I’m Not for 
a Comprehensive Solution, HILL, June 19, 2013, at 1. 
357 COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 346, at 9. 
358 In this instance, the left boundary of the gridlock interval is marked by the left-side  
filibuster pivot, and the right boundary is marked by the median voter in the (majority) right 
party. 
359 This depiction of the gridlock interval assumes that members continue to vote sincerely 
in response to motions to invoke cloture, rather than in response to party instructions. 
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Figure A-6: Party Politics 
Gridlock Interval with Strong Middle, Filibuster, and Agenda Control 
 
Naturally, if the parties become more ideologically polarized (and prefer-
ences within each party more homogenous), the gridlock interval attributable 
to party agenda control widens even more, as depicted in Figure A-7. 
Figure A-7 is identical to Figure A-3 except that party agenda control has 
moved the right-side pivot even farther to the right. If we assume once 
again that the majority party controls the agenda, and that it does so in 
ways that comport with the preferences of the median member of the 
majority party, the legislature will not be able to enact any proposals to 
move policy toward the middle as long as the status quo lies anywhere 
within this larger gridlock interval.  
 
Figure A-7: Party Politics 
Gridlock Interval with Dispersed Preferences and Agenda Control 
 
Thus, we can think of gridlock intervals as affecting the particular mix of 
conditions necessary to enact a law: when the gridlock interval is wider, 
fewer policy proposals will be able to navigate the process successfully, all 
else equal. Stated differently, legislation is more likely when the ideological 
environment within Congress is less polarized, all else equal. 
Polarization in Congress 
As already noted,360 the political science literature documents the  
increasing polarization of Congress (and, some argue, the electorate) over 
time in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, implying that the 
gridlock interval has grown substantially over that time. Using the so-called 
DW-NOMINATE data compiled and developed by Keith Poole and 
 
360 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
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Howard Rosenthal,361 it is possible to show how increased ideological 
homogeneity within the two major political parties (and a corresponding 
polarization between parties) has served to widen the gridlock interval.  
The Poole and Rosenthal data use congressional voting behavior to posi-
tion each member of each Congress in American history at a point along an 
ideological dimension—one which Poole and Rosenthal described as 
corresponding to the “liberal-conservative” dimension, particularly with 
respect to issues relating to government regulation of economic activity.362 
Each member of each Congress is assigned an ideological score ranging 
between -1 (most liberal) and 1 (most conservative).363 Using these ideology 
“scores,” one can examine over time the relative liberalism or conservatism 
of each party, the ideological distance between the parties, the percentage of 
moderates364 within Congress, and the percentage of ideological overlap 
between Democrats and Republicans.365 
Figures A-8 and A-9 illustrate the increasing polarization of Congress 
since the fertile environmental and energy legislative environment of the 
1970s. Figure A-8 shows the ideological positions of the mean Democrat and 
mean Republican in the House of Representatives over time. The widening 
ideological gap between the parties is evident.366 As already noted, there are 
several competing (and complementary) explanations for this trend,367 but it 
certainly supports the notion of a widening gridlock interval. These figures 
also illustrate that the lion’s share of that divergence can be ascribed to 
movement within the Republican Party toward greater conservatism. In any 
 
361 See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 45; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. The 
figures presented here were developed using data from Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 
VOTEVIEW, http://www.voteview.com/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RFM6-
THDL. 
362 Poole and Rosenthal actually position members of Congress along two dimensions, but it 
is this first dimension, left–right ideology, that they use to measure economic policy. 
363 For a full description of the methods used to develop these ideological positions, see 
Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 357 (1985), and Keith T. Poole, NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History, VOTEVIEW, 
http://voteview.com/nominate/nominate.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/V3YH-SVNC. For critical 
analyses of the Poole and Rosenthal typology, see, for example, SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY 
POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 17 n.8 (2008), which highlights potential problems with cross-
Congress comparisons. 
364 Poole and Rosenthal define moderates as those with ideological scores lying between -
0.25 and 0.25. 
365 We can measure “overlap” by looking at the percentage of Democrats whose ideological 
position falls to the right of at least one Republican, and the percentage of Republicans whose 
ideological position falls to the left of at least one Democrat. 
366 The Senate scores are not depicted here, but see Figure A-9, infra, for a measure of ideo-
logical divergence in the Senate over time.  
367 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
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case, the growing ideological gap supports the notion that the pivotal 
members of each party are likely to be farther apart now than they were in 
the 1970s. If ideology drives filibuster decisions, veto override decisions, and 
majority party agenda control decisions in the ways that spatial models 
suggest, the greater ideological polarization depicted here indicates that 
recent congresses ought to be less capable of responding to policy problems 
legislatively.  
 
Figure A-8: Mean Scores (Liberal–Conservative Dimension),  
House of Representatives, 1970–2011368 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-9 illustrates this same point a different way, by graphing the 
ideological distance between the parties (distance between the mean 
Democrat and the mean Republican) in both chambers over time. On this 
scale, the maximum possible ideological distance between the parties is two 
points (representing perfect polarization). In fact, the ideological distance 
between the party means in Congress has grown from about a half a point 
in 1970 to more than a point in the House and more than eight-tenths of a 
point in the Senate four decades later. The rate of divergence begins to 
increase more sharply in the early 1990s, just after passage of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990369 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992.370  
 
 
368 Once again, the Poole and Rosenthal data position members of Congress on a left–right 
scale ranging from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). 
369 Cf. supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text. 
370 Cf. supra notes 193-198 and accompanying text. 
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Figure A-9: Ideological Distance Between the Parties, 1970–2011 
 
Of course, the diverging ideology scores of the mean Democrat and the 
mean Republican are only one possible indicator of a widening gridlock 
interval. We might hypothesize that the presence of centrists can help 
overcome polarization between the parties because centrists can help bridge 
ideological divides and build legislative coalitions. Thus, legislation ought to 
be more likely when there are plenty of moderates in Congress—members 
of opposing parties who are nevertheless like-minded, willing to “reach 
across the aisle” to hammer out legislative bargains and “sell” the resulting 
bargain to members of their own party.371 Figures A-10 and A-11, though, 
document the disappearance of these cross-party potential bridge builders 
in Congress in recent decades. Figure A-10 depicts the percentage of 
moderates (those whose ideology scores fall between -0.25 and 0.25) in the 
Senate over the last four decades, showing a precipitous drop, particularly 
since the late 1970s.372  
 
 
  
 
371 At course, we might surmise that even when moderates are present, the sale of legislative 
bargains within the party becomes more difficult as the distance between the mean party members 
increases. 
372 The House of Representatives figures are not depicted here but show a similar  
phenomenon. 
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Figure A-10: Percentage of Moderates in the Senate, 1970–2011 
 
Figure A-11 looks for the presence of centrists in a different way by  
focusing on members of each party whose ideology overlaps with that of the 
opposing party. More specifically, Figure A-11 combines data from both 
chambers of Congress, adds the number of Democrats whose ideology scores 
lie to the right of at least one Republican to the number of Republicans whose 
ideology scores lie to the left of at least one Democrat, and expresses that 
total as a percentage of the total number of members. As is evident from the 
figure, a majority of the House and a near majority of the Senate fit this 
definition in the late 1970s. Since then, the percentage of overlapping 
members has fallen drastically. 
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Figure A-11: Percentage of Overlapping Members in Congress,  
1970–2011373 
Conclusion 
Over the last four decades, the parties have grown further apart ideolog-
ically in a number of ways. According to these data, the parties have grown 
more ideologically homogeneous; the average Republican is much more 
conservative, and the average Democrat slightly more liberal, than four 
decades ago. There are fewer moderates and overlapping members of 
Congress, suggesting that there are fewer members willing and able to build 
legislative coalitions across party lines. In spatial modeling terms, it appears 
that political polarization has made the gridlock interval much wider than it 
was in the heyday of environmental and energy legislation of the 1970s. All 
of this suggests that the political environment in Congress is less conducive 
to the enactment of legislation addressing problems of public concern now 
than at any time since 1970.  
 
373 Data drawn from Poole and Rosenthal’s Voteview.com, supra note 361. 
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